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PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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Translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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STUDY OF PRC SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FAR EAST INSTITUTE

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[Text] The Far East Institute (IDV) of the USSR Academy of Sciences was founded 15 years ago. Within a relatively short period of time, institute researchers have accomplished significant work in the study of regional problems and have made an important contribution to the investigation of current Chinese events. In this and subsequent issues, we will tell our readers about the main areas of institute research. The articles have been prepared by the corresponding divisions of the IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Problems in the socioeconomic development of the PRC are the central topic of scientific research at the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The investigation of these topics serves as a basis for scientifically sound criticism of the antisocialist, great-power policy of the Beijing leadership. The founding of the institute marked the commencement of a broad program of scientific research, conferences and the compilation of works and dissertations on the transition period in China, the state of production relations, the level and structure of productive forces and the stages and characteristics of economic policy.

When China's fundamental socioeconomic problems were being studied, it was necessary to rise to the level of broad-scale summarization and reveal the natural tendencies in Chinese development with the aid of Marxist-Leninist methodology. This became all the more important in the 1960's, when bourgeois and revisionist writers began to spread the unscientific theory that China's "special path" toward socialism and the "Thought of Mao Zedong" supposedly reflected the peculiarities of Chinese conditions and the traditions of the old society, that this path supposedly stemmed from a uniquely Chinese social order and that Marxism was therefore always something unnatural for China, something imposed from outside. Reactionary researchers of Chinese affairs (K. Wittfogel and others) tried to use the Maoist distortions that were committed after the establishment of the PRC to denigrate the conquests of socialism in the USSR and other countries. The "latest" theory of R. Garaudy set forth, on the contrary, the idea of the multiplicity of socialist models and asserted that neither the "Western" model nor the "Soviet" one suited China and that China would build its own kind of socialism.

Under these conditions, Soviet Sinologists are scientifically substantiating the conclusion that the objective conditions for the transition to democratic and

socialist development had taken shape in China by the 1950's, although this would be an unavoidably lengthy and difficult path to take. The experience of the Chinese revolution and the first years of the PRC's existence conclusively proved that numerous difficulties could be overcome successfully during the transition to socialism. As M. I. Sladkovskiy said in his report at the All-Union Sinologists' Conference (November 1971), "the 'special' path of development imposed on China by the Maoists and the adventuristic 'Great Leap Forward' and 'Cultural Revolution' experiments slowed down the course of social development but could not stop the historically natural progression of Chinese society toward socialism."[1]

The most urgent matters requiring investigation by Sinologist-economists included the characteristic features and peculiarities of the transition period in the PRC and the contradictions between the new, embryonic basis in the Maoist political superstructure and peculiarities in the development of productive forces and the paths of industrial development and prospects for economic development at a time of mounting militarization and increasing demographic pressure. The investigation of these topics was complicated considerably by the absence of official Chinese data on the economy and by the small number of Sinologists working in this field.

The first IDV works on aspects of the PRC socioeconomic structure suggested that the Chinese interpretation of the transition period did not apply to China. According to the Maoist version, the period of transition to socialism ended with the triumph of socialist forms of ownership, or by 1956-1957. This, the Maoists claimed, created extensive opportunities for the rapid development of productive forces. These views were subjected to a discerning analysis by Soviet Sinologists (G. V. Astaf'yev, V. I. Vanin, Ye. A. Konovalov, M. M. Nikol'skiy, M. I. Sladkovskiy, G. D. Sukharchuk and others), who questioned the nature of forms of ownership and stated that the process of establishing new production relations had not been completed by 1958. In their works, they analyzed the changes brought about in social relations by the "Great Leap Forward," the "Cultural Revolution" and the policy of militarization. This required special studies of the deformation of forms of ownership (state and collective), distribution relations and the methods of state appropriation of the product under the conditions of the Maoists' harsh dictatorship over the working public after the major means of production had been collectivized (or, more precisely, "state-ized."

The IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences has been responsible for a number of collective and individual works on fundamental socioeconomic problems in China. Besides this, institute researchers have contributed to many other works dealing with this subject matter.[2]

In these works, a basic scientific theory about the PRC socioeconomic order was elaborated on the basis of the objective study and summarization of conditions and tendencies in China's social development and an analysis of Maoist policy.

In 1949 China entered the transition period of socialist construction. The underdevelopment of productive forces necessitated the gradual and consistent reorganization of social relations. The mere confiscation of Kuomintang capital and the distribution of estate lands to peasants could not replace old production relations with new ones. Formal collectivization was no substitute for real collectivization. As the Maoists climbed to higher levels of the formal collectivization of the means of production (in rural areas--from mutual assistance brigades to cooperatives,

progressing from the lowest to the highest forms, and then to people's communes; in urban areas--from the lowest forms of state capitalism to mixed enterprises, and from craft cooperatives to small enterprises in the state sector), it became increasingly evident that there were disparities between the "progressive" production relations and the unvarying underdevelopment of productive forces and the individual character of labor using primitive tools.

The "prematurity" of collectivization processes, which essentially signified that forms of ownership did not correspond to the level and nature of productive forces, did not provide opportunities for the quicker growth of these forces and, what is more, had a decelerating effect on the entire process of social reproduction. This was also connected with the change in production goals--a move to an intensive process of militarization, to the perpetuation of a low standard of living for the working public, to excessive egalitarianism in wages and to the subordination of production to great-power hegemonistic objectives. The liquidation of the multistructural society in this manner--that is, using the methods of immediate and coercive state appropriation--and the use of collectivized means of production for selfish hegemonistic purposes unavoidably gave birth to profound contradictions between the objective needs of the country and people and the strategy of the Maoist leadership.

The scientific conclusion set forth in a report by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th congress was of major methodological significance in the investigation of socioeconomic problems in China: "It is no longer enough to say simply that Maoist ideology and policy are inconsistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. They are overtly hostile to it."

In its "new line," the present leadership is revising "ultraleftist" defects in economic administration and advertising a system of measures to stimulate "all types of activity"--the revival of "collective" forms of economic management, private enterprise, the attraction of foreign capital, etc. These processes cannot be described simply as a reaction to the leftist extremism of the period of "Cultural Revolution": By taking these pragmatic measures, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders are trying to restore the "multiple structure" (this time from a position of rightist opportunism) and carry out the "four modernizations" by reviving the private sector, restoring the private farms of peasants, restoring the market and establishing mixed enterprises with the aid of foreign capital. Just as in the past, these measures are allegedly being taken for the sake of socialism, are "based on the objective laws of socialism" and are aimed at the creation of a "strong and prosperous China." Just as in Mao Zedong's lifetime, although the present leaders have verbally renounced the strategy of "production for the sake of production," they have continued to maintain the low standard of living for the sake of militarization.

Articles about the benefits of a market economy under socialist conditions and the advantages of competition and complete independence for enterprises are being printed more frequently in the Chinese press, the idea of "getting rich" has become popular, and articles are being written to extol Bukharin's "theory" about the transition period, according to which industrialization can only be accomplished through primary accumulation--that is, only by robbing the peasants. The "new line" has been praised in the West. High-level visitors to China make frequent mention of China's "special path," in which "the socialist order is combined with a market economy," and predict that this symbiosis could be a third alternative for many developing countries.

The purpose of our studies is to analyze the phases and forms of the lengthy and contradictory process of the formation of a basis and socioeconomic structure in China, relate the peculiarities and actual conditions of China's development to general and specific objective laws and gain a clearer view of the way in which future processes will be affected by the domestic and foreign policy of the leadership. In spite of all the antisocialist, anti-Soviet aspects of PRC foreign policy, the bases and elements of socialism still exist in China. They are the main objective factor inhibiting the implementation of the ineffective and hopeless strategy of forcing the people to accept a great-power and hegemonistic policy by means of dictatorship and militarization.

The IDV is the leader in the discussion and analysis of aspects of militarization in China. Works by V. I. Akimov, A. P. Morozov and M. I. Sladkovskiy[3] illustrate that the Chinese leadership's departure from Marxist-Leninist principles, adventurism and great-power hegemonistic ambitions led to the birth of an all-encompassing process of militarization in the early 1960's and to the subsequent development of this process in the Chinese society. The militarism in today's China is a reactionary system which is intended, by means of coercion and force, to guarantee the ruling group political power in the country and establish favorable internal conditions for the attainment of its great-power objectives in the international arena.

Militarism is now the most important element of all social relations in China. It is reflected in the militarization of all facets of public life, including economics, politics and ideology, and in an aggressive foreign policy.

One of the major forms taken by militarism in the PRC is the militarization of the economy, as a result of which all facets of national production are subordinate to the desire to build up military strength and turn China into a "unified military camp." The present Chinese leadership associates plans for economic development in the country and the accomplishment of the "four modernizations" by the end of the present century with preparations for war and with the need for the maximum augmentation of military potential.

Works by institute researchers have demonstrated the variety of militarism's negative effects on the course of social development in China. This is reflected in the deformation of the entire national economic structure, the arms race, the deceleration of technological progress, the reorganization of foreign economic relations with a view to the quicker augmentation of military potential, the cultivation of a militaristic and nationalistic ideology, the fueling of war hysteria, the swelling of the repressive and punitive system and the militarization of production relations.

To ensure the quicker augmentation of military potential within the framework of the underdeveloped economy, Chinese leaders divided the national economy into two sectors: military and civilian. The first one, which serves the needs of the military, is developing on an industrial basis and enjoys certain privileges in the form of centralized supplies of crude resources, fuel, energy, materials, equipment, finances and skilled manpower.

One of the chief consequences of militarism is the exaggerated role of the army in Chinese society. Institute researchers are greatly interested in this new phenomenon and several works on this topic have been written and published.[4]

The militarization of China poses a serious threat to the socialist conquests of the Chinese people. In foreign policy, it takes the form of attacks by the Chinese leadership on international detente, disarmament and measures to limit strategic weapons and the form of a policy of provoking a new world war.

It is obvious that the militarization of Chinese society, especially the militarization of the economy and the arms race, will continue to require the closest and most thorough scrutiny.

The analysis of aspects of national economic management in the PRC is an important part of institute economic research. The importance of this subject stems from its particular significance in the assessment of the present state of the PRC national economy and the prospects for its further development. One of the first results of the research in this area was V. N. Remyga's work "Sistema upravleniya promyshlennost'yu KNR" [The System of Industrial Management in the PRC]. It examined the significance of the use of Soviet experience and assistance in the establishment of the PRC system of industrial management in 1949-1957 and criticized the Beijing leadership's policy in the area of industrial management during subsequent stages in China's economic development. The work contains a thorough analysis of specific forms and methods of management and concludes that the system of industrial management which had taken shape in the PRC by the end of the 1970's was contradictory and reflected the militaristic aims of the Beijing leadership's economic policy.

It is particularly important to study the system of national economic management in the PRC today, now that China is conducting a series of experiments to investigate the possibility of broad-scale economic reform, which the Chinese leaders hope will subordinate the interests of enterprises and individual workers to Beijing's great-power ambitions.

The state and development of productive forces in the PRC are of considerable interest to institute economists. Between 1960 and 1966 there was a vacuum in this area of research in Soviet Sinology. It was necessary to fill this vacuum without delay and to assess the results of the development of PRC productive forces from a new, discerning position. This work was severely complicated by the almost total lack of official Chinese statistics. Under these conditions, the process had to begin with a search for ways of assessing and calculating basic indicators of the developmental level of productive forces. The methods worked out in the institute for the calculation of basic economic indicators helped us to make generally accurate assessments of the basic trends in Chinese economic development.

The state of productive forces was examined on the sectorial and territorial levels. This work resulted in the previously mentioned four-volume publication on the Chinese economy, which covered the period between 1949 and 1974, or the first 25 years of the PRC's existence. The volume entitled "Promyshlennost' KNR" [Industry in the PRC] is a multileveled study. It examines stages in the establishment of PRC industry from the 1930's to the mid-1970's, compares the qualitative features of Chinese industry to the industry of other countries and analyzes the sectorial structure and the state of heavy and light industry. The work contains the first attempt by Soviet Sinologists to describe large territorial production complexes in quantitative terms and reveal the economic relations between these complexes. This

multileveled approach made it possible to reveal the essence and peculiarities of Chinese industrial development and the formation of its industrial system, analyze the state of Chinese industry in depth and determine its strong and weak points.

The work "Sel'skoye khozyaystvo KNR" [Agriculture in the PRC] was the first comprehensive study by Soviet Sinologists of PRC agriculture during the first quarter-century of its existence. It contains a detailed description of this major economic sector. The authors discuss a broad spectrum of topics. In addition to analyzing the theory and practice of the Chinese leadership's agrarian policy, they describe individual branches.

The authors of the volume entitled "Ekonomika KNR: transport, torgovlya, finansy" [The PRC Economy: Transportation, Trade and Finance] analyze the state of productive forces in such important economic sectors as transportation and water management. They also examine the conditions for the reproduction of society's main productive force--the working public, and the individual.

All four books not only contain an extremely thorough qualitative and quantitative description of the state of productive forces in the PRC national economy, but also conclusively reveal, with the aid of a comparison of two periods (1949-1957 and 1958-1974), the negative, sometimes catastrophic effects of the Chinese leadership's antisocialist, anti-people policy from 1958 on and assess the harm inflicted on productive forces by Mao Zedong's "special path" of economic development.

During the 15 years of the institute's existence, many original works have also been written and published within its walls, including dissertations on various aspects of productive forces and the material and technical base of the Chinese economy. General features of industrial development are examined in "Problemy i protivorechiya industrial'nogo razvitiya KNR" [The Problems and Contradictions of Industrial Development in the PRC] (Moscow, 1974) and agricultural development is discussed in "Sel'skoye khozyaystvo KNR. 1966-1973" (Moscow, 1975) and "Kul'turnaya revolyutsiya i yeye posledstviya" [The Cultural Revolution and Its After-Effects] (Moscow, 1979).

"Mashinostroyeniye KNR" [Machine Building in the PRC] (Moscow, 1979), by V. I. Akimov and V. P. Polyakov, made a significant contribution to sectorial studies.

The analysis of small-scale production is an important part of the study of Chinese productive forces.[5] Small-scale production plays an extremely important role in the satisfaction of daily economic needs in the PRC and in providing employment. It now accounts for 50 percent of the gross industrial product.

There is no question that the development of small-scale production and cottage industry plays an important role in providing the Chinese population with employment. There are economic limits to the development of small-scale production, however, stemming from its effectiveness in comparison to large-scale production, and not only from the existence of vast labor resources. China's experience has confirmed that problems in industrialization and problems connected with the means and forms of production development under the conditions of economic retardation and relative overpopulation can only be resolved with the aid of a comprehensive approach. This approach has not been worked out as yet in China.

Transportation in the PRC has been the subject of intense study in past years. One outstanding work is S. L. Shiryayev's "Zheleznodorozhnyy transport Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki" [Railway Transport in the People's Republic of China] (Moscow, 1969). In this work and others, S. L. Shiryayev conclusively proves that the main reason for the acute transportation problem in China is the anti-people policy of the Chinese leaders, stemming from their militaristic and expansionist goals, meaning that the scales and basic areas of transport construction are dictated primarily by military strategy, and not by economic considerations.

Institute studies of the qualitative and quantitative state of productive forces made a realistic assessment of the "four modernizations" policy line possible. This line envisages the modernization of agriculture, industry, defense and technology and China's economic rise to the level of the world's most highly developed countries by the end of this century. Works by institute researchers[6] conclusively prove the groundlessness of this program of economic development. This is primarily due to the extremely low initial level of economic development: The PRC is lagging far behind the developed countries, and even world average indicators, in the per capita output of basic commodities. Several significant flaws of a qualitative nature in the Chinese economy must also be taken into account. They are primarily connected with the state of the main industrial branches, whose development is not keeping up with the needs of the national economy. In spite of the isolated successes of the 1970's in the development of oil and gas production, the country is essentially experiencing constant energy difficulties, particularly in the area of electrical power engineering. Ferrous metallurgy and several branches of nonferrous metallurgy are unable to satisfy the national economy's need for structural materials. The uneven development of branches creates sharp disparities in industry and prevents the full use of capacities. There are particularly significant disparities between the extractive and processing industries, machine building and metal processing, production needs and the energy base of the national economy, etc.

The low technical level of many branches and the high percentage of outdated forms of production are another serious negative factor. In addition, China is lagging far behind the developed countries in scientific and technical development. According to expert estimates, this lag is equivalent to 10-30 years in the major fields. Labor productivity is quite low in agriculture as well.

The policy line of the "four modernizations" is unrealistic not only because of the low initial level of economic and technological development in the PRC, but also because of its fundamental goals, stemming from the nature and social aims of the Chinese leadership's economic policy.

In itself, the desire to accomplish the all-round modernization of the economy by the year 2000 and turn China into a modern developed state is quite natural. This could contribute greatly to the progress of all mankind, and not just the Chinese people. The necessary conditions for this exist in the PRC, which is extremely rich in material and human resources. Analysis indicates, however, that the desire to be ranked among the developed countries in the world, which seems so positive from the standpoint of economic development, is actually reactionary. The ultimate aim is not the reinforcement and development of the bases of socialism in China, and not the maximum elevation of the Chinese people's standard of living, but the transformation of the country into a militarily powerful state, on a militaristic basis, capable of conducting a vigorous expansionist policy from a position of strength.

The reproduction of the labor force is an important research topic in the study of productive forces. The most significant works on this subject are Ye. A. Konovalov's studies, which essentially laid a scientific foundation for the investigation of China's demographic problems. In "Rabochiy klass, yego mesto i rol' v sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoy strukture Kitaya" [The Working Class, Its Place and Role in the Chinese Socioeconomic Structure], A. V. Ostrovskiy analyzes the basic features of the development of the working class in China, its social structure, its socio-economic status and its working and living conditions.

The first Soviet study of one of China's most urgent and pressing problems, the food crisis, was a work by I. N. Naumov.[7] The author cited many facts to prove that if China had a scientifically sound economic policy, it would have all of the objective prerequisites for overcoming difficulties in this area and establishing the necessary conditions for the normal expanded reproduction of the labor force, but the main obstacle is the adventuristic, anti-people policy of the Chinese leaders.

The foreign economic policy and foreign economic relations of the PRC are an important aspect of the study of the Chinese economy today. Institute researchers have concentrated on assessing the nature and consequences of the reorientation of Chinese foreign economic relations primarily toward the capitalist market. Under the conditions of the "special path," the PRC's foreign economic relations have essentially ceased to be a means of international economic cooperation and have become an instrument of the Chinese leadership's hegemonistic and chauvinistic policy instead.

The works of M. I. Sladkovskiy are a significant contribution to the study of these topics. In these works, the author looks back into the history of the Russian people's trade and economic relations with China, as well as the Soviet Union's relations with China between 1917 and 1974.[8] In these works, he discusses the positive features of Russo-Chinese economic relations and stresses that after the victory of the October Revolution, "during all stages of modern history, especially during China's critical years, when the people of this country had to make radical national decisions and fight a mortal struggle for independence and social justice, the Soviet Union invariably acted as their sincere friend and gave them fraternal assistance." In this respect, "China's departure from cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries was the result of the triumph of belligerent great-Han chauvinism."[9]

China's economic relations with other countries are also examined in M. I. Sladkovskiy's "Kitay i Yaponiya" [China and Japan] (Moscow, 1971) and "Kitay i Angliya" [China and England] (Moscow, 1980).

China's economic relations with the Southeast Asian countries are examined in S. A. Manezhev's work,[10] with special emphasis on the main forms and methods of Beijing's economic expansion in this region.

One important aspect of Chinese foreign economic relations, which requires more intense study, is the PRC's scientific and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union, which is discussed in L. V. Filatov's "Ekonomicheskaya otsenka nauchno-tekhnicheskoy pomoshchi Sovetskogo Soyuza Kitayu (1949-1966)" [Economic Assessment

of the Scientific and Technical Aid Received by China from the Soviet Union (1949-1966)] (Moscow, 1980). The author elucidates the basic stages of this cooperation, estimates the economic impact and cost of Soviet aid to China and describes the methods of assessing this aid.

The Chinese leadership is now seriously interested in broad-scale cooperation with the developed capitalist countries and has even gone so far as to attract foreign capital to China for the purpose of accelerating economic development and accomplishing the "four modernizations." Under these conditions, researchers must disclose the social class essence of the new reversal in foreign economic policy and assess the actual role the external factor can play in the resolution of China's economic problems.

The policy of attracting credit and capital from the developed imperialist states to China will necessitate research into the effect this will have on foreign currency reserves and socioeconomic conditions in China.

The study of the Chinese leadership's economic policy during various stages of the PRC's existence has been a separate field of IDV socioeconomic research. The close scrutiny of the economic policy and role of the Maoist state is quite understandable and justifiable because the superstructure in China has traditionally, especially after the establishment of the PRC, had a colossal effect on the course of economic development. According to F. Engels, a government can exert various types of influence on the economy. "It can act with a view to the same goals, and in this case development is quicker; it can act against economic development, and then it will fail within a certain period of time; or it can block economic development in some areas and promote it in others.... It is clear, however, that in the second and third cases the political regime can cause economic development the greatest harm and can lead to the dissipation of huge quantities of resources and materials."[11]

Sinologist-economists are constantly studying the shifts, reversals and consequences of the Beijing leadership's economic policy and its effect on societal development in the PRC, and this work is reflected in "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiy stroy i ekonomicheskaya politika KNR" [The Socioeconomic Order and Economic Policy of the PRC], "Ideyno-politicheskaya sushchnost' maoizma" [The Ideological-Political Essence of Maoism] (Section IV, "Maoist Economic Policy and Economic Theory") and "Kritika antimarksistskikh teoriy v kurse politicheskoy ekonomii" [Criticism of Anti-Marxist Theories in the Study of Political Economy] (the chapter entitled "Maoist Theories About the Socialist Economy") and in many articles in PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA and other publications.

Whereas successful attempts were made to attain high and stable rates of economic development, to balance accumulation with consumption and to set the natural tendencies of socialist economic development in motion during the first years after the PRC was founded, with the tremendous economic assistance of the USSR and other socialist countries and the aid China received in the compilation of the First Five-Year Plan and the draft Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962), at the end of the 1950's the Maoists discarded the general party line for the transition period, departed from the decisions of the Eighth All-China CCP Congress and took the wrong path of "great leaps" and "cultural revolutions." This excluded the possibility of transitional types of reform and demanded "escalation" and "intensified reform."

Understandably, the brief period of beneficial influence on the part of a still weak government could not reveal all of the advantages of the socialist order: The advance toward socialism was stopped by Maoist policy, which first set the adventuristic economic aims of "catching up with England" and "passing up the United States" and then slid into foreign policy behavior evincing rabid anti-Sovietism and hostility toward the entire socialist camp. Since that time, already more than 20 years ago, the economic policy of the PRC has had a sharply negative effect on production relations and the development of productive forces during various stages.

During the stage of the Great Leap Forward, intensive reforms in rural areas and the compulsory and haphazard collectivization of cottage industry and capitalist enterprises in the cities led to the excessive concentration of resources in metal production, which plunged the entire national economy into a severe crisis and gave rise to disparities between the nation's economic potential and the Maoists' ambitious plans. This caused the economy to regress several years in its development and necessitated an entire stage of "regulation" (1961-1965). Furthermore, the Maoists' economic ambitions were replaced by political and strategic aims; by 1963 the country had already embarked on the path of costly intensive militarization. Under the conditions of technical and economic underdevelopment, the Chinese leadership's dream of building up military-industrial potential "as quickly as possible and at any price" is costing the Chinese people dearly.

The economic policy of the leadership during the stage of Cultural Revolution, as works by Soviet Sinologists testify,[12] illustrated how much a political campaign could harm an economy. The peasants' rights to subsidiary plots, auxiliary trades and remuneration according to labor were attacked as remnants of "bourgeois rights." The Chinese working class was a major target of the campaign to "restrict bourgeois remnants." Maximum egalitarianism in distribution was propagandized, the eight-rank wage scale was abolished as something that had supposedly "outlived its usefulness" and a three-rank scale, which ignored the quality of labor, was instituted. The workers were ordered to "work without counting the hours and without any thought of compensation" and "develop the proletarian spirit of the poor." This was not supposed to be a temporary outlook, but one that should last for "an extremely long time."

After Mao Zedong's death, perceptible changes took place in PRC economic policy. In essence, they consisted in a temporary renunciation of "leftist"-extremist, dictatorial methods of economic management, which had discredited themselves and inflicted colossal damages on productive forces. Now the Chinese leadership is preparing the country for a transition stage of so-called "regulation" for the subsequent accomplishment of the "four modernizations." Speakers at the 26th CPSU Congress noted that "the experience in socioeconomic development in the PRC in the last two decades has been a severe lesson, illustrating the result of the distortion of socialist principles and the essence of socialism in domestic and international policy." It was also noted that "changes are now taking place in domestic policy. Only time will reveal their actual import. It will reveal the degree to which the present Chinese leadership can overcome the Maoist heritage." Soviet Sinologists must answer certain fundamental questions: What aspects of the current leadership's line are left over from Mao Zedong's traditional economic policy? Which of its elements are fundamentally new? How will this policy line affect China's social development?

The current "regulating" measures are being accompanied by significant changes in sectorial proportions in the direction of the stepped-up development of light industry and the textile industry. Scales of capital construction are being sharply reduced in the country, and thousands of industrial enterprises manufacturing unnecessary or undesirable products are being closed. Priority has been assigned to enterprises requiring minimal capital investments and negligible quantities of energy but absorbing maximum quantities of manpower. This kind of radical reorganization has led to a general decline in rates of economic development, a larger army of unemployed, a sharp rise in the prices of consumer goods and agricultural stocks, higher rates of inflation and a state budget deficit. All of this is driving the economy into a new crisis.

An analysis of the current leadership's measures in recent years proves that it is chiefly retaining its previous strategy, with the sole difference that this time the intensive buildup of the military-industrial complex has been linked with reliance on the military-industrial strength of the capitalist countries. Just as before, the goal of national production is not the improvement of the Chinese people's living and working conditions, and it still costs colossal expenditures of human labor. The present Chinese leaders have fallen into the trap of military-bureaucratic, dictatorial and authoritarian methods of control, even though they are trying to supplement them with dubious experiments with the revival of the "market economy."

What were the distinctive features of the Chinese State's economic policy in the last 20 years? Above all, there was the lack of a scientifically substantiated long-range development strategy. In the last 20-plus years, the country has been shaken by stormy political campaigns and sharp reversals in the determination of rates of industrial development and the "decisive links" (for example, steel and grain), which have led to the serious disruption of national economic proportions, a decline in production rates and the disintegration of the entire process of social reproduction. During periods of extremely high industrial growth rates (the "Great Leap Forward" and the 1970's), the country experienced tremendous tension because production growth was achieved by means of excessive accumulation and capital construction, the exaggerated development of small-scale production and the expansion of employment with cheap but ineffective jobs. This naturally stabilized the standard of living, reduced the impact of capital investments and led to huge expenditures of live and embodied labor (this has been repeatedly pointed out in works by IDV researchers, and it is now being corroborated even by prominent Chinese economists Sun Yefang, Xu Dixin, Xiue Muqiao and others). The increased number of jobs in small-scale production in the collective and private sectors temporarily lowered the rate of unemployment, but it meant that the limited resources of raw materials and energy (cotton, tobacco leaves, sugar cane and coal) would first be distributed not to modern large facilities, but to thousands of small industrial enterprises, people's communes and districts with primitive equipment which produce substandard products and do not supplement state financial revenues. On the whole, the national economic impact of production is steadily diminishing, foreign currency receipts decrease with each year and enterprises are actually fighting over raw materials, state contracts and sales markets.

An analysis of the Chinese leadership's economic policy testifies that the political regime in China, regardless of the methods it uses, whether "leftist"-extremist or

rightist opportunist, will always have a destructive effect on the socioeconomic structure and create new contradictions and problems in the life and work of the billion-strong population. The purpose of our studies of the socioeconomic structure and role of the Chinese State consists in the continuous objective assessment and analysis of events in the country with the aid of Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Problemy sovetskogo kitayevedeniya" [Problems in Soviet Sinology], Moscow, 1973, p 12.

2. "Ekonomika KNR (Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiy stroy i ekonomicheskaya politika KNR. 1949-1975)," in four volumes, Moscow, 1978; "Promyshlennost' KNR," Moscow, 1979; "Sel'skoye khozyaystvo KNR, 1949-1974," Moscow, 1978; "Ekonomika KNR: transport, torgovlya, finansy (1949-1975)," Moscow, 1979; "Kitay segodnya" [China Today], Moscow, 1969; "Problemy sovetskogo kitayevedeniya" (Collected Reports of the All-Union Sinologists' Conference, November 1971), Moscow, 1973; V. I. Vanin, "Gosudarstvennyy kapitalizm v KNR" [State Capitalism in the PRC], Moscow, 1974; Ye. A. Konovalov, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiye posledstviya 'bol'shogo skachka' v KNR" [Socioeconomic Consequences of the "Great Leap Forward" in the PRC], Moscow, 1969; L. A. Volkova, "Izmeneniya sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoy struktury kitayskoy derevni 1949-1970 gg." [Changes in the Chinese Rural Socioeconomic Structure in 1949-1970], Moscow, 1972; "Kritika teoreticheskikh osnov maoizma" [Criticism of the Basic Theories of Maoism], Moscow, 1973; "Ideyno-politicheskaya sushchnost' maoizma," Moscow, 1977; "Kritika antimarksistskikh teoriy v kurse politicheskoy ekonomii," Moscow, 1979.

3. M. I. Sladkovskiy, V. I. Akimov and A. P. Morozov, "Problemy i protivorechiya industrial'nogo razvitiya KNR," Moscow, 1974; V. Akimov and A. Morozov, "Beijing's Military-Economic Preparations," in the book: "Militarizm v ideologii i praktike maoizma" [Militarism in the Ideology and Practice of Maoism], Moscow, 1976; V. Akimov and A. Pamor, "The Militarization of the PRC Economy," in the book: "Antimarksistskaya sushchnost' voyennoy politiki maoistov" [The Anti-Marxist Essence of the Maoists' Military Policy], Moscow, 1973; A. P. Morozov, "The Militarization of the Economy and Public Life in the PRC," in the book: "Kitay i gonka vooruzheniy" [China and the Arms Race], Moscow, 1980.

4. B. P. Barakhta and R. M. Neronov, "The Army--Basis of the Maoist Regime," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1976, No 1; K. A. Yegorov, "Punitive and Repressive System of the Maoist Dictatorship," Ibid.; A. P. Pamor, "The Place and Role of the Army in China," Ibid., 1972, No 3.

5. A. M. Kruglov, "Melkaya promyshlennost' KNR" [Small-Scale Production in the PRC], Moscow, 1976.

6. M. I. Sladkovskiy, "Kitay: osnovnyye problemy istorii, ekonomiki, ideologii" [China: Basic Aspects of History, Economy, Ideology], Moscow, 1978;

V. I. Akimov and V. I. Potapov, "The 'Four Modernizations': Plans and Realities," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1979, No 2; and others.

7. I. N. Naumov, "Prodovol'stvennaya problema v Kitaye" [The Food Problem in China], Moscow, 1973.

8. M. I. Sladkovskiy, "Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy narodov Rossii s Kitayem (do 1917 g.)" [History of Trade and Economic Relations Between the People of Russia and China (Before 1917)], Moscow, 1974, and "Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy SSSR s Kitayem. 1917-1974" [History of USSR-China Trade and Economic Relations in 1917-1974], Moscow, 1977.

9. M. I. Sladkovskiy, "Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy SSSR s Kitayev. 1917-1974," pp 318, 319.

10. S. A. Manezhev, "Ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya KNR so stranami Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii" [The PRC's Economic Relations with Southeast Asian Countries], Moscow, 1980.

11. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 37, p 417.

12. See "Kitay segodnya"; "Ideyno-politicheskaya sushchnost' maoizma"; "Problemy i protivorechiya kitayskoy ekonomiki," Moscow, 1974, and others.

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STUDY OF CHINA'S CURRENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN FAR EAST INSTITUTE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 40-55

[Text] In the last decade and a half the Chinese problem has become increasingly acute with each year. In the beginning of the 1960's the Beijing leadership launched broad-scale subversive activity against the fraternal parties and the socialist countries. Under these conditions, relations with China began to acquire a fundamentally different content.

The previous goal was the development of all-round cooperation between all of the socialist countries and China and the coordination of efforts in the common struggle against imperialism. After the power in China was usurped by Mao Zedong's group, it became necessary to oppose the subversive and schismatic line of the Maoists, who actually opened a second front against the world communist movement and the socialist system and acted as the accomplices of the most reactionary and aggressive imperialist circles. The question of struggle for China's socialist future again acquired significance. The combination of all this moved problems connected with the situation in China and the fate of the revolution in this country to the forefront of the urgent issues of today.

In the 1960's, particularly after the October (1964) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, our party called upon communists and all Marxist-Leninists to take a more vigilant stand in relation to the Chinese leaders' antisocialist intrigues and defend the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and socialist ideals.

When Comrade L. I. Brezhnev spoke at an international conference of fraternal parties in 1969 in Moscow, he said that "a thorough Marxist-Leninist analysis of the class content of events in China in recent years and the roots of the CCP leaders' present policy line, which is posing a threat to the socialist gains of the Chinese people, is a great and serious responsibility."[1]

In recent years, Soviet Sinology has accomplished a great deal in this field. Soviet Sinologists have conducted a number of large-scale projects in the criticism of Maoist theory and practice and its distortion of scientific communism. The institutes of the Far East, Oriental studies, the international workers movement and others have published several monographs and collective works. In conjunction with Marxists from fraternal countries, Soviet scholars have analyzed Maoist theory and practice in detail and exposed the dangerous character of this anti-socialist, anti-Marxist phenomenon. The results of this research have been reported in "Maoizm-ideynyy i politicheskiy protivnik marksizma-leninizma" [Maoism--The Ideological and Political Opponent of Marxism-Leninism], a collective work by

Marxists from several socialist countries, in the anthologies "Maoizm glazami kommunistov" [Maoism Through the Eyes of Communists] and "Opasnyy kurs" [A Dangerous Policy Line] and other works.

It would be of definite practical value to trace the evolution of the concepts worked out by researchers from the Far East Institute and other scientific establishments in regard to domestic political problems in the PRC. This is all the more important today, now that the Central Committe of our party, which has always been interested in the situation in China and the state of Soviet-Chinese relations, is demanding that the level of research on China be raised. Historical circumstances have made Sinology one of the social sciences dealing with the most crucial aspect of the ideological and political struggle of our party and the entire communist movement against Maoism, one of the most dangerous enemies of Marxism-Leninism and scientific communism.

At the end of the 1950's our party criticized Mao Zedong's group and the "barracks communism" it had cultivated and issued warnings about the possible ruinous consequences of the attempts to accomplish the "Great Leap Forward" in national economic development and the hasty "communization" of rural China. In the 1960's the mounting negative developments in the superstructure and basis of Chinese society made the class analysis of China's sociohistorical development an even more urgent necessity. This applied above all to the study of socioeconomic and political processes in the PRC.

The main aspect of IDV [Far East Institute] research into the PRC domestic political situation in 1966-1976 was the assessment of the Maoist "Cultural Revolution," its results and its effect on the Chinese revolution and the Chinese people. The value of the "Cultural Revolution," especially its domestic results, has recently been the object of fierce political struggle in China and in the international arena, including the communist movement.

Basically, the correct and incorrect revisionist assessments of the "Cultural Revolution" and its consequences are connected with the continuation of the domestic political struggle, the unresolved nature of major socioeconomic problems, the continuation of the crisis of Maoism and the attempts of Beijing leaders to "correct" and reinforce the regime of the Maoist group's military bureaucratic dictatorship. These assessments are connected with the Maoists' struggle against opposition views and their attempts to prevent, at all costs, the consolidation and unification of healthy forces in the nation.

Imperialist propaganda, anticommunists and bourgeois Sinologists have begun to praise the "Chinese model of socialism" and extol the "Cultural Revolution," stressing that it was supposedly intended to "save China for socialism."

Under these conditions, Soviet scholars, including research associates at the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, studied the domestic political situation in the PRC in order to elaborate a Marxist-Leninist theory of China's internal development and reconstruct the historical truth about the activities of Mao Zedong and his associates and about the tremendous damage the Maoists inflicted with their domestic policy on the Chinese people, the world communist and national liberation movements and the cause of socialism in China.

In 1966-1968 Soviet Sinologists elaborated a theory about the roots of the "Cultural Revolution" in China. Scientific analysis on the domestic political level elucidated the lengthy struggle between Mao Zedong's nationalist group and internationalist forces in the CCP. It was stressed that when the nationalist group in the CCP usurped power, it did not learn any lessons from the failure of the Maoist policy of the "Great Leap Forward," the "People's Communes" and the "New General Line." This tightened the knot of contradiction that sooner or later had to bring about a crisis in China's socialist development.[2]

In 1967-1969 IDV scientific works described the domestic political course of the events of the "Cultural Revolution" in detail and revealed its essence as the "suppression of socialist revolution" in China and a "reactionary military coup."[3]

General conclusions regarding the sociopolitical results of the "Cultural Revolution" and Ninth CCP Congress were set forth in several institute articles and scientific works. They completely corroborated the accuracy of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's general assessment of September 1967: "What the Mao Zedong group calls 'Cultural Revolution' should be called counterrevolution." In brief, the conclusions were the following.

The Ninth CCP Congress legitimized the military bureaucratic regime that had been established during the "Cultural Revolution." Considerable power shifts took place in the political sphere and had a serious effect on the socialist elements of the superstructure of Chinese society, deforming them. All power in the country was in the hands of the military bureaucratic group of Maoists, who established their own absolute dictatorship. The tendency of the people's democratic regime in China to evolve into a dictatorship of the proletariat was temporarily stopped. The guiding role of the CCP as the vanguard of the working class was undermined, and the party itself was ruined during the course of the "Cultural Revolution." The development of a Maoist political organization, using the CCP label, on fundamentally different political, ideological and organizational bases was intended to reinforce social chauvinist tendencies in China.

In the social sphere the Maoists continued their Bonapartist manipulation of classes and artificially created social groups, used the army as the main basis of support for their regime and regarded the perpetuation of the political apathy and cultural retardation of the huge peasant masses as a favorable condition for the existence of the Maoist regime.

However, the compulsory nature of the shift to a military bureaucratic regime and the Mao Zedong group's plans to reorient foreign policy toward political alliance and collaboration with imperialist countries, especially the United States, aroused increasing opposition within existing CCP organizations in the PRC and a new outburst of domestic political fighting between factions of the Beijing leadership. Symptoms of a crisis in Maoism and conflicts between the military faction (headed by Lin Biao) and the Mao Zedong-Zhou Enlai faction gradually came to a head in 1969-1971 and resulted in the "September crisis" of 1971.

In the beginning of 1972 IDV researchers worked out a theory about the latest crisis in Maoism and formulated a scientific hypothesis about the reasons for Lin Biao's clash with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The basic premises of this theory were the following:[4]

The "September crisis" of 1971 was basically due to the intensification of the power struggle between factions of the Maoist regime after they sensed the disruption of the unstable equilibrium in the power conglomerate of the regime's transitional mechanism. The problem lay in redistributing instruments of authority and spheres of influence and in excluding the Lin Biao faction from the power structure.

As the regime moved away from the extremist line of the "Cultural Revolution," it became increasingly evident that Zhou Enlai's influence on the entire political structure was growing. When new party committees were formed as a counterbalance to the mechanism of military control, Zhou Enlai was able to oppose Lin Biao, and Mao Zedong supported Zhou and his allies in the military establishment with a view to the new balance of power.

The army, as the basis of the Maoist regime, ultimately gained the status of a governing force. The disintegration of the CCP and public organizations gave local military men a dominant position. This does not mean, however, that the entire military establishment supported Lin Biao. There were many rival factions in the PLA, and this undermined Lin Biao's position.

Although Lin Biao's position in 1972 is not completely elucidated in available documents, the basic differences can nonetheless be discerned: 1) While he was "wildly waiving Mao's banner," Lin Biao was actually striving for the complete debilitation of the ideological nucleus in the Maoist leadership and trying to establish his own "absolute authority" and control over it; 2) Lin Biao's views on the United States and the USSR differed from the views of Mao (and Zhou Enlai); 3) the major area of Lin's conflict with Mao was the question of the party's militarization; 4) there was a conflict over the so-called Maoist "course of army construction" (and militia construction); 5) in the broader context, the differences of opinion between Mao and Lin apparently concerned several domestic policy issues, particularly questions of national economic policy.

The "September crisis" of 1971 rephrased the question in a broader context--in the context of a new crisis of Maoism in the ideological, political, social, organizational, military and other spheres. It was concluded that this crisis reflected the fundamental defects and weaknesses of the Maoist regime, its characteristic tendency to manipulate various political forces and social strata and its practice of artificially fueling conflicts within the party and society. It was obvious that the Maoist regime was based on a balance between these conflicts, and not on any real ideological and political authority. "The crisis within the Maoist leadership is giving rise to general instability in domestic politics and increased adventurism in foreign policy."[5]

The major conclusions pertaining to the domestic political situation were the following:

In 1970-1972, and especially after the "September crisis" of 1971, many measures were taken in China which differed radically, even externally, from the measures of the "Cultural Revolution" and previous Maoist slogans. By the middle of 1972 the domestic political methods and slogans that had generally been associated with Zhou Enlai were the most highly developed. A thorough analysis of the essence of these new measures proved that they were not radical changes in

domestic policy or radical departures from the previous line of the Maoist leadership. The strategic line of the Ninth CCP Congress, the basic content of which consisted of "permanent revolution," preparations for war, anti-Sovietism and the mobilization of the entire Chinese population for a struggle for the Maoists' Great China, was still being implemented and propagandized to the maximum in the domestic policy sphere.

The most urgent of the Maoists' problems was the problem of the army and the related more general need to suppress all overt and potential opposition forces within the military and political system. The army remained the regime's major basis of support, and the regime wholly retained its military bureaucratic nature. For this reason, the problem did not lie in the mechanical replacement of the military contingent within the political system, but in the more pronounced subordination of the army to the Maoist dictatorship. Consequently, the broad objective of ideological and political reorientation of the army took precedence over the narrow objective of purging the army of certain elements.

At that time the political struggle moved into the party, into its governing bodies on various levels. Mao Zedong and his closest associates were primarily striving to gain stronger control over the army, military officials and cadres through the party mechanism.

The resulting political system (1972) was build as a temporary and transitional structure. Its development according to Maoist plans was a failure.

These conclusions were reinforced by a statistical analysis of slogans set forth in the Chinese press at the end of 1971 and the first half of 1972.

Besides this, a scientific study of the composition of the Beijing leadership with the aid of lists printed in the central PRC press at the end of March 1972 produced similar results.

A concrete historical analysis of the dynamics of military control in the PRC in 1965-1970, which was completed in the institute by the end of 1971 in the form of a detailed research project,[6] revealed the danger posed to Mao Zedong's group by the continuous growth of the military establishment's influence in China. It was concluded that the Beijing leadership might try to limit the role of the military in the administrative sphere and strive to engage the PLA in more extensive combat preparations. An analysis of the spread of military control and militaristic forms of administration throughout China revealed the workings of the military bureaucratic regime and the difficulties blocking the Chinese society's return to socialist sociopolitical relations. This was also attested to by the conclusions of two monographic studies on the sociopolitical role of the army in China in 1949-1957 and in 1958-1969, conducted in the IDV by research associates N. N. Trubochkin and G. N. Mos'ko. These studies proved that the Mao Zedong group had been striving to cultivate militarism and a special status for the army in China since 1949 and that the spirit of violence, militarism and preparations for war had dominated political and social life in China in the last two decades.[7]

From these studies, institute scholars concluded that it would be necessary to engage in the more thorough analysis of the actual role of the PLA and its leadership during the "Cultural Revolution" in order to verify, clarify and, if necessary, reasses some previous conclusions.

Scientific debates in the first quarter of 1973 in regard to PRC internal politics in 1972 resulted in several new ideas about domestic political tendencies:

The political situation in 1972 revealed a growing struggle between the factions headed by "Cultural Revolution" activists--Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen and others--and the faction of "administrators" (pragmatic statesmen closely allied with Zhou Enlai) over supreme authority and the nomination of "Mao's successor." An analysis of 1972 documents pertaining to the "Lin Biao affair" revealed, in the first place, that these documents were most probably a joint undertaking of the faction of "orthodox" Maoists and "pragmatists" and, in the second place, that the line of confrontation had also been drawn between this faction and Lin Biao's faction. Mao acted in the interests of the orthodox Maoist faction by striving to curtail the influence of the military on the level of government authority. The elimination of the stronger military faction was the first step in the advancement of a new clan of leaders, and Mao Zedong associated the problem of the "transfer of authority" with the consolidation of this clan (including Jiang Qing). The rivalry between the Jiang Qing and Zhou Enlai factions, their local support and military groups acquired primary significance.

In 1972 Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen formed a separate group with as much power as Zhou Enlai. At the end of the year this faction took charge of party construction on the CCP Central Committee level, practical party management, ideological work, propaganda and agitation and international party contacts. Its influence in the party and in the army as a whole, however, was traditionally weak.

When the task of eliminating Lin Biao's supporters had lost its urgency (according to available data, the Beijing ruling clique had made short work of Lin Biao's supporters in the army by March 1972, repressing 34,000 in all), the orthodox Maoist faction nonetheless continued, during the political and ideological campaign for "criticism of revisionism and the improvement of style," to intensify the "class struggle" and exaggerate the problems posed by "scoundrels like Liu Shaoqi." Within a year and a half after Lin Biao's dismissal, the accusations leveled at the "scoundrels" changed dramatically: The "scoundrels like Liu Shaoqi," who had previously been branded "ultra-leftist," were now being called "ultra-rightist." This means that the targets of the struggle were not so much Lin's supporters, who were known as "ultra-leftists" and "leftists," as other political forces.

The spearhead of the campaign was now aimed against those who had been in the party for a long time, held administrative positions, were connected with events and traditions in the intra-party struggle and doubted the accuracy of Mao's line.

Tendencies toward political decentralization became more pronounced in China. In connection with this, the Maoists began to take more pains to consolidate the political system and centralize their dictatorship. The use of force in the establishment of the Maoist dictatorship and its policy line and the struggle for power within the ruling clique led to the serious development of separatism and "polycentrism" in the country. The battle between various groups within the Chinese leadership and the related tendencies toward decentralization were the main reasons why the formation of necessary but lacking administrative bodies was postponed and the work of existing bodies was paralyzed.

The socioeconomic policy of the Maoists has been accompanied by the increasing militarization of society, which includes: the planning of enterprise production cycles with a view to the possibility of a transfer to military production; the accumulation of food stocks in rural areas; the construction of bomb shelters, underground plants and entire underground "cities," duplicating populated points above the ground, special facilities for use in the event of war and highways; the teaching of methods of "people's war" to the public, beginning with elementary school pupils; the expansion of the people's militia (its ranks grew noticeably in 1972); the enlargement of production and construction corps in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, the provinces of Heilongjiang, Gansu, Qinghai and Guangdong and other locations; the organization of militarized Red Guard formations, and so forth.

In an article commemorating the new year of 1973, the population was called upon to comply with Mao's request to "dig deep tunnels, stock large quantities of grain and never aspire to hegemony." This was called the "quintessence of Chairman Mao's strategic line" of preparation for war.[8]

In 1972 the Maoists engaged in sociopolitical maneuver on a broader scale in all areas.

In 1973 the journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA began to print regular "roundtable" discussions, in which leading institute researchers shared their views on internal development in China with readers and with the scientific community. Many of the topics were discussed earlier in the Far East Institute and at scientific conferences.[9]

The beginning and middle of 1973 were marked by feverish activity by the members of the orthodox Maoist faction in the PRC, who had reinforced their position in the party power structure and in new public organizations (trade unions, the CYL and women's and peasants' alliances), in preparation for the 10th CCP Congress. In June and July 1973 articles and predictions about the coming congress were widely circulated in the Western, Japanese and Taiwanese press.

Institute researchers determined the reason why the 10th Congress had been convened and predicted the probable results of the congress. Debates led to highly accurate forecasts of the general content of congress documents and the general trend of personnel changes in the 10th CCP Central Committee. The main predictions were the following:

It would be the common task of all Maoists to seriously perfect their ideological and political platform and reinforce current policy trends at the party congress. This would be a prerequisite for the Maoist goal of reorganizing the party and, what is more, establishing Maoist control over it. The coming congress would not be held to disavow the previous one, but to extol it and to reaffirm and develop the great-power policy and social chauvinist essence of Maoism in a more convincing "Marxist" disguise. This is attested to in particular by the increasing appeals, especially in July 1973, to implement the "line of unification and victory stipulated by the Ninth CCP Congress."

Mao Zedong and the contenders who hoped to succeed him were motivated even more to hold the 10th Congress by organizational factors. The previous organizational basis of the Maoist regime, taking the form of an alliance of the three factions

(Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing), had collapsed. What is more, it did not fit in with Mao's plans for the "Cultural Revolution" and his attempts to transfer authority to a new clan of leaders, grouped around Jiang Qing, and gain political support for this clan by making sweeping changes in the party membership and including pro-Maoist forces that had advanced during the course of the "Cultural Revolution" among the party ranks.

Mao was only able to return to his original plan after September 1971, after he had engaged in numerous complex maneuvers, with the main one being the unavoidable compromise with Zhou Enlai and even the temporary offer of the top position in the leadership to Zhou. After the difficult process of reorganizing the party committees had been completed, the machinery of the party had been transferred to the control of Mao's followers and their influence had increased significantly, the conflicts in the power struggle were such that their resolution required a party congress.

Mao's group had to fill the breach in the leadership. At the same time, it could not rely on the Central Committee membership and this is why there had been no plenums of the Central Committee for 3 years. Apparently, all of the hidden possibilities for curtailing separatist tendencies among military authorities on the local level had also been exhausted. The new members of Mao's group had to suppress tendencies toward separatism without changing the essence of the regime as a military bureaucratic dictatorship and transfer national authority from military control, which was largely ineffective and posed a danger to the ruling clique, to political control by the Maoist party, in which military cadres would be included as only one subordinate element.

An analysis of the political process in China and the Maoists' undertakings proves that they had been preparing for the 10th CCP Congress for a long time, particularly since the beginning of 1973. The parallel campaigns for "criticism of revisionism and the improvement of style," "research into the history of struggle between two lines in the CCP" and "criticism of scoundrels like Liu Shaoqi" were supposed to brand all of the victims of Mao's brutality during the course of his struggle for power as "class enemies," prepare the soil for the condemnation of Lin Biao and others at the coming congress and reinforce the foundations of Mao's cult of personality and the authority of the ruling group.

By the middle of 1972 the Maoists began to emphasize the "advancement of new cadres" and take more new members into the party. This was Mao's cadre policy, intended to reinforce Jiang Qing's faction. Mao associated the continuity of power and the continuation of his policies with new cadres who had no respect for CCP traditions.

At the end of 1972 the Maoists began to form the missing links in the political system (a Komsomol, trade unions and women's organizations). It was already apparent around February 1973 that this process was also a preparation for the 10th Congress. A certain percentage of the delegates would have to come from the new party stratum in the Komsomol, trade-union and women's organizations. The special emphasis on a high percentage of women in new administrative bodies and Beijing propaganda's demands for the dramatic augmentation and "development of the role of women in all spheres," including public administration, were just as indicative. In addition to establishing women's organizations, all of this seemed to be a special effort to create authority and political support for Jiang Qing.

The congress was supposed to illustrate the fictitious "monolithic" nature of the leadership and signify another compromise for the sake of party "unity." It was most likely that the congress could not bring up the topic of "succession" and would officially set forth something resembling principles of "collective leadership." Each of the ruling factions hoped to use the congress to strengthen its own position. An analysis of the preparations for the congress, however, reveals that Mao (and this is quite important) intended to pave the way for subsequent domination of the leadership by the Jiang Qing wing and associated political forces.

On the surface, the congress seemed to be unexpected because there were none of the usual and visible signs of preparatory work: There were no Central Committee plenums, decisions were not made public, and there were no party conferences on the local level. But this attests only to the particularly complex political situation that forced the Maoists to abandon common procedures, even those that had been implemented at the time of the Ninth Congress.

It was possible that the military and the "administrators" headed by Zhou Enlai, who were more closely related to one another than to the third faction, could unite and frustrate the plans of the "leftist" Maoists and exert strong pressure even on Mao Zedong.

In general, the 10th CCP Congress marked another round in the domestic struggle in China, in which Mao was prepared to play the deciding role, appoint people he trusted to carry on his work and take practical steps to "renew" the party. Whereas the 9th CCP Congress could be regarded as the constituent congress of the new Maoist political organization, the 10th would seem to be an important stage in its formation.

The 10th CCP Congress documents that became available in September 1973 and numerous responses to this event by experts on Chinese affairs confirm the accuracy of the abovementioned prediction.

When 10th Congress documents and the post-congress domestic political situation were analyzed,[10] the facts listed above were verified and corroborated with documented evidence. Four new facts were also discovered:

The 10th Congress proved that the internal struggle between factions had become even more intense than expected. On the eve of the congress, on 7 August 1973, a new political campaign was launched for "criticism of Confucians" (it was not until February 1974 that it was officially called "criticism of Lin Biao and criticism of Confucius") and Wang Hongwen advised "going against the current" in his speech, which marked the beginning of a new stage in the struggle of the "leftist" Maoists for power.

The final stages of the construction of the political system were accelerated, and a new element appeared in this system (in October 1973)--the intensive organization of municipal militia forces under the party aegis began.

The intensification of the political struggle within the nation resulted in repeated postponements of the announced NPC session.

Steps were taken to weaken the army's political role to some degree, although there was no question that the army was still one of the pillars supporting the regime and that the regime could not exist without the army. This was reflected in the renunciation of one of the fundamental theses of the Ninth Congress, referring to the army as the "main element of the state" and in the emphasis placed primarily on the army's functions in the sphere of military preparations and its "readiness to repulse aggression."

One general conclusion was of conceptual significance: "The present stage in Beijing's policy is unique and is distinguished by a dramatic shift to the right.... This shift is reflected in the Maoist policy line and in internal developments in the PRC. The state of affairs in the PRC is distinguished by new Maoist tendencies, which are pushing China even further in the direction of antisocialism."[11]

The successful experiment with the first short-term forecasts pave the way for regular forecasting by IDV researchers. Comprehensive studies of the situation in China, however, would obviously be more promising and could be used in forecasts and situation analysis.

In 1974 institute researchers delved deeper into some specific problems which seemed important because they were new and little researched: the elements of the political system--the municipal militia and the army, the course of the campaign for "criticism of Lin Biao and criticism of Confucius,"[12] the dazibao [big-character posters] campaign, the mass media and others. These studies led to the publication of major works: the forecast "O politicheskom razvitii KNR" [The Political Development of the PRC], "Politicheskaya sistema KNR" [The Political System of the PRC], "Osnovnyye gruppirovki v kitayskom rukovodstve" [The Main Groups in the Chinese Leadership] and "Problema preyemstvennosti vlasti v Kitaye" [The Problem of Succession in the Chinese Power Structure].

The main conclusions pertaining to domestic politics were the following:

Mao Zedong's military bureaucratic group still controlled the party and the country and made Chinese domestic and foreign policy. The Maoist regime was still working on its political system. The firmly established cult of Mao Zedong gave him virtually unlimited authority.

The new Maoist party, created under the banner of the CCP, consisted mainly of people who had been raised on the "Thought of Mao Zedong" and had proved their loyalty to "Mao's line" during the "Cultural Revolution" (the so-called "new blood"). The orthodox Maoists ("leftist"-Maoists) faction had gained even more influence and dominated the party leadership.

Mao Zedong's special line was aimed at the thorough militarization of the country for the sake of social chauvinistic goals.

Various factions within the Maoist ruling camp were still fighting for power and for control over the party, army and government. The struggle for the army became more intense after Lin Biao's expulsion.

The internal political struggle was even more intense after Mao Zedong's departure. Its outcome in the next 5-7 years would apparently be one of three alternatives: a) a victory for the pragmatic Maoist faction in an alliance with provincial

authorities; b) a victory for the orthodox Maoist faction; c) the formation of a weak coalition of the two. In the more distant future, within 10-15 years, the usurpation of power by the "leftist" Maoists could become inevitable. The actual outcome would depend largely on which side the army took. The struggle for the army was one of the key areas of the domestic political battle. In this case, it was difficult to predict the army's actions. As time went by, however, there would be more chance that the army would take the side of the "leftists."

The increasing tendency, which had already been apparent at the beginning of the "Cultural Revolution," toward complete separation between the interests of the military bureaucratic dictatorship and the objective economic interests of the working population established grounds for mounting opposition by the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia and other social strata. Several objective and subjective factors, however, were impeding the organizational establishment of the anti-Maoist opposition and the formation of a single political platform. These factors included the Maoists' unrestrained social demagogy, their speculation on the slogan of proletarian dictatorship and their flirtation with the working class and the socially retarded peasantry, and later with the intelligentsia as well. More general factors were the disintegration of state and political superstructural institutions of popular democracy and the tactic of cultivating confrontation between various Chinese strata with differing interests.

China's return to the course of true socialist development was made difficult. It would be contradictory and complicated and would have to take place in an atmosphere of fierce internal political struggle.

In 1975 and 1976 IDV researchers conducted in-depth studies of aspects of the PRC political structure, state and law. They also researched crucial developments in the Chinese political struggle, which developed when Mao Zedong's imminent departure from the political arena was anticipated.

Since 1975 the institute has regularly published a yearbook entitled "The People's Republic of China. Politics, Economics, Ideology." These almanacs have elucidated basic theories, facts and conclusions from the research of IDV Sinologists on Chinese domestic politics and other Chinese affairs. Most of the information in the almanacs consists of statistics and facts for the independent study of Chinese affairs, and this is why monographic studies of Chinese domestic politics have continued.[13]

Some IDV articles and scientific works analyze the establishment of the Maoist CCP and public organizations during the preparations for the 10th Congress in 1973.[14] The characteristic features of the new CCP were:

A split between the active upper echelon of the party, in which the prevailing influence was that of the "leftist" Maoists, and the majority of CCP members, who were passive.

The actual dismissal of the CCP from its governing role in the country. This role was taken over by Mao Zedong's group.

The absence of ideological and organizational unity in the party.

Continuous attacks on intra-party democracy.

The existence of a fairly strong anti-Maoist opposition within the party.

The apathy and political confusion of most CCP members.

The close relationship of party, military and administrative authority.

In spite of various pressure tactics and the Mao Zedong cult of personality, his group was unable to turn the CCP into a completely obedient executor of Mao's wishes.

The reinforcement of the regime's political system did not in any sense signify that the CCP and mass public organizations had been restored on the ideological, political and organizational bases that were characteristic prior to the "Cultural Revolution." The gradual resumption of their work was allowed primarily because the Maoists sensed that their social base was diminishing and tried to stop this process and expand their influence by creating party groups and various public organizations that would remain under their control. Examinations of state construction in the PRC indicated that the work in this field was aimed at consolidating the military bureaucratic regime and eliminating its more extremist features.[15]

The antisocialist, anti-Soviet purpose of the Beijing leadership's activity within the country led to a new situation with a negative effect on the entire state of world affairs and the conditions of the struggle against imperialism. The Maoist regime became increasingly brutal from 1973 on. The political features of Chinese society in those years included a military bureaucratic dictatorship backed up by the army, a punitive and repressive system and the methods of social demagogy; no participation whatsoever by the working public in government administration; contempt for the laws; a hierarchical power organization headed by a leader with absolutely unlimited authority and an almost sacred status. The social features were the decelerated growth of the working class, the preservation of the undeveloped class structure and the unnatural equalization of social strata; urban-rural conflicts; the preservation of a small scientific and technical elite for the execution of military preparations, accompanied by attacks on the thinking intelligentsia and attempts to turn the society into a faceless and uniform mass.

After the Maoists had established their policy line, they undermined the socialist gains of the Chinese working public in all spheres.

The years of 1974-1976 represented a period of intense internal political struggle in China prior to Mao Zedong's death. During these years, mass political and ideological campaigns were constantly launched. It was difficult to distinguish between main and secondary trends in this kaleidoscope.

The development of IDV research took two directions: It was necessary, firstly, to determine the nature, causes and goals of these mass campaigns and single out their dynamics and main tendencies and, secondly, to conduct a class analysis of the political forces in society that were instrumental in the Chinese campaigns or were affected by them. In connection with the last of these aspects, it was particularly important to determine the forces opposing the orthodox Maoist group.

During this period, the first comprehensive and multileveled campaign was the campaign for "criticism of Lin Biao and criticism of Confucius," which was declared the "primary duty of the entire party and the entire population." It reflected all of the peculiarities, contradictions and mounting difficulties in the establishment of the Maoist regime in 1974-1975, the continued depreciation of Maoist values in Chinese society and the exacerbation of disputes within the ruling Maoist elite over major domestic and foreign policy issues.

The conclusions of the studies of the campaign for "criticism of Lin Biao and criticism of Confucius"[16] noted that the Maoist leadership was trying to solve a broad range of problems in specific ways: Urgent questions were raised in camouflaged form, by means of references to the history, culture and ideology of ancient or medieval China. In essence, however, the struggle was being fought for key positions in the party, government and army. In the broader sense, the domestic political struggle at this stage was being fought over the continuity of authority in China, which had become a particularly pressing matter in connection with the imminent departure from the political arena of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other senior Chinese leaders.

Of course, this campaign did not consist solely of sweeping political maneuvers and an internal power struggle. It was primarily aimed against the Chinese people and against the unorganized and diverse, but fairly large opposition within the party, government and army and at enterprises and establishments. Many cadres on various levels were attacked, including internationalist communists who had to adapt to the conditions of the Maoist dictatorship, people without any precise political orientation, and even Maoists whose practical work went astray of Maoist directives and insisted on the use of socialist methods of management and control. As long as Maoist political objectives go against elements of the socialist basis in China, the objective conditions will exist for an anti-Maoist opposition and the Maoists will have no shortage of "class enemies" for their latest purge.

The Chinese leadership tried to escape economic difficulties by means of the further intensification of labor and restriction of public consumption. Just as before, priority was assigned to political pressure on the working public. This conclusion was corroborated by the political campaign launched in China in February 1975 for the "study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship."

The campaign for the "study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship" testify to the intentions of a certain segment of the Chinese leadership to turn China into a "strong and modern socialist power" by the end of this century, as stipulated at the NPC session in 1975, by reinforcing the military bureaucratic dictatorship, exerting more pressure on the working public and making extensive use of coercive methods to stimulate public labor and minimize public consumption.

Soviet academics regarded the campaign for the "study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship" as a dangerous Maoist social diversion. It took the form of attempts to brand certain cadres and members of the working class and intelligentsia as the so-called "new bourgeoisie," supposedly "engendered by the corrupting influence of bourgeois ideology and the existence of bourgeois laws."

Special mention was made of the Maoists "social strategists'" schismatic plans for the Chinese working class. It was hypothesized that Mao Zedong's new social maneuvers might be aimed at artificially dividing the working class in the same way

that the peasants in rural China had been artificially divided into rich peasants, middle strata (lower and upper) and the poor. The "leftist" Maoist group was trying to win the "lower middle strata" and the "poor" workers over to its own side by equalizing the workers' wages.[17]

In certain respects, this campaign and the subsequent mass campaigns of 1975 and 1976 (criticism of the novel "Backwater" and of "cowards," criticism of the "rightist deviationist current and the revision of the correct conclusions of the Cultural Revolution" and "criticism of Deng Xiaoping") pursued the same political goals that the "orthodox" Maoists had not been able to attain during previous stages of their struggle. The "new bourgeois elements," "cowards," adherents of the "rightist deviationist current for the revision of correct conclusions" and others were nothing more than labels that were pasted on overt and covert opponents of the Maoist regime and the ruling faction.

Considerable comparative research in the IDV made it possible to synthesize the accusations made in the official Chinese press at various times against the Lin Biao faction, "new bourgeois elements," "cowards," adherents of the "rightist deviationist current" and others. The "political portraits" of various groups which had, according to the official Beijing press, opposed Mao Zedong, were essentially identical. This indicated that the Mao Zedong leadership had fabricated many of the charges brought against each new set of "class enemies."

Domestic politics in China after Mao Zedong's death constituted an important aspect of IDV research in 1976-1980. The political urgency of this importance stemmed not only from the need for a precise Marxist-Leninist analysis of developments in the PRC after 9 September 1976, but also from the desire to verify the thesis regarding the "de-Maoization" that had supposedly begun in China, according to the testimony of Western Sinologists. They drew their conclusions about de-Maoization from isolated, often ambiguous and contradictory declarations by the new Chinese leadership and disregarded its actual political practices. It must be said that Soviet Sinologists were correct in their general assessment of developments in China.[18]

Mao Zedong's death and the expulsion of his closest followers from the CCP Central Committe Politburo (Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao, now called the "gang of four") marked the beginning of a new stage in China's internal political development. This stage has been distinguished by the new leadership's attempts to establish a political platform consisting of compromises: On the one hand, it recognizes the basic elements of the great-power Maoist course, but, on the other, it takes actual conditions in China into account. This platform did not appear suddenly in September-October 1976, but took shape while Mao was still alive, reflecting the views of nationalistically inclined government and party cadres of the older generation. Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were typical representatives of this group.

The factions fighting for power within the Maoist leadership combined anti-Sovietism with the great-power nationalist line—the line of militarizing state, public and economic affairs. Their disagreements concerned some of the methods of attaining chauvinistic and hegemonistic goals. These differences of opinion were expressed quite clearly during the campaign for criticism of the "gang of four," which was launched after the gang was "overthrown" on 6 October 1976. The military, party

and administrative leaders who took power after the gang of four had been overthrown stressed, with their first actions (the decisions to build a mausoleum for Mao Zedong and to publish selected writings by Mao), that Maoism was and is the basis of party and state activity. The invariability of the previous policy line was reaffirmed in a number of official statements by Chinese leaders at the 11th CCP Congress.

The fundamental conclusion drawn from research was that the "proceedings of the 11th CCP Congress and Beijing's practical line do not indicate any kind of 'de-Maoization' in the PRC or 'dismantling' of Maoism. It is actually being freed of certain premises which have been completely discredited for the more effective conduct of the previous, antisocialist great-power policy line, and this makes it even more dangerous."[19]

Several works contained conclusions about the latest stage in Maoism's evolution without Mao, and the main conclusion was that the PRC would be unable to return to the healthy path of socialist development unless it could discard Maoism.

Soviet Sinologists have made a significant effort to thoroughly consider all of the changes that took place in the PRC after the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum (December 1978) in the sphere of domestic policy. Research indicates that serious adjustments in domestic policy have been announced and are being accomplished in the PRC.[20] Nonetheless, the Chinese leadership's domestic policy adjustments have not changed the strategic goals of this policy, and we therefore have no grounds to draw any fundamental distinction between this policy and Mao Zedong's.

At the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "The present leaders of China are themselves calling the practices in their country during the period of so-called Cultural Revolution 'the most brutal type of feudal-fascist dictatorship.' We have nothing to add to this definition.

"Changes are now taking place in Chinese domestic policy. Their actual purpose will be revealed in time. Time will reveal the degree to which the Chinese leadership can overcome the Maoist heritage."[21]

It is still extremely important to expose and defeat Maoism. Before China can return to a position of scientific socialism in the political sphere, it will have to liquidate the military bureaucratic regime and restore the power of the working public and the popular democratic order, based on an alliance of workers and peasants with the working class playing the leading role, through the revival of the CCP as a Marxist-Leninist party. It is the duty of Soviet Sinologists to conduct timely analyses of negative and positive trends in Chinese social development. This is their duty, as academics, to our party and people, and this is what the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress have instructed us to do.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following the Leninist Course], vol 2, Moscow, 1973, p 392.

2. See: O. Ye. Vladimirov and V. I. Ryazantsev, "Stranitsy politicheskoy biografii Mao Tszeduna" [Pages from the Political Biography of Mao Zedong], Moscow, 1969; G. V. Astaf'yev, "Problemy promyshlennogo razvitiya Kitaya (1949-1957)" [Problems in China's Industrial Development (1949-1957)], Moscow, 1970; M. I. Sladkovskiy, "Kharakteristika sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo stroya KNR" [The Distinctive Features of the PRC Socioeconomic Structure], Moscow, 1970; V. Vyatskiy and F. Dimin, "Ekonomicheskiy avantyurizm maoistov" [The Economic Adventurism of the Maoists], Moscow, 1970; G. D. Sukharchuk, "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh vzglyadakh Mao Tszeduna" [Mao Zedong's Socio-economic Views], Moscow, 1970; Ye. A. Konovalov, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiye aspekty narodonaseleniya KNR" [The Socioeconomic Aspects of PRC Population Statistics], Moscow, 1970; "Kitayskaya Narodnaya Respublika. Ekonomika, gosudarstvo i pravo, kul'tura" [The People's Republic of China. Economics, Government and Law, Culture], Moscow, 1970; Z. A. Muromtseva, "Problemy industrializatsii KNR" [Problems in the Industrialization of the PRC], Moscow, 1971; "Sovremennyy Kitay. Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiye problemy" [Present-Day China. Socioeconomic Issues] (M. I. Sladkovskiy, ed-in-chief), Moscow, 1972; L. A. Volkova, "Izmeneniye sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoy struktury kitayskoy derevni. 1949-1972 gg." [Changes in the Chinese Rural Socioeconomic Structure, 1949-1970], Moscow, 1972; V. I. Vyatskiy, "Ekonomicheskaya politika maoistov" [Maoist Economic Policy], Moscow, 1972; A. M. Rumyantsev, "Istoki i evolyutsiya 'idey Mao Tszeduna'" [The Origins and Evolution of the "Thought of Mao Zedong"], Moscow, 1972.

3. See: B. Zanegin, A. Mironov and Ya. Mikhaylov, "K. sobytiyam v Kitaye" [An Inquiry into Events in China], Moscow, 1967; "Maoizm glazami kommunistov" (prefaced and edited by V. A. Krivtsov), Moscow, 1969; "Antimarksistskaya sushchnost' vzglyadov i politiki Mao Tszeduna" [The Anti-Marxist Essence of Mao Zedong's Views and Policy] (M. I. Sladkovskiy, ed-in-chief), Moscow, 1969; "Kitay segodnya" [China Today] (eds-in-chief L. P. Delyusin and G. D. Sukharchuk), Moscow, 1969; A. Mironov and Ya. Mikhaylov, "Voyenno-byurokraticheskaya diktatura--orudiye velikoderzhavnoy politiki gruppy Mao Tszeduna" [The Military Bureaucratic Dictatorship--an Instrument of the Mao Zedong Group's Great-Power Policy], Moscow, 1969; "'Revkomy'--organy diktatury Mao" [The "Revolutionary Committees"--Organs of Mao's Dictatorship], Moscow, 1969; "Leninizm i politika sovremennogo Kitaya" [Leninism and the Policy of Present-Day China] (collected articles edited by M. I. Sladkovskiy), Moscow, 1972; "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya 1917-1970 gg." [A Contemporary History of China, 1917-1970] (collective work edited by M. I. Sladkovskiy), Moscow, 1972.

4. The theory was worked out by a group of researchers at the Far East Institute under the supervision of V. P. Fetov, candidate of historical sciences, at the end of 1971. See V. Fetov, "Another Crisis in Beijing: The Fall of Lin Biao," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1973, No 2.

5. M. I. Dal'nev, "Crisis in the Great-Power Maoist Policy Line," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1972, No 2.

6. B. P. Barakhta and R. M. Neronov, "The Army--The Basis of the Maoist Regime," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1976, No 1; B. P. Barakhta, "The Sociopolitical Role of the PLA, 1969-1975" (candidate's dissertation), Moscow, 1978.

7. "Maoizm: Voyennaya teoriya i praktika" [Maoism: Military Theory and Practice], Moscow, 1978; G. N. Mos'ko, "Armiya Kitaya--orudiye avantyuristichuskoy politiki maoistov" [The Chinese Army--An Instrument of the Maoists' Adventuristic Policy], Moscow, 1980.

8. HONGQI, 1973, No 3; RENMIN RIBAO, 11 March 1973.

9. PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1973, No 1; 1974, No 3; 1975, No 2; 1977, No 4; 1979, Nos 1, 2; 1980, No 1. Important aspects of the domestic state of affairs in present-day China are discussed in these issues.

10. K. V. Kukushkin and V. G. Timoshin, "New Evidence of the Chinese Leadership's Antisocialist Line (the 10th CCP Congress)," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1973, No 4.

11. O. Ye. Vladimirov, "Some Features of the Present State of Affairs in China," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1973, No 3.

12. L. S. Perelomov, "The Political Campaign for 'Criticism of Lin Biao and Criticism of Confucius,'" PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1974, No 2.

13. See, for example: V. G. Karymov, "Basic Tendencies in the Domestic Political Development of the PRC After the 'Cultural Revolution'" (candidate's dissertation), Moscow, 1976.

14. G. A. Stepanov, "Provincial Party Committees in the PRC," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1976, No 2; B. Andrysevich, "The Organizational and Ideological Bases of the Maoist Party," ibid., 1975, No 3, and others.

15. L. M. Gudoshnikov, "Politicheskiy mekhanizm KNR" [The Political Machinery of the PRC], Moscow, 1973; K. A. Yegorov, "The Maoist Dictatorship's Punitive and Repressive System," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1976, No 1; L. M. Gudoshnikov, "The Two Constitutions of the People's Republic of China," ibid., 1975, No 2. For a discussion of the government structure and government agencies, see the "PRC: Politics, Economics, Ideology" almanacs for 1973-1976.

16. V. G. Karymov, "The Maoists' Domestic Political Maneuvers After the 10th CCP Congress," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1975, No 3.

17. Ibid.

18. L. M. Gudoshnikov and V. G. Karymov, "Some Aspects of the Domestic Political Situation in the PRC," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1977, No 3; "New Stage in the Evolution of Beijing's Antisocialist Policy and the Objectives of the Struggle Against Maoism," ibid., 1977, No 4; "China After Mao Zedong," ibid.; "Maoism Without Mao Zedong," ibid., 1978, No 2; "Kitay posle 'kul'turnoy revolyutsii.' Politicheskaya sistema, vnutripoliticheskoye polozheniye" [China After the "Cultural Revolution." The Political System and the Domestic Political Situation], Moscow, 1979; "KNR. Kratkiy istoricheskiy ocherk (1949-1979)" [The PRC. A Brief Historical Survey (1949-1979)] (ed-in-chief M. I. Sladkovskiy), Moscow, 1980.

19. "New Stage in the Evolution of Beijing's Antisocialist Policy and the Objectives of the Struggle Against Maoism," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1977, No 4.

20. "An Inquiry Into Some Modifications of Beijing's Domestic Policy," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1980, No 4.

21. KOMMUNIST, 1981, No 4, p 9.

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DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS IN THE 'REGULATION' OF THE PRC NATIONAL ECONOMY (BASED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN 1980)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 56-66

[Article by V. I. Akimov, doctor of economic sciences, and V. I. Potapov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

JAPAN'S FOREIGN CURRENCY AMBITIONS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 67-77

[Article by Yu. S. Stolyarov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE 'UNITED FRONT' POLICY IN TIBET

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 78-89

[Article by V. A. Bogoslovskiy, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The problem of nationality occupies far from the last place among the numerous problems encountered by the current Chinese leadership. China's national regions, which take up more than half of the country's territory, are exceptionally rich in minerals, and this is extremely important in the plans for the "four modernizations" and for the buildup of military-industrial potential. At the same time, the national regions are mainly border areas and are regarded by the Chinese leadership as bridgeheads for expansionist actions against neighboring countries. Of course, Beijing officials realize that the national regions can only play this dual role in the presence of a "political atmosphere of unity and stability." The great-power nationalist policy, however, which has been conducted by the Maoists for many years, especially during the time of the "Cultural Revolution," has exacerbated interethnic relations in China to the extreme, intensified the actual inequality of non-Han people, aroused deep dissatisfaction in the native population and created mistrust in the general policy line of the Chinese leadership and in the actions of local authorities.

Beijing has had to make certain adjustments in its policy in the national regions. In particular, they concern the treatment of national cadres, the system of education and the use of the local spoken and written language.

The Chinese leaders have made a special effort to "restore" the united front, the immediate aim of which is the creation of a "political atmosphere of unity and stability." Problems connected with the united front have been discussed at NPC and CPPCC sessions and are reflected in the Constitution of the PRC (1978) and the CPPCC Charter. In March 1979 the CCP Central Committee decided to drop the charges of "capitulation" and "revisionism" that had been brought against all organs and establishments of the united front (including those in charge of work with nationalities and in charge of religious affairs).[1] The united front was charged with the task of uniting all who could be united, fully mobilizing all active factors and, if possible, turning passive factors into active ones. The united front, according to the plans of Chinese leaders, should unite not only all "patriots" supporting socialism, but also those who support the unity of the motherland, including "all people of the Chinese nationality (zhonghua minzu) in general with a passionate love for their motherland."[2]

The policy of the united front is being conducted in Tibet in a more complete form than in other national regions. In the first place, Tibet is one of the largest national districts in the PRC. In area, the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) constitutes one-eighth of the country's territory, and if Tibetan areas in neighboring provinces, where more than half of the 3.45 million Tibetans in the PRC live, are included, the figure exceeds one-fifth. Beijing is particularly interested in Tibet's natural resources. But the Chinese leaders are mainly interested in Tibet's strategic location as a bridghead for expansion in southern Asia. The broad-scale military construction in Tibet, the presence of an army of 300,000 here and the continuous provocations against neighboring countries, which evolved into open hostilities against India in 1962, testify to this quite eloquently.

In the second place, Tibet is the most "restless" national region in the PRC, as far as the Chinese leadership is concerned. This has been the site of several armed uprisings, including the well-known rebellion in Lhasa in March 1959. Social reforms began later in Tibet than in any other party of the PRC. The Tibetan Autonomous Region was only founded in 1965. The process of "communization," which began during the "Cultural Revolution," took almost 10 years because it was resisted by the Tibetans and was only completed in 1975. Now the socioeconomic and political structure of Tibet is essentially in line with the general Chinese model. But nationalistic and religious feelings are still strong in the broad Tibetan masses. These feelings frequently evolve into uprisings and demands that the Hans leave Tibet.

The Beijing leadership's difficulties have been compounded by the fact that it cannot rely on effective support from the Hans living in the TAR. In the first place, they make up a negligible portion of the autonomous region's population (120,000 out of 1.83 million); in the second place, most of the Hans are cadres (26,000), establishment employees and technical personnel who live almost exclusively in cities; in the third place, the overwhelming majority of Hans regard their stay in Tibet, with its bleak climate and the hostility of the Tibetan population, as a temporary "exile" and have no wish to "settle down" there.

The anti-Han feelings of the Tibetans are kept alive in part by the existence of a large emigration (up to 110,000 people), whose leaders engage in fairly active anti-Beijing activity. The 14th Dalai Lama, who is one of these emigres, still has considerable authority in Tibet, which was vividly illustrated by the demonstration in Lhasa when a delegation of Tibetan emigres visited this region in summer 1980.

The united front is not a new phenomenon in Beijing's policy toward Tibet. Its basic principles were formulated in an agreement concluded on 23 May 1951 by representatives of the Central and Tibetan Governments. In particular, this agreement envisaged the preservation of the "political system" and the "existing status and powers" of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama and stipulated that "there must be no kind of coercion on the part of central authorities in matters pertaining to various reforms in Tibet. The local government must conduct reforms voluntarily, and when the people demand reforms, decisions will be made on these matters after consultations with Tibetan officials."[3]

The PRC leadership's motives for basing their policy in Tibet on the principles of the united front were quite clearly defined by Mao Zedong in a CCP Central Committee directive of 6 April 1952 on the progress of the work in Tibet. They included

Tibet's isolation from the central regions of the PRC, the unreliability of the army's material supply system, the fact that the Tibetan upper echelon had "a social base stronger than ours" and, mainly, the absence of "support among the popular masses."[4] On the whole, the policy of the united front was supposed to reinforce the position of the central authorities in Tibet and force the Tibetan upper echelon to agree to socioeconomic and political reforms--that is, to agree, in essence, to self-liquidation. Beijing's ultimate goal was the transformation of Tibet to fit the Chinese model, the exclusion of the very possibility of any kind of separatist movement and the creation of the necessary conditions for the unimpeded conduct of the central government's general policy line in this region.

The reluctance of Tibetan ruling circles to comply with all orders from Beijing and accede to the mounting pressure of central authorities led to increasing tension in the relations between the partners in the united front. In May 1958, at the second session of the Eighth CCP Congress, Mao Zedong announced: "Some people in Tibet favor schism and do not want to cooperate. These people will suffer a defeat." In March 1959 there was an uprising in Lhasa. This was followed by the repression of members of the Tibetan upper echelon who had participated in the uprising, and many of them fled the country.

As a result of this, the united front policy underwent radical changes. The alliance with the dominant classes turned into an alliance with individual representatives of these classes who had not taken part in the "rebellion." They were offered high administrative offices (for example, the 10th Panchen Lama[5] and Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme[6]) and monetary compensation was offered for property that had been confiscated during the course of reforms.

The exacerbation of the internal political situation in Tibet, which was engendered by the bloody repressive actions taken when the 1959 rebellion was suppressed and was later compounded by the hasty social reforms that were instituted under pressure, including the formation of cooperatives and the violent measures to eradicate the Buddhist religion, forced Beijing to give more attention to the united front policy.

In July 1962 a CCP workers committee in the Tibetan region drafted four documents on the work in Tibet, including documents on cooperation and religion. In particular, they envisaged the cessation of the mass repression and persecution of Buddhists. They set forth the idea of the two alliances that were supposed to constitute the United People's democratic front: The alliance of the working class with other working people (the basic alliance) and the alliance of the working class with the non-working population that wanted to cooperate (the auxiliary alliance). Zhang Jingwu, chairman of the central government in Tibet and secretary of the CCP workers committee of the Tibetan region, stressed: "We must unite all of the forces that can be united.... Judging by the specific state of affairs in the Tibetan region, the auxiliary alliance is just as necessary and is quite important in its own way."[7]

This new variation on the united front, however, did not last long. In August 1963 Mao Zedong declared in the "Statement in Support of the Struggle of American Negroes": "In the final analysis, the ethnic struggle is part of the class struggle." Soon this statement was given the interpretation that "the class issue is the essence of the issue of nationality." In this form, it lay at the basis of

Beijing's policy on nationalities. This led to a situation in which the national question was treated exclusively as part of the class struggle, which signified a denial of the need to have and carry out some kind of special national program with a view to the distinctive features of various nationalities and the actual state of affairs in specific national regions and, consequently, signified a denial of the need for the united front. In accordance with this, a slogan was voiced in Tibet, calling for reliance on "liberated slaves and serfs" (the Tibetan version of the call for reliance on "the poor and the lowest middle strata"). Many members of the upper echelon (including the Panchen Lama) were suppressed.

The "Cultural Revolution," which represented a bloody illustration of the idea that the "class issue is the essence of the issue of nationality," exacerbated the political situation in Tibet to the maximum, which aroused considerable worry in Beijing. In September 1975 a delegation, headed by Hua Guofeng, who was then vice premier of the State Council and minister of public security, arrived in Lhasa (officially, to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the autonomous region). When party committee Secretary Tian Bao spoke at the festive gathering, he said: "The class struggle in our autonomous region is still quite heated and complex, the economic base is weak and the upcoming tasks of revolution and construction will be difficult."[8] At that same time, RENMIN RIBAO appealed, for the first time in many years, for "strong reliance on the millions of emancipated slaves and the unification of all forces that can be united."[9]

After the death of Mao Zedong and the expulsion of the "gang of four," the work to "restore" the United Front became much more active. The Second Congress of the TAR CCP (October 1977) demanded "the firmest adherence to party policy in regard to patriotic democratic activists, the continuation of the work to unite, educate and reeducate these activists..., the development of a united front, led by the working class, based on an alliance of workers and peasants and including patriotic democratic activists among its members..., the conscientious implementation of party policy in regard to religion; the guarantee of freedom of religion..., the unification, education and reeducation of religious activists who are patriotic and observe the laws."

In February 1978 the Panchen Lama was "pardoned" and he became a member of the CPPCC. The members of the autonomous region's administrative bodies, elected at the second session of the TAR NPC (6-14 August 1979), included members of the former Tibetan upper classes. For example, the former "Living Buddha" Pabala Gelielangjie became one of the vice chairmen of the People's Government of the TAR, and Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme became the chairman of the TAR NPC Standing Committee. The upper classes were represented on a particularly broad scale in the Tibetan branch of the CPPCC, the organization directly responsible for conducting the United Front policy.

In April 1980 the CCP Central Committee issued a report in connection with the publication of the "Protocol of the Conference on the Work in Tibet."[10] On 22 May 1980, Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the CCP Central Committee, and Wan Li, member of the Central Committee Secretariat and vice premier of the PRC State Council, arrived in Lhasa. They were joined on their "observation tour" by Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and chairman of the TAR NPC Standing Committee, Yang Jingren, vice chairman of the All-China Committee of the CPPCC and chairman of the State Committee on the Affairs of Nationalities,[11] and Zhao Zhenqing, deputy director of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee.

The Eighth CCP Central Committee "directives" and the six "important tasks" stipulated by Hu Yaobang and Wan Li[12] declared the institution of a more "flexible" policy in the TAR. The problem of overcoming poverty in Tibet and the catastrophic collapse of the economy and raising the extremely low standard of living of the working public was discussed at length in these documents. All of these misfortunes were the direct result of the careless use of economic methods in Tibet that were suitable for the country's central regions and a result of Beijing's great-power Maoist policy, which was subsequently passed off as the ultra-leftist line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four."

The united front occupied a prominent position in the definition and implementation of the "flexible" policy in the TAR, based on the principle of "governing in line with local conditions," and in the reports of the CCP Central Committee. The second CCP Central Committee directive states: "Organs of the united front of the CCP Central Committee and State Committee on the Affairs of Nationalities must actively aid the Central Committee and State Council, regularly observe and study the state of work in Tibet, submit proposals on their own initiative and cooperate with the appropriate establishments to improve the work in Tibet." Hu Yaobang and Wan Li met with "patriotic democrats from the upper strata," listened to their opinions, told them of CCP Central Committee policy and called upon them to "continue cooperating with the party and contributing to the construction of a new Tibet."[13]

A large reception, organized by a division of the united front of the CCP Central Committee and the State Committee on the Affairs of Nationalities, was held in Lhasa on 9 July 1980. The more than 300 guests included representatives of the upper strata (including a relative of the 14th Dalai Lama and the 14th Dalai Lama's personal physician), Tibetan physicians, artists of the old school, actors, writers, scientific and technical personnel and representatives of various non-Han nationalities. Tibetan leaders, members of the army command and delegations for economic cooperation from Beijing also attended. Chinese and local leaders who spoke at the reception, just as at other meetings and gatherings (the main speaker was Yang Jingren), stressed that it would be necessary to continue the party's policy on the united front, launch more extensive work in the area of the patriotic united front, unite all forces that could be united, win over all people who could be won over (including religious leaders), strengthen the unity of party members and non-members and the unity of the army and people, mobilize all active factors and turn passive factors into active ones. Addressing representatives of the "upper strata," speakers called upon them to put their strength and knowledge to work and contribute to the unity of the motherland, the unification of nationalities and the development of Tibet. They were promised that the "party and state will never abandon an individual who performs good deeds for the people. This is a party policy of long standing."[14]

Yang Jingren summed up the results of his 2-month inspection tour of Tibet in HONGQI magazine in the form of seven "thoughts."[15]

One of them pertains directly to the united front, which "is still working miracles during this new stage in history" and must be reinforced, developed and expanded in the interest of the completion of the "four modernizations."

Let us take a look at the methods to which Beijing resorts in its attempts to achieve "mutual understanding" and determine what part the "patriots" are supposed to play, according to the Beijing leadership, in the construction of a "new, united, culturally flourishing Tibet."

The most prominent "patriots" from the upper strata are now the 10th Panchen Lama and Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme. We should recall that this Panchen Lama's predecessor, the 13th Panchen Lama, fled to the Chinese interior after a conflict with the 13th Dalai Lama. He later became a member of the Kuomingtang Government. The 10th Panchen Lama and his associates were only able to return to Tibet after the PLA troops had entered this region. The Chinese leaders' attempts to win the 10th Panchen Lama over to their side were successful: Neither he, nor the monks in the Tashi Lumpo monastery he headed, nor the feudal authorities in the Tsang region, which had been turned over to Beijing under the administratorship of the 10th Panchen Lama, took part in the 1959 rebellion. Nevertheless, at the end of 1964 the 10th Panchen Lama and many of his associates and relatives were accused of "counterrevolutionary" and "schismatic" activity and were repressed. In 1978 the 10th Panchen Lama was rehabilitated. Beijing was not stingy; he was awarded a comfortable allowance (more than a thousand yuan a month), but his political and religious status was not restored. The 10th Panchen Lama was awarded the distinguished but largely meaningless title of deputy chairman of the CPPCC All-China Committee (since September 1980 he has been a deputy chairman of the NPC Standing Committee). He has not been in Tibet a single time since 1964. His participation in Tibetan affairs is limited to the issuance of patriotic appeals from Beijing to the former elite and to emigre leaders. The 10th Panchen Lama can only be referred to as the hierarch of the Tibetan church in the past tense.

The story of Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme is similar in some respects. This hereditary aristocrat and major feudal lord commanded the Tibetan troops defending Chamdo at the time of the PLA offensive in October 1950. He was taken prisoner and was then taken directly from the prison camp to Beijing, where he signed an agreement on the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet on 23 May 1951. Since that time Ngapoi has been the most zealous promoter of Beijing's policy in Tibet. He was the chairman of the TAR People's Committee and then deputy chairman of a "revolutionary committee." At the beginning of the 1970's, however, Beijing ended his active participation in Tibetan affairs. As one of the deputy chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee, he had to stay in Beijing. It was not until 1980 (when he was already chairman of the TAR NPC Standing Committee) that he could return to Tibet as a member of the inspection group headed by Hu Yaobang.

Another of the "patriots" who were quite recently members of the "reactionary clique of the Tibetan upper echelon" is Lhalu Tsepang Dorjie. This prominent feudal aristocrat (he owned several thousand serfs) and minister of the Tibetan Government commanded the "rebels" in March 1959, was then arrested and was set free in August 1965. In 1977 Lhalu was asked to work on the TAR CPPCC as an agitator and supervisor of the translation group. He is now a member of the TAR CPPCC and is putting the Tibetan historical archives in order.[16]

But Lhalu is one of the few members of the former aristocracy who was released in the 1960's and was able to survive the "Cultural Revolution." By the time the united front began to be established, the overwhelming majority of the members of the upper classes had died, been executed, were in prison or had emigrated. The number remaining at liberty in Tibet was obviously insufficient for the creation of a united front.

On 4 November 1978 Beijing released 24 members of the Tibetan "reactionary elite" who had been convicted of participating in the "rebellion" in March 1959. On 17 March 1979 Tibetan judicial authorities announced the release of another 376 persons, including former ministers of the Tibetan Government, "living Buddhas," superiors of large monasteries and district chiefs. All of them, in the words of the Chinese press, had repented of their "crimes" and had even thanked the government for...their 20 years of patient "re-education."[17]

But the "work to unite, indoctrinate and reforge" members of the previous upper echelon, potential members of the united front, is far from finished.

When Yang Jingren surveyed the state of affairs in Tibet in summer 1980, he concluded that "our main concern is the work on the united front in Tibet, but it has been inadequate in some respects and must be intensified. We must improve our work in the implementation of policy toward patriots from the upper strata of the Tibetan nationality and religious circles, quickly release those who deserve this but have not been released as yet, and quickly find jobs for those who deserve jobs but are not working as yet. If anyone expresses the wish to work, he must be given a job. If anyone experiences difficulties, he must be given effective help."[16]

The "jobs" offered to "patriots" consist, judging from reports in the press, in work on Tibetan archives, primarily historical, and in the collection and study of examples of Tibetan folklore. Some "patriots" have written articles about Tibetan history in an attempt to prove that Tibet has supposedly always been part of China and have called upon readers to "make every effort to defend the unity of the motherland and the unity of nationalities."

But the main "job" offered to "patriots" consists in collaboration with central and local authorities, in the unquestioning acceptance and support of the Beijing leadership's general policy line and in the demonstration of "unity" within the Tibetan population and the Tibetans' "unity" with other Chinese nationalities, especially the Han.

Beijing is trying to extend the thesis regarding the Tibetans' desire to live in a "unified China" and their unanimous support of the Chinese leadership to the Tibetan emigres as well. Beijing calls all Tibetan refugees (there are 110,000 of them and they live mostly in India, but also in Nepal, Bhutan and other countries) "fellow countrymen" and members of the "Chinese nationality" who are temporarily living "outside the motherland" (China). It has been alleged that the overwhelming majority of refugees, "after 20 years of hardship, want to be patriots" and return to their native land.

As early as September 1975, at a rally in Lhasa commemorating the 10th anniversary of the TAR, Hua Guofeng issued an insistent appeal to these "fellow countrymen," asking them to return to Tibet and promising that they would be completely safe and would be given jobs. On 1 May 1977 the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY reported that Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme had spoken with Japanese journalists and had said: "We will welcome all patriots, whether they come now or later."

The campaign for the refugees' return grew to particularly significant dimensions at the end of 1978, after the release of the 24 rebels. Most of the emigres were Tibetans who had fled the country when the rebellion was suppressed in 1959. They

included the 14th Dalai Lama and the present leaders of the emigre community. Speaking at a gathering commemorating the "release of the rebels" on 4 November 1978, Tian Bao (then TAR "revolutionary committee" deputy chairman and party committee secretary; chairman of the TAR People's Government since August 1979) announced: "Our fellow Tibetans abroad, including members of the Tibetan upper classes who fled the country, will be given a warm reception if they return to their native land."[19] This was followed by a number of "invitations" by the 10th Panchen Lama and Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme at the end of December."[20]

On 6 January 1979 a reception committee was set up in the TAR to welcome fellow countrymen who returned to their native land and people who wanted to visit Tibet. It was headed by Tian Bao. The committee's members included representatives of the former upper strata.

The main condition for returning was "patriotism"--that is, recognition of the "unity" of China and, consequently, Tibet's present status in the PRC. Neither social origin nor past activity (even "counterrevolutionary" or "subversive") would be considered important now. "A fellow countryman who loves his motherland (Tibet--V. B.), even one who lives abroad, must resolutely defend the unity of the motherland (China--V. B.)" and fight against schism; otherwise, he is "an inveterate enemy of the people."[21]

Special attention has been given to the 14th Dalai Lama, who supposedly "displayed an ability to assess the current situation and a wish to return to the motherland." The hope has been expressed that he "will make a personal contribution to the cause of defending the unity of the motherland." Beijing propaganda has ceased to call the 14th Dalai Lama a "traitor" and "betrayer." He is no longer being accused of leading the 1959 "rebellion."

In 1979 Beijing allowed representatives of the Dalai Lama's administration to visit China (this was something it had wanted for many years). The first delegation's visit lasted from August to December, and it spent most of its time in Tibet. When the visit was over, at the end of February 1980, the 10th Panchen Lama again expressed his hope that the 14th Dalai Lama would return.[22] In May 1980 a delegation of representatives of the Tibetan emigre communitis in India, Japan, England, the United States and Switzerland visited the PRC. A third group, headed by the Dalai Lama's younger sister, was then sent to China.

Beijing has obviously played up to the leaders of the Tibetan emigres. "We must do our utmost to win the Dalai's group and the Tibetan fellow countrymen abroad over to our side," Yang Jingren said.[23] Of course, the return of some prominent emigres, especially the 14th Dalai Lama, would suit Beijing's plans the most, but even the campaign itself, the "talks" and the visits by delegations, regardless of their results, should suggest that the Chinese leadership is "concerned" about the fate of the "fellow countrymen" and is willing to comply with their wishes. Officials in Beijing obviously expect the 14th Dalai Lama and his associates to stop their "anti-Chinese" political activity. The ultimate goal is to convince public opinion abroad, especially in India and in Buddhist countries, that the "Tibetan fellow countrymen" in the PRC and in other countries[24] "unanimously" support Beijing's policy in Tibet, and thereby completely "solve the Tibetan problem."

It is in this context that we should examine the "Appeal to the Tibetan Fellow Countrymen Abroad," published in RENMIN RIBAO on 17 January 1979 on behalf of six "representatives of the upper strata." It states, in particular (apparently in reference to India): "Farsighted politicians in South Asia cannot agree that the fellow countrymen, who are not emigres in any sense of the term, should call themselves refugees and remain abroad for an indefinite period, and they also cannot allow an 'emigre government,' which harms good-neighbor relations, to last indefinitely."

To date, however, the Chinese press has only been able to report three cases involving the return of Tibetans "to the motherland," and not one of them was a member of the upper classes. The Tibetan refugees have little faith in the Chinese leaders' promises to give them a warm reception and provide them with the appropriate living and working conditions. They also take a skeptical view of the widely publicized "liberalization" of Beijing's policy. The incident that occurred with the second Tibetan delegation, when the Chinese authorities cut short its visit in the PRC because one of its members made negative comments to the inhabitants of Lhasa, did not help at all to increase faith in the Chinese leaders. This is apparently also the reason for the 14th Dalai Lama's repeated statements that he will not return to Tibet until he is certain that all Tibetans live a happy life and that his return will benefit the Tibetan people.

It is possible that the campaign for the return of the Tibetan "fellow countrymen" is largely propagandistic and provocative in character and that Beijing has no interest in the actual return of tens of thousands of refugees who could have a destabilizing effect on the already complex state of affairs in Tibet.

It must be said that Beijing's "restoration " of the united front, which was accompanied by several other measures, primarily in the sphere of religion, did not escape the attention of the Western press, which is writing about the "liberalization" of the Chinese leadership's policy and the "normalization of the situation" in Tibet, is eagerly taking up the official Chinese propaganda about the restoration of Tibetan "self-government" and "freedom of worship" and, in general, is giving Beijing's policy in this national region of the PRC a positive evaluation. In a number of cases, the Western press has expressed the barely concealed wish that the 14th Dalai Lama would return to Tibet in an attempt to convince the reader that the Chinese side has supposedly done everything within its power to ensure this and that the matter now depends mainly on the Dalai Lama's administration.

In connection with this, it would be wise to briefly discuss some general features of Beijing's policy in Tibet in recent years. The widely publicized CCP Central Committee "directives" about the work in Tibet stipulate, in particular, "the fullest possible exercise of the right to national regional autonomy." Furthermore, Tibet has been promised more independence in the management and settlement of internal affairs than any other national region in the PRC. For example, the CCP Central Committee's third "directive" specifies that "if the policy line, political aims and system defined by the CCP Central Committee and various Central Committee organs and the documents, directives and decrees promulgated for the entire country do not correspond to the specific state of affairs in Tibet, the administrative bodies of the party, government and mass organizations can choose not to implement them or to implement them in a modified form."[25] Hu Yaobang and Wan Li set the

"important objective" of ensuring that the Tibetans constitute or exceed two-thirds of the total number of state cadres with full-time administrative positions in the next 2 or 3 years.[26]

It is true that the TAR "People's Government," the Standing Committee of the Tibetan People's Council and the Tibetan division of the CPPCC are now headed by Tibetans. Tibetans also head the majority of local administrative bodies. But the "full" exercise of the right to national autonomy can only be carried out under the "united leadership of the Central Committee." The independence of local government bodies was declared in a CCP Central Committee announcement but was nullified by the provision in the same announcement that "it will be necessary to ask for instructions before acting on important matters and to make progress reports on minor matters." It is also significant that the institutions of the "People's Government" and, to an even greater extent, the CPPCC bodies in Tibet play only an auxiliary role. The army command and party exercise all of the real authority. Han cadres from China's central region still head the party committees of the autonomous region and districts. None of the CCP Central Committee directives or statements by Beijing leaders stipulate that Tibetans should head party organs. They only mention the desirability of accepting more Tibetan applicants for CCP membership, and only in the most general terms. It is indicative that Yin Fatang, a Han military cadre who was once the political commissar of the Jinan military district, was reappointed as acting first secretary of the TAR Party Committee in May 1980.

We should take a look at Beijing's policy on religion and at the way in which the constitutional guarantee of freedom of worship is exercised in Tibet, particularly since, as the Chinese press stresses, the religious question is "frequently related" to the national question.[27] Official propaganda depicts the freedom of worship that supposedly exists in China as the most convincing example of consideration for "national distinctions," and the Western press regards it as almost the chief indication of "liberalization."

The actual state of affairs, however, testifies to something else. In 1959 Tibet had 2,469 monasteries and 110,000 monks, but it now has 10 monasteries and 1,000-2,000 monks. All monks must spend most of their time in productive labor and study the "party policy on nationality." The monks can "read the sutras," as the head Lama of the Drepunga monastery told foreign correspondents in 1979, "in their free time."

The worshippers' access to the remaining shrines and monasteries is severely restricted. The Jokhang Cathedral in Lhasa, for example, is open only three times a week, and only until noon. There is an entrance fee (20 fen).

On the whole, Beijing's policy is essentially aimed at liquidating the monastic community. It is true that the current leadership is not resorting to the harsh and brutal methods of the period of "Cultural Revolution" (the devastation and destruction of monasteries, the total prohibition of all religious rites without exception, the mass repression of the clergy and of all people "infected with religious prejudices"). Nevertheless, no Tibetans are allowed to become monks. The youngest of the Jokhang monks turned 50 long ago. The belief in "reincarnation" has been refuted and, consequently, the very possibility of the appearance of new "living Buddhas" has been denied.

The Chinese leaders are not concealing the fact that freedom of worship has been permitted for tactical reasons. Yang Jingren, for example, says that "history, from the most ancient times to the present day, proves conclusively that harsh methods of dealing with religion will not diminish its role, but, on the contrary, will arouse religious feelings in the popular masses and promote their development. This was the case with Langdarma in Tibetan history,[28] and this was the case with Lin Biao and the 'gang of four.'" Nevertheless, Yang Jingren advises the "thorough and correct implementation of the party policy of freedom of worship" and calls for "stronger leadership in the work connected with religion."[29] The monastic life and the religious activity of the monastic community have been placed under the strictest control and are supervised by administrative bodies. The monasteries and shrines in the Lhasa region for example, are under the jurisdiction of the Lhasa Administration for the Preservation of Cultural and Historical Monuments.

The superiors or head Lamas of monasteries are appointed from above and their status is virtually no different from that of the civil servant. The salary of the Jokhang head Lama, for example, is paid by the state.

In this way, the church has turned into a unique government body. This is not surprising if we consider that not one of the legislative acts of the PRC, including the constitution, envisages the separation of church and state. The Chinese press harshly criticizes those who "demand only freedom for religious activity," who "do not care for leadership" and who "believe that leadership is interference and that it is incompatible with the policy of freedom of worship." "The religious life of the individual and the interests of the religious sect," the official press states, "must be subordinate to the common interest, especially with regard to the four modernizations."[30] It is therefore understandable that, although Beijing has permitted "proper" religious activity, it does not tolerate "feudal superstitions," by which it means religious rites conducted outside the church, which is extremely characteristic of Tibetan Buddhism. A RENMIN RIBAO article demanded that persons who engage in religious activity outside the church be regarded as criminals who, "under the cover of freedom of worship, sow insecurity, pervert the human spirit and impede and poison the atmosphere of stability and unity."[31]

In conclusion, we would like to discuss a few "theoretical" matters pertaining directly to the "united front." In the Chinese press the renunciation of the united front policy is being blamed on the implementation of the general idea that "the class issue is the essence of the issue of nationality." Chinese theorists are now criticizing this idea. A "special correspondent" of RENMIN RIBAO wrote an obviously prescribed article which asserted that the issue of nationality is the result of ethnic differences and the actual inequality of nationalities in China and that, after socialist reforms had been instituted, interethnic relations essentially became relations between workers of different nationalities, and ethnic conflicts became conflicts between workers of different nationalities. The "special correspondent" did, however, qualify his remarks: "Within each nationality," he wrote, "a class struggle is still being waged with some degree of intensity. Some aspects of this class struggle can still influence relations between nationalities.... Class conflicts and conflicts between us and our enemies still constitute some part of ethnic conflicts."

Who are the "class enemies"? The author of this article removes all doubt. "Of course, the correct resolution of ethnic conflicts," he says, "does not mean that we can allow an extremely small group of reactionary elements, hiding within these ethnic groups, to take advantage of a convenient opportunity to fuel antagonism between nationalities, provoke a rift between nationalities and endanger the solidarity and unity of nationalities."[32]

These quotations testify that the present Chinese leaders, who are criticizing the "gang of four" for the artificial "exaggeration of the class struggle," essentially have not discarded the old Maoist definition of the "class enemy" as anyone who "undermines" the unity of nationalities and the "motherland"--that is, anyone who disagrees with Beijing's line in general and its policy on nationality in particular.

Therefore, the few changes that have recently been made in the Chinese leadership's policy in Tibet do not testify in any sense that Tibetan "self-government" has been restored in this autonomous region, that the Tibetans are actually exercising "freedom of worship" or that legality has been completely restored in Tibet after being violated flagrantly for many years.

Officially, after Mao Zedong's death the Beijing leaders returned to the policy of the united front, which had been carried out in Tibet in the 1950's. But a "return" is not a "restoration." The united front in the 1950's was a policy of alliance with the majority of members of the upper strata, who had real political and economic power, an alliance which was supposed to safeguard the unity of the PRC and establish the necessary conditions for political and socioeconomic reforms. Now this is merely an attempt to win over the members of the former upper strata, who have been deprived of all power, but still have some authority in Tibet, including religious authority. The united front is now only one part of the political machinery with which the Beijing leaders are trying to achieve greater "mutual understanding" with the Tibetan masses. The members of the united front (just as the "national cadres") are expected to act as obedient and subservient middlemen in the establishment of a "political atmosphere of unity and stability" and in the conduct of Beijing's general policy line.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 19 March 1979.

2. HONGQI, 1980, No 3, p 25. The "zhonghua minzu" category takes in the Hans and all non-Han nationalities in the PRC. This term was widely used by Chiang Kai-shek in reference to the "unified" Chinese nationality.

3. "Konstitutsiya i osnovnyye zakonodatel'nyye akty Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki" [The Constitution and Major Legislative Acts of the People's Republic of China], Moscow, 1955, pp 119-123.

4. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 5, Beijing, 1977, p 83 (in Russian).

5. The 10th Panchen Lama was the acting chairman of the committee in charge of preparations for the establishment of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

6. Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme was appointed deputy chairman of the preparations committee.

7. XIZANG RIBAO, 16 January 1963.

8. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 September 1975.

9. Ibid.

10. HONGQI, 1980, No 15, p 2.

11. In September 1980 Yang Jingren was elected vice premier of the State Council and relieved of his duties as deputy chairman of the NPC All-China Committee.

12. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 May 1980.

13. Ibid., 31 May 1980.

14. Ibid., 11 July 1980.

15. HONGQI, 1980, No 15, pp 2-8.

16. RENMIN RIBAO, 20 March 1979.

17. Ibid., 16 November 1978; 20 March 1979.

18. HONGQI, 1980, No 15, p 8.

19. RENMIN RIBAO, 16 November 1978.

20. Ibid., 28 December 1978; 1 January 1979.

21. Ibid., 17 January 1979.

22. Ibid., 25 February 1980.

23. HONGQI, 1980, No 15, p 8.

24. At the beginning of 1980 the term "Tibetan fellow-countrymen," which had previously been used only in reference to Tibetans living abroad, was also used in the Chinese press to signify Tibetans living within the PRC (members of other non-Han nationalities are not called fellow-countrymen).

25. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 May 1980.

26. Ibid., 31 May 1980.

27. Ibid., 14 June 1980.

28. Langdarma (836-842) was the last ruler of the Tibetan empire of the 7th-9th centuries. He is notorious for his persecution of the Buddhist clergy. He was killed by a monk. In Tibetan works of history he symbolizes evil and brutality.

29. HONGQI, 1980, No 15, p 8.

30. RENMIN RIBAO, 14 June 1980.

31. Ibid., 22 January 1980.

32. Ibid., 15 July 1980.

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AUSTRALIA IN BEIJING'S HEGEMONISTIC PLANS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 90-100

[Article by A. G. Larin, candidate of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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EVOLUTION OF BEIJING'S IDEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE IN 1980

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 101-111

[Article by V. F. Feoktistov, candidate of philosophical sciences, and G. N. Yashchenko, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] Ideological processes in the PRC, just as the domestic political situation in general, are distinguished by contradictory and complex phenomena. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted in the accountability report at the 26th CPSU Congress, "changes are now taking place in Chinese domestic policy. Time will reveal their real import. It will reveal the degree to which the present Chinese leadership can overcome the Maoist heritage."[1] Therefore, the need to reveal the tendencies and class content of the processes going on in China today is an objective stemming directly from this part of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report.

Events in recent years have shown that the Beijing leaders who came to power after Mao Zedong's death are making feverish, sometimes mutually exclusive attempts to overcome the severe crisis that overtook China through the fault of Maoism. As yet, however, these attempts have not only lacked consistency, but, and most importantly, have been devoid of the desire to give up the strategic line and ideological and political bases of Mao Zedong's legacy of "Sinized Marxism," hegemonism, anti-Sovietism and great-Han chauvinism. In spite of significant changes in Maoism, which have led to the rejection or revision of individual "ideas" and even entire "theories," these main elements of the Maoist heritage have remained untouched and constitute the basis of the present Chinese leaders' ideological arsenal.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that contemporary Beijing ideologists are simply rehashing the old "ideas" of the late helmsman. They are trying to breathe new life into these ideas, adapt them to the present line of the militaristic modernization of China and create some kind of new, "modernized" variant of Maoism.

As O. Ye. Vladimirov and M. A. Il'in correctly pointed out in their recently published book, "Evolyutsiya politiki i ideologii maoizma v 70-kh--nachale 80-kh godov" [The Evolution of Maoist Policy and Ideology in the 1970's and early 1980's], the main purpose of the present Chinese leadership's modification of the ideological and theoretical content of the "Thought of Mao Zedong" is "the elaboration of a contemporary version of Maoism, which could serve as theoretical grounds for the Beijing rulers' policy line within the PRC and in the international arena and could supplement the 'four modernizations' with a fifth modernization, the modernization of Maoism."[2]

Although the process of this "fifth modernization" is not complete, we can nonetheless see certain tendencies that suggest the basic guidelines for a new official ideological and political doctrine.

The first factor which must be taken into account when this process is analyzed is the clash of various tendencies reflecting the continuous struggle within the Beijing leadership over Mao Zedong's ideological heritage. It is therefore not surprising that there are certain differences in the interpretation of the "party ideological line" in the official Chinese press. Sometimes it is described as the "dialectical-materialistic line of the third plenum" (1978), which called for adherence to "a businesslike, realistic approach," "consideration of the actual situation in all decision making" and "the combination of theory with practice" (meaning the "freedom" to interpret theoretical premises or reject them in line with current policy). These directives were formulated and propagandized as the "most fundamental principles of Marxism" by Deng Xiaoping. According to other definitions, the "party ideological line" consists of the so-called "four basic principles": "adherence to the socialist path, proletarian dictatorship, recognition of the guiding role of the party and Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong," which were set forth in April 1979 as a counterbalance to the tendency to purge Maoism of ultra-leftist ideas. In spite of the differences in these interpretations of the "ideological line," however, they are the same in essence because the "most fundamental principles of Marxism," even according to official propaganda, are the same "Thought of Mao" during different periods when he was opposing the supporters of Marxism-Leninism in the CCP. Consequently, even the "ideological line of the third plenum" is defined as a line "established by Comrade Mao Zedong."[3]

The main trend in official policy-making in the ideological sphere in China today is the practice of equating various official directives after the 11th CCP Congress (1977) through the recognition of Maoism as the general ideological basis of party activity. The directive to "free the consciousness"[4] and the "four basic principles" have been reduced to a common denominator: The "four basic principles" have been defined as the "main way of freeing the consciousness" and "Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong" have been declared the only possible ideological basis. The tendency toward de-ideologization, which was the reason for the first appeals to "free the consciousness," has diminished and the task of "freeing the consciousness" is now reduced to the simple revival of the "party ideological line" in the form of the "most fundamental principles of Marxism." The "freeing" is now aimed at more specific goals: overcoming the dogmatic acceptance of all "Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong," correcting the errors of the "Cultural Revolution" and renouncing the slogan that "class struggle is the basis."[5] Furthermore, the aim of "overcoming dogmatism" has been clarified in the slogan calling for the "restoration of a businesslike, realistic approach" in line with the directives of the Fourth CCP Central Committee Plenum regarding the "restoration of the true appearance of the Thought of Mao Zedong." This "restoration" is primarily taking the form of criticism of the "ultra-leftist line of Lin Biao and the gang of four" and criticism of the "idealistic views of Kang Sheng," as "one of the major theoretical sources of the ultra-leftist line."[6] During the course of this criticism, ultra-leftist Maoist distortions of the theory and practice of socialist construction are called distortions of the "Thought of Mao."

One aspect of the efforts to "restore the true appearance of the Thought of Mao" is the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi, which was an important event in Chinese ideological life in 1980. This rehabilitation was presented to public opinion as, on the one hand, "evidence that the announced goal of restoring the true appearance of the Thought of Mao Zedong is not simply a meaningless phrase" and, on the other, evidence of the actual correction of the errors of the "Cultural Revolution" in line with a "businesslike, realistic approach." In contrast to the criticism of the "ultra-leftist line," the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi turned into an open apology for the Maoist ideology. Several works by Liu Shaoqi and many articles about him appeared in the press, commending his activity as a "revolutionary Marxist and prominent PRC statesman." A characteristic statement in these articles was that although Liu Shaoqi had made "some errors," he never had a "line of his own" which differed from the CCP Central Committee line, and his thoughts "coincided with the Thought of Mao Zedong."[7] In short, the "rehabilitated Liu Shaoqi" not only appeared to have been Mao Zedong's loyal compatriot, but also one of the founders of the "system of Mao Zedong's thought"--the embodiment of "collective party wisdom." The apologetic purpose of this rehabilitation was apparent in the statements that it was undertaken "for the purpose of firmly and more accurately adhering to the Thought of Mao Zedong as an integral scientific system and restoring the best party traditions, established by Comrade Mao Zedong." The "Thought of Mao" was called the "spiritual treasure of the CCP and the Chinese people" and it was said that "the guiding significance of the Thought of Mao Zedong" in the life of the party and people "will increase in the future." As a result of the restoration of the "true appearance of the Thought of Mao," Beijing propaganda formulated the "great truth" that "the principle of a businesslike, realistic approach and the correction of errors, established by Mao Zedong for the CCP, is precisely the Thought of Mao Zedong as a scientific system."[8]

Therefore, the basis of the CCP leadership's policy and ideological line is still Maoist ideology, "restored in its true appearance"--that is, in a form purged of leftist revolutionary ideas. This testifies to the stronger influence of the rightist pragmatic group in the Chinese leadership, which suggested, after the 11th CCP Congress, the further revision of Mao's ideological heritage and the renunciation of his ideas of the late 1950's; in other words, this advocated the absolutization of superstructural factors, which essentially took the form of "continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." In this way, a compromise was reached: Maoism remained the ideological basis of party activity, but it was reduced to the pragmatic directives of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum (1978). The resulting situation, in which Maoism lost its leftist revolutionary aims but retained the status of official PRC ideology, refutes the belief that Maoism is a purely "leftist" ideology.

The relative stabilization of the ideological line of the acceptance of Maoism as the official ideology breathed new life into the propaganda of the "Thought of Mao." In 1980 the statements about Mao Zedong's "contribution" to social theory and practice and about the impermissibility of departures from the "Thought of Mao" became more peremptory and more categorical than they had been the year before. Quotations from Mao began to be used more widely as "theoretical grounds" for current objectives. In line with the directives of the Fourth CCP Central Committee Plenum, which reunited the entire CCP with Maoism, it was suggested that Maoism was "a natural phenomenon engendered by the entire history of the Chinese revolution's development" and that "the birth of the Thought of Mao Zedong

was commanded by history."[9] Tracing the process of Maoism's ideological growth, propaganda is trying to ascribe all of the achievements of the Chinese revolution to the "Thought of Mao" and depict all of the conquests of the Chinese people as a Maoist triumph. Statements about the "interrelationship between theory and practice" are used for the same apologetic purposes.

The essence of Maoist apologies is now reflected in the thesis that "the Thought of Mao Zedong led the Chinese revolution to victory because it is the truth, and it is true because it is consistent with Chinese reality and with the objective laws of the Chinese revolution."

The first stage in Maoism's establishment as the ideological and political current that laid, according to current Chinese propaganda, theoretical foundations for the Chinese revolution that were "correct and suitable for Chinese conditions" was distinguished by the theory of "rural encirclement of the city," which paved "a new revolutionary path--the Jinggangshan path," which was different from the path of the October Revolution. This theory is being called the "quintessence of collective party wisdom" and "an important part of the scientific system of the Thought of Mao Zedong" because Mao Zedong himself made the "most systematic contribution" to its elaboration.

The next stage, the stage of struggle against "dogmatism," began with the conference in Zunyi (1935), when the Maoists usurped the power in the CCP, and ended with the "zhengfeng" campaign of the Yanan period (1942-1945), when "Sinized Marxism" was imposed on the CCP as the ideological basis of its activity. The "new democratic revolution" theory[10] that resulted from this campaign has been called "the conclusion of the consistent establishment of the scientific system of Mao Zedong's thought." Furthermore, the "scientific system" of Mao's ideas was called the "dialectical materialistic ideological line created by Mao Zedong," with the "businesslike, realistic approach" as its focal point. Its "restoration" is the main objective of the present official ideological course. This "line" was precisely the reason, according to official propaganda, for the triumph of the Chinese revolution and the successful implementation of the CCP general line of socialist construction in 1947-1957, which is called "the decade of the most vivid and triumphant results of Mao Zedong's ideological line."[11]

Instilling specific content into "Mao's ideological line," official propaganda has primarily cited individual ideas, primarily of a "businesslike" nature, as Mao's "theoretical contribution to Marxism." The idea of "studying and discussing matters on the local level" has been elevated to the status of a "Marxist principle of operation, set forth by Comrade Mao Zedong," and is being represented as the scientific discovery of the method of concrete sociological research![12] Propaganda is once again extolling "Mao's contribution" to the elaboration of the Marxist philosophy. Mao's ideas about the mutually transforming potential of spirit and matter, which are essentially dualistic, are being called a "great contribution."[13]

"Mao's ideological line" also includes "integral teachings"--the "teachings on practice" and the "teachings on contradictions"--which refer to Mao Zedong's works "Regarding Practice" and "Regarding Contradictions." Furthermore, the work "An Enquiry Into the Correct Resolution of Contradictions Within the Population" (1957) is being called Mao Zedong's last work on the "teachings" level and is also being represented as a "Marxist theory."[14] As for Maoism's subsequent (after 1957)

ideological evolution, it is being ignored in the Beijing press. The so-called "great theory of Chairman Mao Zedong about the continuation of revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat," which served as the ideological and theoretical grounds for the "Cultural Revolution" and was called "Mao's greatest contribution to Marxism" at the 11th CCP Congress (1977), has now been excluded from the subject matter of official propaganda and from the list of "Mao's ideas."

Propaganda invariably links statements about the continuous "augmentation of the guiding role of the Thought of Mao Zedong" in social practice with the line of the "four modernizations," the "unshakeable guiding principle" of which is "firm adherence to Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong."[15] At present, propaganda about "Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong" is the major way of cultivating the Maoist ideology. It is true that some Beijing publications use the simple term "Marxism-Leninism" but they do not contrast the "Thought of Mao" to this doctrine.

Ideological affairs in the PRC in recent months have provided new proof of the Chinese leadership's speculative and parasitical treatment of Marxism-Leninism, which is being cultivated on the official level in order to substantiate the ideological and political line and socioeconomic course of the present leaders. These data indicate that propaganda about Marxism-Leninism in today's China is actually the revision of this doctrine from the standpoint of Maoism in its "true form." The rightist pragmatic purpose of this revision has become increasingly evident during the process of similar revisions of the "Thought of Mao." Beijing propaganda is openly linking its appeals for the study of Marxism-Leninism with the interests of "restoring the true appearance of the Thought of Mao Zedong" and the task of gaining "a correct understanding of the new theoretical grounds for the four basic principles." The insistence on a "restored appearance" has also been applied to Marxism-Leninism, and its "restoration" is being carried out in the same way as the "restoration" of the Thought of Mao--that is, by reducing the essence of Marxism-Leninism to the "most fundamental principles" and, in the final analysis, to the "businesslike, realistic approach" that has been called the common "fundamental principle of Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong."[16]

The official attitude toward Marxism-Leninism in China today is distinguished by its rejection as a theory of scientific communism on the grounds that the founders of Marxism-Leninism supposedly "did not and could not provide a specific definition of socialism" and limited themselves to merely indicating "general principles"--public ownership of the means of production and distribution according to labor.[17] The thesis concerning the "absence" of a theory of scientific communism in Marxism-Leninism and, consequently, the absence of teachings about the natural laws governing the construction of socialism "in any specific country" (although this was precisely how Marxism began) was set forth in Chinese propaganda as early as the end of 1979. To develop this thesis,[18] attempts are now being made to reduce the entire content of Marxism-Leninism to only its methodological aspects and to interpret Marxism not as an entity made up of three elements--that is, not as a theory of scientific communism in the broad sense of the term--but simply as a theory of cognition from the rightist Maoist vantage point, in which the point of departure is the so-called "vantage point of practice," described as the "key aspect of Marxist philosophy and the theoretical system (?) of Marxism." What is more, the Beijing press has called Deng Xiaoping's "eloquent phrase" that "it is not important whether a cat is grey or white as long as it catches mice" the essence of the "Marxist theory of cognition."[19]

In 1980 the previous goal of creating a "new theory" by combining "Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong" with the practice of the "four modernizations" was essentially renounced. The ideological platform is now being revised under the slogan of the "development of Marxism," which, as was pointed out above, signifies the refusal of the Beijing leadership to recognize Marxism-Leninism as a theory of scientific communism. The thesis about a "crisis of faith" has been put forth as grounds for the insistence on this "development of Marxism." Propaganda is blaming Marxism for the widespread feelings of disillusionment with Maoist ideology and policy in China in recent years. The official press has blamed this phenomenon not only on errors in the construction of socialism in China through the fault of the "leftist ideology" and "line of Lin Biao and the gang of four," imposed on the nation under the guise of Marxism, but also on the "contradiction between theory and practice" that has allegedly arisen because "Marxist books contain no answer to the newest questions" raised by international affairs. One method of overcoming the "crisis of faith" has been proposed--a "new development of Marxism in China," which is supposed to be just as radical as the development that allegedly took place in the history of the Chinese revolution, when the "new Jinggangshan path" was discovered during the process of the struggle against "dogmatism," as a result of which it supposedly became possible to overcome the "first crisis of Marxism encountered by the CCP during the stage of democratic revolution."

This "contradiction" between theory and practice has even been described as the impetus for a "new development of Marxism," and the restoration of the "dialectical materialistic ideological party line," which was supposedly always "insisted upon by Comrade Mao Zedong," has been called the basic prerequisite for its accomplishment. The restoration of the "businesslike, realistic approach" is regarded as the actual beginning of the "new development of Marxism." Although the press admits that the Maoists do not have any new theoretical premises as yet, and that even if they do appear they are interpreted "in the old way"--as revisionism--the present course in ideology is nonetheless regarded as a "new development of Marxism" and the present stage of China's history is regarded as a "period of dramatic replacement of the old with the new."[20] What is more, the "development of Marxism" is interpreted in line with Mao's sophistic "idea" that "a Marxist is not someone who is not Marx' equal or even someone who is Marx' equal, but only someone who has surpassed Marx" (!)[21]

In connection with the policy of restoring the "true appearance of Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong" and the insistence on their "new development," Maoist theoreticians are particularly interested in the problem of dogmatism and revisionism. Their positions on this problem are not only tendentious and speculative but are also intended to substantiate the need for this "new development" of Marxism and inspire the appropriate "research." As part of this process, the incompatibility of Marxism with "dogmatism" is persistently stressed, but the previous theses about the danger of revisionism have been forgotten and, in essence, the very possibility of revisionism is denied on the condition that the so-called "criterion of practice" is observed. Official propaganda has actually announced an entire campaign against "dogmatism." The previous insistence on "freeing the consciousness" has gained new meaning in connection with this. It is no longer simply an appeal to replace the ideocratic approach with a "businesslike approach," but also a demand to renounce "dogmatism." The consciousness is still supposed to be freed from excessive reliance on books, uncritical reading and ideological stagnation or semistagnation, but these are now being called "a dogmatic attitude

toward Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong as something inviolable." Another thesis[22] suggests that "the development of Marxism on the basis of practice cannot be regarded as revisionism." In this interpretation, "dogmatism" signifies a refusal to "correct Marxism" and revisionism signifies the modification of the "basic principles of Marxism, with the most fundamental one being the principle of the unity of theory and practice." From this standpoint, any "corrections" of theory to the benefit of political practice cannot be called revisionism and, therefore, the restoration of the "businesslike, realistic approach," presupposing the renunciation of leftist revolutionary Maoist concepts, "cannot be called revisionism."[23]

The instructions to overcome "dogmatism" have recently been supplemented by appeals to overcome the "non-analytical approach" to past ideology, including the Marxist heritage. These appeals have actually allowed the "struggle against dogmatism" to evolve directly into rightist revisionism. The "analytical" approach to Marxism-Leninism was reflected, in particular, in the denial of Lenin's teachings about the forms of proletarian class struggle during the transition period and the denial of the need to suppress bourgeois opposition and the possible exacerbation of the class struggle, which, according to Beijing theoreticians, "are inconsistent with Chinese reality" (!)[24] Finally, this "analytical approach" was reflected in open appeals for the study of non-Marxist ideological and political currents. Under the guise of overcoming the "dogmatic viewpoint," officials in Beijing are now demanding recognition of the "progressive role of the idealistic philosophy," which "still promotes the development of philosophical thinking by bringing up new problems and ushering in new fields [of research]" and are calling for the "combination of today's Chinese philosophy with the traditional Chinese philosophy," without which, they allege, "the development of philosophy will be impossible in present-day China."[25]

The "new development of Marxism" is mainly taking the form of attempts to find "new" grounds for the "Chinese form of the four modernizations"--that is, the previous "special path to socialism." It is here that its rightist revisionist essence is most apparent, as well as its denial of the general laws governing the construction of socialism, which were revealed in the theory of scientific communism, summarized in documents of the international communist movement and corroborated by the international experience of the socialist community and the experience of socialist construction in the PRC in 1953-1957.

The conceptual aspect of the "Chinese form of socialism" has not been worked out by its authors as yet, and available publications indicate only the basic principles and general features of its establishment. In 1980 there were some attempts to justify the definition of the "Chinese form" as a special path to socialism with the aid of the fashionable revisionist idea of "models of socialism." However, they did not or could not amplify this idea, and public opinion is still being prepared for this process. Criticism was leveled at the "belief of some comrades" that socialism could take "only one form" and that its construction could only be carried out in one way, and their ignorance of the fact that "the term 'socialism' could signify a variety of developmental forms."[26] This thesis, which is correct in principle, has been given a revisionist content in line with the opportunistic theory of "models of socialism." In essence, the "Chinese form" of socialism is substantiated by the old Maoist statements about China's unique history. These old statements have merely been amplified; the Maoists have supplemented them with references to unique natural, socioeconomic, demographic and other conditions.[27]

An analysis of the Chinese press indicates that the investigation of the "Chinese form of socialism" is still not within the competence of scientific research. The matter is now being discussed on the political level and it is the task of researchers to simply find ideological grounds for this. Furthermore, those who are trying to establish the concept of the "Chinese form of socialism" are obviously striving primarily to substantiate the Beijing leadership's insistence on "combining socialism with a market economy." Judging by all indications, this is thought of as the basic characteristic of the "Chinese form of socialism." This insistence, which was first substantiated by practical considerations--the need to quickly develop productive forces, solve employment problems and so forth--gradually began to acquire "theoretical" grounds as well.

Chinese theorists have recently displayed considerable interest in the "question" of the nature of socialist ownership. Widespread discussion has resulted in the "conclusion" that socialist ownership is extremely diverse (!) in character, depending on the degree of collectivization. Attempts have been made at the unnatural separation of state socialist ownership from public socialist ownership.[28] There is no question that some part has been played here by Mao's "idea" that only something subject to state distribution can be called public property. The "conclusion" about the "diverse forms of socialist ownership" serves essentially to justify the restoration of non-socialist forms of ownership under the guise of using "various economic forms with varying degrees of collectivization." The basis of all this is Mao Zedong's old "idea" about "putting all positive factors to use" to turn China into a "strong power."

The conclusion regarding the "varied character of socialist ownership" eventually evolved into candid statements about the "multistructural socialist economy." In this connection, Beijing propaganda has taken advantage of Lenin's statements about the New Economic Policy. The false interpretation of the temporary use of capitalist elements in the economy of the USSR essentially implies that this is a natural part of the entire period of socialist construction. Beijing ideologists allege (of course, without any references to direct sources) that "Lenin stated that the New Economic Policy in economics and (!) politics would completely guarantee the construction of the economic foundations of socialism."[29]

The thesis about the "Chinese form of socialism" necessitated the corresponding revision of the principles of state economic management in the direction of decentralized planning. Beijing "theorists" have taken pains to verbally promote the combination of planning with market regulation of production. The "accuracy" of this combination is substantiated by remarks by prominent CCP members, included in the "scientific system of Mao Zedong's Thought," particularly Liu Shaoqi's remarks about the need to restrict the role of planning and augment the role of market regulation in order to give the socialist economy such features as "variety and flexibility."[30]

The talk about reinforcing the role of market regulation has led Beijing theorists to "conclusions" about the need to acknowledge the principle of competition. Without a hint of embarrassment, the question of "socialist competition" has been formulated in the spirit of the "survival of the fittest": "If I succeed, you fail." For this reason, it is not surprising that official propaganda sometimes takes the position of social Darwinism when this matter is discussed, citing examples from nature, where the law of natural selection is in force.[31]

At the end of 1980 the results of many years of discussion of the basic law of socialism in the Chinese press were summarized. The main goal of the socialist society was declared to be the fullest possible (!) satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the people. This could have been viewed as an important victory for sociopolitical thought in present-day China if the formulation of the basic law of socialism had been separated from the "Thought of Mao" and the entire policy of the "Chinese form of the four modernizations" for the sake of intensive militarization. As matters stand now, however, it is clear that the basic law of socialism was vindicated solely for demagogic purposes. At the same time, obvious attempts were made, "in the interests of the maximum enrichment of the material and cultural life of the people," the "maximum development of the individual's potential" and the "maximum development of production," to camouflage and rationalize the rightist revisionist distortion of socialist theory and practice, which is contrary to the fundamental interests of the Chinese people. The purpose of this demagogy was reflected in the typical propaganda statements that all "forms," "methods" and "paths" are good "as long as they stimulate production, enrich life and are accepted by the masses."[32]

The Beijing press has recently been appealing for the introduction of the "Yanan spirit" into public practice--a spirit which is expressed in the famous Maoist slogan: "Do not fear difficulty, do not fear death."[33] In essence, this signifies a return to the previous Maoist policy of "sacrificing" and disregarding the interests of the working public for the sake of the hegemonistic program of militarization. The revival of these aims testifies to the demagogic nature of the "acceptance" of the basic law of socialism and to the continuous struggle within the Chinese leadership over the ideological bases of domestic policy. It is also evident that Beijing propaganda statements about "the nature of socialist ownership" and "the objective laws governing the construction of socialism in China" are inconsistent and unstable. No constant or officially approved definitions of the "Chinese form of socialism" have appeared in the press. This means that the official ideological doctrine in the PRC is still amorphous, and this is due to the uncertainty of the Chinese leadership's domestic policy line. In spite of the loud appeals for the "intensive development" of non-socialist forms of economic activity, this policy as a whole is still limited. This is obviously due to the leadership's fears that the uncontrolled revival of non-socialist practices will lead to the loss of the Maoist style of rigid control over economic and social life. For this reason, non-socialist practices are defined as something auxiliary, as "a supplement to the socialist economy."[34] Nevertheless, this line does not call for temporary measures, but for the "Chinese form of socialism," and the efforts to revive the non-socialist sector in China's economy are rationalized in propaganda as a "policy of genuine scientific socialism."[35]

The need to determine the criteria of the "Chinese form of socialism" has presented Beijing propaganda with another urgent ideological problem, the problem of the existence of classes and class struggle in today's China. The urgency of this problem stems from the fact that, in the last 2 years, the official press has essentially disavowed Mao Zedong's well-known "theory of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat," which was based on the thesis that antagonistic classes exist in the socialist society and that a "new bourgeoisie" is constantly being engendered in China. This is supposedly the reason for fierce class struggle in the socialist society, a struggle between socialism and capitalism, and the reason for the probability of the latter's restoration. According

to this theory, this "basic contradiction of socialism" could be resolved by means of "new cultural revolutions." All of these statements by Mao Zedong are now being described in the Beijing press as "the distortion of the Thought of Mao by the gang of four."

In place of this "theory," contemporary Beijing ideologists have proposed the thesis regarding the "complete sociopolitical homogeneity" (!) of present-day Chinese society, the economic conditions of which exclude the possibility of the birth of new exploitative classes and, consequently, class struggle. Political events, however, soon presented ideologists with a problem: How could the mounting dissatisfaction of broad segments of the public with the leadership's policy line and the increased opposition to this line on various party levels be explained? How could this opposition be qualified? And, most importantly, on what grounds should it be combated? As we can see, this was the old Maoist problem of finding "theoretical" justification for unavoidable repression. Propaganda turned to Mao Zedong's "teachings" about the "two types of contradictions" in the socialist society and attempted to "modernize" them in line with "new objectives." What was "new" here was the need to "coordinate" the current Beijing propaganda thesis about the absence of antagonistic classes, about the "social homogeneity" of present-day Chinese society, with Mao Zedong's "theory" about the continuation of class struggle under socialism. As a result of "theoretical inquiries" and numerous debates, Beijing ideologists came up with a "totally new" idea about "class struggle in China in the absence of exploitative classes." The "theoretical" basis of this idea was the same old Maoist theory about the "two types of contradictions" under socialism. The statement about the "social homogeneity" of China necessitated that contradictions "within the population" be stressed. At the same time, these contradictions were declared consistent with the concept of "class struggle," which was thereby extended to relations "within the population," including conflicts between the working public and the bourgeoisie, which are now wholly included in the category of "contradictions within the population." The official Beijing press is even calling this old Maoist postulate the ideological and theoretical basis of the "unique and productive experiment in the socialist reform of capitalist ownership in the PRC"!

The Beijing ideologists have not completely discarded Mao's thesis that conflicts exist "between us and our enemies." This thesis is present in the "new" concept of "class struggle without exploitative classes." "Now that there are no exploitative classes and the class struggle is continuing in specific forms," RENMIN RIBAO reported, "it is still manifesting itself as conflicts within the population and as conflicts between us and our enemies."[36] The circle is therefore closed by the "classic" confusion: All of the "theoretical inquiries" aimed at explaining the class struggle in today's China have ended in a return to Mao Zedong's old "theory" about the existence of class "enemies" and class struggle in the socialist society. The anti-people policy line and the mounting dissatisfaction with this line in the country have unavoidably led the ideologists of the present Beijing regime to the restoration, in a slightly updated form, of the previous Maoist "theory" of class struggle under socialist conditions, which always served only to justify the policy of purges and mass repression, but not against bourgeois and antisocial elements.

These are the main features of the "fifth modernization in China," the modernization of Maoist ideological concepts in 1980. The Chinese leadership's elaboration

of a new ideological and political doctrine has remained true, on the whole, to the same old "Thought of Mao Zedong," which has been declared the embodiment of the "application and development of Marxism-Leninism in the Chinese revolution" and "the present and future wealth of the party and state."[37] This doctrine has been formulated as a rightist revisionist modification of Maoism, as a nationalist platform of alliance with opportunism and anticommunism on the common soil of hostility toward the theory and practice of real socialism and scientific communism. Such ideological principles of Maoism as hegemonism, anti-Sovietism and great-Han chauvinism have been preserved in this doctrine in their entirety.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.
2. O. Ye. Vladimirov and M. A. Il'in, "Evolyutsiya politiki i ideologii maoizma v 70-kh--nachale 80-kh godov," Moscow, 1980, p 311.
3. RENMIN RIBAO, 30 May 1980.
4. PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1980, No 1, p 126.
5. HONGQI, 1980, No 12, pp 28-31.
6. RENMIN RIBAO, 4 August 1980.
7. Ibid., 1 March, 16 May, 3 April 1980.
8. Ibid., 3 March, 16 May 1980.
9. Ibid., 4 July, 11 November 1980.
10. Ibid., 18 September, 15 April, 11 November 1980.
11. Ibid., 29 May 1980.
12. HONGQI, 1980, No 15, p 20.
13. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 July 1980.
14. GUANGMING RIBAO, 14 August 1980.
15. RENMIN RIBAO, 3 March 1980.
16. Ibid., 16 July, 3 March 1980.
17. Ibid., 8 August 1980.
18. HONGQI, 1980, No 14, pp 38-45.
19. RENMIN RIBAO, 14 April 1980.

20. Ibid., 11 November 1980.

21. HONGQI, 1980, No 12, p 34.

22. Ibid., 1980, No 1, pp 42-45.

23. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 August 1980.

24. Ibid., 12 August 1980.

25. Ibid., 18 August 1980; GUANGMING RIBAO, 7 August 1980.

26. RENMIN RIBAO, 8 August 1980.

27. HONGQI, 1980, No 9, p 22.

28. GUANGMING RIBAO, 15 March 1980.

29. RENMIN RIBAO, 22 April 1980.

30. GUANGMING RIBAO, 25 May 1980.

31. RENMIN RIBAO, 8 August 1980.

32. Ibid.

33. GUANGMING RIBAO, 22 January 1981.

34. RENMIN RIBAO, 13 August 1980.

35. GUANGMING RIBAO, 7 July 1980.

36. RENMIN RIBAO, 8 February 1980.

37. HONGQI, 1981, No 2, p 36.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM IN CCP ORIGINS AND ACTIVITY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 112-123

[Article by M. I. Sladkovskiy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Proletarian Internationalism--A Powerful Weapon in the Working Class' Struggle Against World Capital

The 26th CPSU Congress was conclusive evidence of effective communist solidarity based on the principles of proletarian internationalism. The delegates who were sent to the congress by communist, workers and other revolutionary parties heartily saluted this forum of the communists of the Soviet Union, which, as F. Castro said in his speech at the congress, represents "the prospect of peace and a guarantee that the imperialists will be unable to act on their claims to supremacy."[1]

In response to the salutations of the congress' foreign guests, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev said: "You can be certain, dear Comrades, that the Soviet communists, true to Lenin's teachings, will continue to travel the tried and tested internationalist road."[2]

International proletarian solidarity is an essential condition for communist activity. Even when the first communist party, the Communist League, was formed (1847), the founders of scientific communism issued a challenge to the world working class in the famous "Communist Manifesto": "Proletarians of all nations, unite!" "Just as workers of all countries have the same status," F. Engels said, "and just as they have the same interests, they have the same enemies and must fight together."[3]

It was on the basis of these principles that the First Internationale (1864-1876) was established. It, as V. I. Lenin remarked, "laid the foundations for the international organization of workers to prepare for their revolutionary attack on capital."[4]

One of the great services performed by V. I. Lenin, who discovered the laws of social development in the last stage of capitalism, in imperialism, was his elaboration of a strategy and tactics for the proletariat of the modern era. Lenin suggested that imperialism, as an international repressive force, be counteracted by the international unity and solidarity of all working people and all progressive forces in the world. He felt it would be necessary to "arouse the interest and awaken the revolutionary potential of the proletariat and its communist party, and

not just the entire proletariat or the overwhelming majority of proletarians, but all working people and all people exploited by capital."[5]

Under these new conditions, V. I. Lenin believed it would be necessary to add something to the proletarian slogan and approved the wording: "Proletarians of all nations and oppressed people, unite!"[6]

The communist parties, the vanguard of the working class, headed the struggle of working people throughout the world against imperialism for national and social liberation. "The international working class and its political vanguard, the communist and workers parties," L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "approached the 1980's with a confident stride. They approached like vigorous fighters for the rights of working people and for peace and security."[7]

In reference to communist party activity, L. I. Brezhnev said: "The main thing is that communists, armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, have a deeper and more accurate understanding than anyone else of the meaning and possible consequences of world events and draw accurate conclusions from this for their struggle for the interests of the working class and the working people of all countries, for democracy, peace and socialism."[8]

For the parties of scientific communism, international solidarity and proletarian internationalism represent the most important weapon in their struggle against imperialism.

The Political Situation in China Before the Formation of the Communist Party

Due to the domination of feudal-monarchic China by the imperialist powers at the end of the 19th century, the country was completely isolated from the world's progressive and democratic currents. The main thrust of the revolutionary struggle of China's progressive circles at the beginning of the 20th century was the anti-monarchic movement to overthrow the Manchurian Ch'ing Dynasty, which had displayed an absolute inability to defend national interests and was maintaining its authority over the Chinese people by means of despotism and the isolation of the country from the influence of the world progressive public. This stifled the anti-imperialist struggle. The spontaneous Yihetuan anti-imperialist movement was not given any organized leadership by the supporters of democratic reform, and the Ch'ing rulers used this movement to defend the reactionary policy of isolationism and to fuel nationalist fanaticism.

Sun Yat-sen's "People's Will" democratic program ignored the class heterogeneity of Chinese society and absolutized Chinese nationalism (the capitalists were considered to be the worker's benefactors because they gave him work). Sun Yat-sen, just as the Chinese reformists, objectively took an idealistic stand, overestimated the strength of Chinese tradition and held the utopian view that economically weak China could have an equal partnership with the countries of monopolistic capital, with the imperialist states.

Sun Yat-sen, whose ideas enjoyed the most prestige and popularity in the progressive strata of the Chinese public, could not assess the actual state of affairs in the world and in China at that time or scientifically determine China's potential for

development. Nevertheless, his sincere desire to fundamentally transform the country on the basis of three popular principles (national liberation, the formation of a democratic republic and public prosperity), which were declared by Sun Yat-sen in 1906,[9] won the wholehearted sympathy and support of V. I. Lenin. "Militant, genuine democratism," V. I. Lenin wrote, "is apparent in each line of Sun Yat-sen's platform. There is full realization of the inadequacy of 'racial' revolution. There is not a trace of apolitical feeling or even contempt for political freedom, no suggestion that Chinese autocracy might be compatible with Chinese 'social reform,' with Chinese constitutional reforms, and so forth. There is undiluted democratism with the demand for a republic. There are unequivocal statements about the status of the masses, about mass struggle, there is fervent sympathy with workers and the exploited and there is faith in their strength and the belief that they are right."[10]

However, V. I. Lenin also saw the significant defects and petty bourgeois essence of Sun Yat-sen's program. Although he pointed out its noble, subjectively socialist goals, he also noted the historical limitations of the program. "If this theory is examined from the standpoint of doctrine," Lenin wrote, "it is the theory of a petty bourgeois 'socialist'--a reactionary.... With inimitable and, one might say, virginal naivete, Sun Yat-sen completely discredits his own reactionary populist theory by announcing what reality itself has announced--namely, that 'China is on the verge of gigantic industrial' (that is, capitalist) 'development,' that...'there will be many Shanghais'--that is, millions of centers of capitalist wealth and proletarian need and poverty."[11]

It is extremely significant, however, that V. I. Lenin took a concrete historical approach when he assessed Sun Yat-sen's activity during this period. Although he revealed the objective causes of the weakness of the revolutionary movement in China, V. I. Lenin also commended the efforts of revolutionary democrats in China and expressed deep faith in their victory. "Nevertheless," he wrote, "the revolutionary democrats in China...have done much to awaken the people and to attain freedom and consistently democratic institutions."[12]

On the whole, Sun Yat-sen ignored the antagonistic nature of capitalism and the certainty that it would engage in expansionism during the monopolistic stage of its development, and this caused him to draw illusory political conclusions.[13] This was most clearly reflected in Sun Yat-sen's "Appeal to All Friendly Nations," in which Sun addressed the great capitalist powers in the hope of obtaining material assistance for the reconstruction of China and its transformation into a leading state. The imperialist states' reply to this request is well known. The imperialists taught the Chinese idealists a brutal lesson. They humiliated China with the Versailles Treaty and began a new campaign for the partition of China. The Chinese people had to find new means and methods of escaping the clutches of feudalism and imperialist domination and of building a democratic republic. The Communist Internationale, established at the initiative and under the guidance of V. I. Lenin, offered a means of national and social liberation. It consisted in a strong and indissoluble alliance binding the liberation movement in China to the first Nation of Soviets and the entire world communist and workers movement.

The October Revolution Lights the Way for the Chinese Revolution

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution marked the beginning of the era of the world capitalist system's collapse and the imperialist colonial system's profound crises and subsequent disintegration. The revolution in Russia was a powerful stimulus for the national consciousness of dependent and colonial countries. It inspired all progressive forces in China to take an active part in politics. The example set by the Russian proletariat inspired Chinese patriots to fight for national and social progress. They viewed the Nation of Soviets as a loyal ally.

The imperialist powers took pains to isolate oppressed China from Soviet Russia. The foreign policy announced by the government of Soviet Russia, which was based on equality, national independence and sovereignty, undermined the colonial policy of the imperialist powers and stimulated the establishment of relations between people on the basis of new, egalitarian principles.

The "Message of the RSFSR Government to the Chinese People and the Governments of North and South China" (25 July 1919) was particularly important to the people of China. From this message, the Chinese people learned of the Red Army's triumphant advance through Siberia to the borders of China, and heard that this army was "bringing help not only to our (Russian--M. S.) laboring classes, but also to the Chinese people." This message was the first act of Soviet Russian moral and political aid to China.[14]

The ideas of scientific communism spread through China under the influence of October. An important role in publicizing Soviet Russia's revolutionary experience was played by the Chinese living in Soviet territory, and by Qu Qiubo, who wrote accurate accounts of Soviet affairs as a CHEN BAO correspondent.

The idea of following the Russians' example began to take root in Chinese revolutionary democratic circles. Sun Yat-sen arrived at the same conclusion. On 28 August 1920, when Sun Yat-sen was the head of the revolutionary base in the south, he requested the RSFSR Government for an opportunity to study Soviet Russia's experience. This was followed by a message to the Soviet Government, requesting military and economic aid for China's revolutionary south.

The gradual realization of China's historical underdevelopment, the repeated failure of plans for national resurgence with the aid of the imperialist powers, the Soviet nation's sincere international interest in the future of the Chinese people and its willingness to give them every type of assistance in the struggle for independence and social progress motivated Sun Yat-sen and many other revolutionary-minded Chinese patriots to depart from the bourgeois nationalist concept of the racial solidarity of Asian countries and resolutely support a revolutionary alliance connecting all oppressed people in the world with Soviet Russia.

The Comintern's Help in the Formation of the CCP and the Determination of Chinese Revolutionary Objectives

The Comintern's revolutionary strategy regarding the people of the colonies and dependent countries was based on V. I. Lenin's history-making conclusion that a backward country could achieve socialism without going through the capitalist stage of development if it had the support and assistance of the proletariat of progressive countries.

Basing his conclusions on the experience of the revolutionary movement and socio-economic reforms in the backward, formerly colonial outlying regions of tsarist Russia, V. I. Lenin said that, "with the aid of the proletariat of progressive countries, the backward countries can achieve a Soviet order and, after undergoing certain stages of development, communism without going through the capitalist stage of development."[15] This conclusion played a tremendous role in the growth of the national liberation movement in the Eastern countries, the establishment of their strong ties with the world communist movement and the gradual evolution of the national liberation movement into a social revolution. When V. I. Lenin revealed the indissoluble connection between struggle for national liberation and struggle for social liberation, he stressed that "in the coming decisive battles of the world revolution, the movement of the majority of the earth's population, which was originally aimed at national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism and could play a much more important revolutionary role than we expect."[16]

Lenin's program for an alliance between progressive forces in dependent and colonial countries and the anti-imperialist struggle of the world proletariat provided broad historical scope for cooperation by these forces in the struggle for social progress. "We will strive," Lenin wrote, "to give people who are more backward and oppressed than we 'selfless cultured assistance,' in the eloquent words of the Polish Social Democrats--that is, we will help them to progress to the use of machines, to the simplification of labor, to democracy and to socialism."[17] As we know, this program has been successfully implemented. A strong alliance of contemporary revolutionary forces, made up of the socialist community, the world workers' movement and the national liberation movement, has taken shape in the world and is taking successful action.

In its work in China, the Comintern was guided by V. I. Lenin's instructions about the need to establish revolutionary parties in all colonial and backward countries and to train leaders who would be able to head the working masses' movement for national and social liberation, direct them to establish soviets and oversee the transition of these countries to the non-capitalist course of development.

In addition to laying theoretical and political bases, which were of policy-planning value to the Chinese revolution, the Comintern rendered a great deal of organizational assistance. In 1920 the first communist groups were formed in China with the participation of the Comintern and preparations were made for the formation of the Chinese Communist Party. In July 1921 the First CCP Congress was convened, marking the beginning of the organized communist movement in China.

After adopting the fundamental, policy-planning premises of the Comintern, the CCP announced in 1922 that it would join the Third Internationale. In other words, it pledged to act in conjunction with other parties. This considerably reinforced the Chinese revolutionary movement's ties with the world communist and workers movement. The interaction of these movements was highly effective, especially with regard to the Chinese revolution. Its successes during all stages of the struggle for national liberation and social progress were indivisible from the internationalist activity of the Comintern and USSR. The establishment of contacts with the revolutionary south, headed by Sun Yat-sen, and the subsequent Soviet military, economic and personnel assistance offered to the southern government reinforced the CCP's position. Sun Yat-sen realized that the CCP enjoyed the ideological and political

support of the USSR and was on close terms with it. It was this that simplified and accelerated the creation of a united national democratic front based on the CCP's alliance with the Kuomintang. When the communists joined the Kuomintang (retaining their own organization with centralized party machinery), they helped to considerably revolutionize the Kuomintang's policy line.

The manifesto of the First Kuomintang Congress (January 1924) noted that the Kuomintang was waging a struggle against imperialists and militarists, against the classes whose interests were contrary to the interests of the peasants and workers. In other words, it was waging a struggle for the liberation of peasants and workers. Such prominent internationalist communists as Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo and others participated in compiling the manifesto, and this made it possible to set not only national objectives, but also demand the social liberation of workers and peasants.

The international proletariat, represented by the Soviet Union in government relations with China and by the Comintern in party affairs, rendered a great deal of theoretical and practical assistance in the establishment of a working class party, the CCP, and this promoted the development of the revolutionary movement in China.

Attempts by Imperialists and Chinese Reactionaries To Isolate China from the USSR and the International Communist Movement

Anti-Sovietism and a struggle against the "red menace" were the main components of imperialist foreign policy in the post-October period. The imperialist powers asserted that the Chinese revolution was the "work of Moscow" and they therefore believed it was essential to isolate China from the Soviet Union and annihilate the "Soviet agents"--Chinese communists.

Preparing for his counterrevolutionary coup, Chiang Kai-shek was already attempting in March 1926 to keep communists out of southern government bodies and thereby isolate the CCP and deprive it of international contacts. Chiang's conspiracy with Anglo-American imperialism was founded, on the one hand, on a rabid anti-Soviet foreign policy, aimed at putting an end to Soviet-Chinese treaty relations, and on the other, on Kuomintang China's anticommunist domestic policy, aimed at the terroristic persecution of Chinese communists and progressive public spokesmen.

Imperialism and Chinese reaction hoped to stop the historical process of the revolutionization of Chinese society by isolating China from the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

China's isolation from the USSR, the CPSU and the international communist movement was also promoted by the bourgeois nationalist views expressed by some CCP leaders, consisting essentially in a denial of the principle of proletarian internationalism and the establishment of the nationalist great-Han ideology in the party. At first, this tendency was camouflaged by "arch-revolutionary" attitudes and devotion to "world revolution." At the beginning of the 1930's "Lilisanism" became one of the dangerous varieties of great-Han chauvinism. Li Li-san, who reported the "rapid growth of revolution throughout the world" and declared that the construction of socialism in one country (that is, in the USSR) engendered "pure opportunism," also alleged that a revolutionary situation existed only in China and that China, consequently, should become the center of the world revolution. Li Li-san's followers

took an instigative, provocative position with regard to the Soviet Union and tried to push the USSR into a war with Japan.[18]

Under the cover of arch-revolutionary slogans, Li Li-san, who was supported by Mao Zedong in fundamental strategic matters, was essentially urging the CCP to sever its ties with the Comintern and the international communist movement.

Mao Zedong's sectarian ambitions were one of the main reasons for the weaker ties with the Comintern and the isolation of revolutionary bases (the soviet regions in the Chinese Soviet Republic) from the Soviet Union. They also kept the Chinese Soviet Republic from entering into an alliance with the 19th Army, which was led by General Cai Tingkai and had rebelled against Chiang Kai-shek, in Fujian Province. The acquisition of this coastal province would have made the establishment of maritime communications between the Chinese Soviet Republic and the USSR possible (1933). Mao Zedong's objections to convergence with Cai Tingkai predetermined the defeat suffered by the rebels in Fujian Province and complicated the defense of the soviet regions.

The Significance of Soviet Aid to China During the Years of the Anti-Japanese Struggle

Japan's attack on China taught the Chinese people the truth about the Kuomintang's imperialist allies--the United States and Great Britain. They actually encouraged Japan in the hope of using it as an anticommunist policeman.

Under these conditions the Soviet-Chinese non-aggression pact, signed 27 August 1937, played an inestimable role. Loyally adhering to the principle of proletarian internationalism, The Soviet Union gave China wholehearted proletarian support and a great deal of material assistance. By 1937 the USSR was already sending large quantities of weapons, ammunition, fuel and other military supplies to China. In 1938 and 1939 China was extended 250 million dollars in credit for the purchase of military equipment. Military freight was shipped along a specially built highway more than 3,000 kilometers long. In the beginning of 1939 more than 3,500 Soviet military specialists were assisting China in its fight. Soviet volunteer pilots were directly involved in air battles and more than 200 of them died as heroes in the fight for China's independence.

The moral, political, economic and military assistance the Soviet Union gave China in its struggle against Japan helped to establish the alliance between the Kuomintang and CCP and to create the Chinese people's united national anti-Japanese front.

The CCP gained more influence in Chinese society and gradually built up an important territorial base--the Special Zone, with its capital in Yanan.

The necessary conditions for the reinforcement of the position of the popular democratic movement in China, with the CCP playing the leading role, were established on the basis of the CCP's fraternal alliance with the international communist movement and the USSR.

The objectively favorable conditions for the struggle against the Japanese occupation troops, conditions which took shape as a result of the CCP's establishment of

ally relations with the Kuomintang, nationalist tendencies mounted within the CCP leadership and there was some departure from cooperation with the international communist movement. The tactic of basing the CCP in remote rural regions and severing its ties with the nation's industrial centers and the working class helped in this process. The CCP lost the characteristics of a proletarian party.

The Kuomintang took advantage of the CCP's weaker position and moved to the political and military offensive. Military conflicts between the armies of the Kuomintang Government and the troops led by communists disintegrated the united anti-Japanese front.

When the Chiang Kai-shek Government began to concentrate on the struggle against the popular democratic movement, against the communists, it again looked for support from the imperialist powers and began to conduct an anti-Soviet policy.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union could not continue delivering weapons to the Chongqing Government because the Kuomintang leaders were trying to use it in a civil war against the communists.

The Kuomintang Government's anti-Soviet policy weakened the efforts of the Chinese people in the fight against Japanese intervention forces.

Mao Zedong's Nationalist, Anti-Marxist Line Did not Meet the Requirements of the Fight Against Japanese Occupation Troops.

In 1940 Mao Zedong set forth the bourgeois nationalist theory of "new democracy," which postponed China's transition to socialism and a political structure of proletarian dictatorship indefinitely. It signified a complete departure from the policy-planning premises adopted at the First CCP Congress.

After the USSR was invaded by fascist Germany, Mao Zedong and his associates began to change the ideological and political bases of the CCP and to sever ties with scientific communism. These changes took place at the time of the terroristic campaign for the "improvement of style," announced by Mao Zedong in February 1942 and accompanied by the persecution and physical torture of communists opposing Mao Zedong and the expulsion of internationalist communists from the leadership (Wang Ming, Bo Gu, Luo Fu and others).

The departure from Marxist-Leninist theory and from the political practices of parties of scientific communism was reflected in the final documents of the "zhengfeng" campaign--"Decisions on Some Aspects of CCP History," compiled on the eve of the Seventh CCP Congress (April 1945).

The Seventh CCP Congress based its decisions on Mao Zedong's "new democracy" doctrine and announced that "Sinized Marxism"--the "Thought" of Mao Zedong--would be the party ideology. The congress oriented the CCP toward China's special course of development, proceeding from Mao Zedong's ideas about the impossibility of building socialism in China for several decades after the expulsion of the Japanese occupation troops. On the eve of German fascism's defeat and the imminent failure of militaristic Japan, the Maoist leadership of the CCP used various excuses to refuse to cooperate with the USSR and the international communist movement.

After the Soviet Army had defeated the Japanese troops in Manchuria and had helped to restore industry and transportation here, popular democratic authorities in this extremely rich zone controlled all of the major sectors of industry, transportation, communications, banking and foreign trade that had previously belonged to the Japanese. The strong military and economic base established in Manchuria was important as a supply point for the people's liberation army, which, under CCP guidance, had won a complete victory over reactionary forces, and constituted the basis for the creation of a state sector of the economy. The popular democratic administration held all of the political power and the principal economic levers, with the aid of which it could effectively influence the entire Chinese economy.

In this way, a solid foundation was laid in Manchuria for the implementation of Lenin's idea about the possibility of advancing to socialism, with the aid of progressive socialist countries, without going through the capitalist stage of development. Mao Zedong's "new democratic predictions," on the other hand, suffered a failure.

"The direct assistance of the Soviet Union," O. Borisov correctly points out, "in the political, military and economic reinforcement of the Manchurian revolutionary base provides another vivid example of the internationalism of the CPSU and Soviet State. The significance and role of this assistance, which guarantee the thorough preparation of the base for decisive battles, were quite apparent to Chinese internationalist communists, particularly in the party organizations of Manchuria. This is why many of the internationalist communists who fought in Manchuria were repressed during the course of China's many subsequent campaigns."[19]

When the CCP entered industrial centers, the party had to perform more active work in the cities. The Second Plenum of the Seventh CCP Central Committee, held from 5 through 13 March 1949, resolved to transfer its operational emphasis from rural zones to the cities and advised that the work in the cities be conducted primarily with the working class in mind.

The second plenum represented a milestone in the CCP's fundamental reversal in defining the social base of the party (the working class) and the course of China's future development (socialist, and not "new democratic").

The PRC's Treaties and Agreements with the USSR and Other Socialist Countries on Friendship and Mutual Assistance--An Important Factor in the Establishment of Marxist-Leninist Ideology and Policy in the CCP

The experience of the northeast Chinese popular democratic authorities' cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Soviet help in supplying the Manchurian CCP troops with modern weapons, which played the deciding role in the defeat of the Kuomintang armies that were backed up by U.S. military support, convinced the Chinese communists and the laboring public of China that it would be important and necessary for revolutionary China to cooperate closely with the USSR, as the chief base of world socialism, and with the international communist movement.

The Soviet-Chinese treaties and agreements concluded in Moscow were in the interests of the Chinese revolution, the USSR and world socialism. These documents were based on a recognition of equality and independence and on the principles of mutual assistance, in line with the vital interests of the Soviet and Chinese people.[20]

The Chinese people were even more convinced by the action taken in line with the terms of these treaties, as a result of which, the Eighth CCP Congress announced, "socialist reforms won a decisive victory...and the system of class exploitation, which had existed for thousands of years, was eliminated."[21] Commending the role played by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the establishment of a basis for socialism in China, the Eighth CCP Congress made the following decision on China's future course: "We will continue to strengthen and intensify our eternal and invisible fraternal friendship with the Soviet Union and all popular democratic countries.... We will support the socialist movement of the working class and laboring people of all countries and strengthen the international solidarity of the proletariat of all countries."[22]

The Departure of Mao Zedong and His Supporters from the Socialist General Line of the CCP and its Effect on China

In the end of the 1950's Mao Zedong and his supporters began to undermine the principles of proletarian internationalism. The CCP leaders continued to waive the banner of Marxism-Leninism as they openly worked toward separation from the fraternal communist parties and made statements contrary to the general line of the international communist movement. During the course of international conferences of communist and workers parties, particularly the Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960, the Chinese leaders tried to propagandize their own anti-Marxist, adventuristic plans.

In 1960 the Chinese press began to publish derogatory articles about the CPSU and world communist movement. In 1962 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the ruling party of the world's first socialist state, was officially called "revisionist" in a resolution of the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth CCP Central Committee. The anti-Soviet features of CCP policy were intensified at the 11th CCP Central Committee Plenum in 1966. At the 11th CCP Congress in 1977, the struggle against the Soviet Union was legitimized in the party charter.

China's unprecedented attack on Socialist Vietnam in the beginning of 1979 and the Beijing leadership's subsequent unilateral abrogation of the treaty on friendship, alliance and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union unequivocally attested to the CCP leadership's further departure from the principles of proletarian internationalism and its open contempt for these principles. This is also attested to by the Chinese leadership's attempts to establish the "broadest possible united front" to undermine the unity of the socialist community and to fight against the Soviet Union.

According to the CCP Charter, the ideological and theoretical basis of its activity is "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong's Thought." Although this "Thought" has been gradually modified and Mao Zedong's errors have been frankly admitted ever since his death, his reactionary ideas, called the "quintessence of the collective wisdom of the entire party," still constitute the basis of party ideology and policy. The modification of Maoist ideas in recent years has not changed the essence of the post-Mao leadership's ideological platform of great-Han chauvinism, hegemonism and anti-Sovietism.

The principle of democratic centralism is called the organizational principle of the party in the CCP Charter, but the declaration of this principle has not been reinforced by its actual implementation. For years and decades Mao Zedong's group ignored the most important requirements of intra-party life. There was no observance of election and accountability rules, the principles of collective leadership and majority rule and so forth in the CCP. As a result, confusion and chaos reigned in the party. Approximately half of the 38 million CCP members joined the party after the "Cultural Revolution." They have a "weak" or "inadequate," as the Chinese press puts it, understanding of the party and are "incapable of playing the role of an exemplary vanguard." Peasants still make up most of the multimillion-strong membership and the working class represents an extremely negligible percentage of members because the new members who joined after the "Cultural Revolution" were mainly non-proletarian youths.

Some idea of the present composition of the CCP, the low ideological and theoretical level of its members and the degradation of many cadres can be obtained from the CCP Central Committee document "On Some Standards of Intra-Party Political Life," adopted at the Fifth CCP Central Committee Plenum in February 1980 and recommended for compulsory study and implementation in all party organizations.[23] The fact that a special document had to be drawn up as a supplement to the CCP Charter in the 59th year of the party's existence, a document listing the rights and obligations of CCP members, explaining elementary concepts and stipulating the need to observe various principles, testifies to the critical state of cadre policy at the present time.

In the last few years the CCP leadership has made numerous references to the proceedings of the Eighth CCP Congress. We should recall that the policy statements set forth at the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956 were essentially Marxist-Leninist and that they were disregarded by Mao Zedong's group. Now the CCP leadership has decided to make use of the tremendous prestige of the Eighth Congress' decisions in the party and the nation. For this purpose, references are made to certain statements from the documents of the Eighth CCP Congress: For example, statements about the observance of collective leadership, the principle of democratic centralism, the struggle against the cult of personality and others. Nevertheless, nothing is being said about the most important decisions of the Eighth Congress, envisaging the unconditional observance of the principles of Marxism-Leninism (and not the "Thought" of Mao Zedong) and proletarian internationalism and the all-round reinforcement of friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This does not signify that some leaders are simply forgetful, but that the CCP leadership is still adhering to the course of reactionary nationalist Maoism.

Some steps taken by the CCP leadership in recent years to improve party organization, strengthen discipline within the party and restore agencies of control within the party administrative system are not in any sense meant to correct the fundamental errors, omissions and shortcomings committed through the fault of Mao Zedong and his closest associates. These steps were dictated exclusively by the pragmatic interests of the present leaders, who have an interest in strengthening the party as an effective instrument for the accomplishment of the great-power task of the "four modernizations."

The main defect in the activity of the CCP leadership is that all processes, even the presumably positive steps taken in recent years, are based on Maoism, which the party leadership is not renouncing. As long as CCP activity is based on Maoism, we cannot expect any real improvement in intra-party life or the CCP's return to the Marxist-Leninist course of development.

"Changes are taking place in Chinese domestic policy," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress. "Time will reveal their actual significance. It will reveal the degree to which the present Chinese leadership is able to overcome the Maoist heritage."[24]

The Soviet communists and the Soviet people have not lost hope; they believe that the Chinese Communist Party can overcome the oppressive Maoist heritage and resume the undeviating observance of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 25 February 1981.
2. KOMMUNIST, 1981, No 4, p 71.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 4, p 373.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 302.
5. Ibid., Vol 41, pp 184-185.
6. Ibid., Vol 42, p 71.
7. PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.
8. Ibid.
9. Sun Yat-sen, "The Three Popular Principles and the Future of China," in "Selected Works" (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1964, pp 121-133.
10. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., Vol 21, p 401.
11. Ibid., p 404.
12. Ibid., Vol 23, p 140.
13. For more detail, see M. I. Sladkovskiy, "Lenin and China," in the book: "Lenin i problemy sovremennogo Kitaya" [Lenin and the Problems of Present-Day China], Moscow, 1971, pp 6-19.
14. For more detail, see M. S. Kapitsa, "An Important Document from the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1979, No 2.

15. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., Vol 41, p 246.

16. Ibid., Vol 44, p 38.

17. Ibid., Vol 30, p 120.

18. For more detail, see A. M. Grigor'yev, "The Comintern and the Revolutionary Movement in China Under Soviet Slogans (1928-1930)," in the book: "Komintern i Vostok" [The Comintern and the Orient], Moscow, 1969, pp 313-349.

19. O. B. Borisov, "Sovetskiy Soyuz i man'chzhurskaya revolyutsionnaya baza" [The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base], Moscow, 1977, p 208.

20. O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya" [Soviet-Chinese Relations], Moscow, 1977, pp 10-103; M. I. Sladkovskiy, "Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy SSSR s Kitayem. 1917-1974" [The History of Soviet Trade and Economic Relations with China, 1917-1974), Moscow, 1977, pp 190-228.

21. "The Materials of the Eighth CCP Congress," Moscow, 1956, pp 470-471.

22. Ibid., pp 482-483.

23. RENMIN RIBAO, 1, 15, 17 March 1980.

24. PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.

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BEIJING'S ISLAMIC CARD

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 124-127

[Article by M. Ya. Sushanlo, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] China's diplomatic activity in the Arab world indicates that Beijing is trying to use the Islamic states as another instrument of its hegemonistic strategy. Within the next few years, Beijing wants to establish an integral system of political, military, economic and other ties connecting China with the Islamic countries and regional organizations. For this purpose, the Chinese leadership is striving for the more active involvement of the Muslim community in China in this work and is carefully concealing the actual Maoist attitude toward this segment of the population in the past and the present.

Islam entered China as early as the 7th century. It was brought in by Arab and Persian merchants who visited the coastal cities of southern China. The maritime trade routes to the Arab world began in China's southern regions. When the Arabs and Persians arrived in China (the Chinese called them people from the Dashi empire), they founded trade colonies in China's coastal cities, built mosques and settled all personal and religious disputes in accordance with the precepts of Islam. The first Muslim mosque in China (Guangtasi) was built during the T'ang Dynasty (618-907) in Guangzhou, and a second mosque, Fenghuangsi, was later erected in Hangzhou.

Islam also took an overland route to China, through Central Asia and East Turkestan.

A new Islamic wave in northwest China was connected with the aggressive Mongol campaigns in the Arab countries (in Central Asia and Asia Minor). After these had been conquered, the Mongol conquerors organized special Muslim detachments for the subjugation of China (under the Sung Dynasty). These detachments, or armies, called "weijun" ("police troops"), "qin jun" ("guards") and "hueihueijun" ("Muslim army"), helped the Mongols in their campaigns against the southern Sung Dynasty in China.

After the Mongols had conquered Central Asia and Asia Minor, they forced the Muslim population eastward, into Mongolia and China. Local Muslim aristocrats joined the aggressive Mongol army and helped the Mongols carry out their aggressive campaigns. After China had been conquered, troops of Muslims from Central Asia and Asia Minor were stationed throughout the country, with a particularly large number concentrated

in the northwestern regions of the empire. They lived in special settlements and were used to guard large cities and travel routes.

The Mongol khans used Islam to conduct an actively expansionist policy. Kublai Khan, who conquered southern China, asked the Central Asian Muslims for assistance. Much later the first Ch'ing emperors also enlisted the services of the "hueihueijun" during the period of the Chinese conquest in the western regions. It was the Ch'ing Dynasty, however, that systematically provoked religious enmity between the Chinese and Muslims in China. In the 1860's genuine anti-Islamic hysteria flared up when many anti-Ch'ing rebellions were staged by Muslims and when the Dongans and Uighurs overthrew the Manchurian Ch'ing regime in Yunnan Province and in vast territories of the empire's northwest. The persecution of Muslims on the pretext of protecting the Ch'ing Dynasty became a synonym for the protection of the Chinese government in general in some circles.

The Kuomintang militarists and Chinese nationalists of all stripes, including the Maoists, conducted, in general, the same policy toward China's Muslims as the Ch'ing emperors did. The Muslim people of China experienced the same forms and methods of pressure and oppression in the 1920's and 1930's as they had under the Ch'ing Dynasty. The Maoists launched a policy of great-Han chauvinism toward the Muslims in China for the purpose of their assimilation. In the 1960's the PRC mass media began to openly advocate the merger of non-Chinese nationalities, including Muslims, with the Chinese. The following statement was printed in XINJIANG HONGQI magazine: "The Chinese constitute 94 percent of the country's population, and they are more advanced from the standpoint of political, economic and cultural development. For this reason the merger of nationalities must be carried out on the basis of one nationality. In China, the Chinese must make up this backbone."[1] "Whoever objects to this kind of assimilation is objecting to socialism and communism, to historical materialism," the XINJIANG RIBAO newspaper echoed.[2]

In the 1960's the national customs and traditions of non-Han nationalities were stifled on the pretext of struggle against "feudal culture." The policy of the Maoists was essentially a continuation of the ethnic discrimination that was intensively practiced under the Ch'ing Dynasty and the Kuomintang regime. At that time, as we know, hundreds of popular uprisings took place in regions with a non-Chinese population. In the last century more than 400 popular uprisings had taken place just in Xinjiang Province and in the regions densely populated by Dongans. A number of serious popular revolts also took place in Maoist China in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's. When the people of Qinghai Province revolted against the unbearable Maoist regime, hundreds of thousands of Dongans, Salars, Dongxiangs, Tibetans, Kazakhs and others died. The excesses of young Maoist rogues--hongweibings and zaofans--inserted the blackest pages into the history of China's non-Hans. On the orders of Mao himself, rogues from hongweibing and zaofan detachments murdered members of the non-Han intelligentsia and converted Muslim mosques and Buddhist monasteries into barracks for their detachments and barns for livestock. Many mosques and monasteries were burned to the ground or devastated and members of the Muslim clergy were persecuted.

The Maoists desecrated cultural monuments and burned sacred Muslim books and the works of China's Muslim theologians.

Now, however, the Beijing hegemonists have begun to play up to the Arab countries, using the "Islamic card." The Maoists and their followers are loudly advertising Chinese editions of the Koran and other Muslim works both at home and abroad. Permanent exhibits of books by China's Muslim theologians have been set up in the Dongsi mosque in Beijing and the Guangtasi mosque in Guangzhou. The Chinese mass media are advertising the Guangtasi mosque and the Beijing mosque on Niujie Street as ancient Arab monuments in China. The advertising is accompanied by assurances of a solicitous attitude toward these monuments and Muslim holy places in East Asia. Furthermore, the head imam of the Dongsi mosque in Beijing, al-Haji An Shiwei (member of the bureau of the CPPCC All-China Committee and NPC deputy) is the chief promoter among China's faithful Muslims and abroad of the Maoist propaganda that only China shares the hopes of the Muslims and is aiding them in their struggle against the "non-believers," signifying primarily the USSR and the countries of the socialist community.

The traces of hongweibing raids on Muslim mosques and other holy places are hastily being eradicated in China. Mao's successors are loudly calling upon the Muslim faithful to preserve the Islamic cultural heritage. The "gang of four" and Lin Biao have been blamed for all of the excesses committed against Islam. Muslim cuisine is being widely advertised in Beijing, Tianjin, Guangzhou and Xian, and the mosques in these cities have become noticeably more active. Articles about the life and culture of China's Muslims have begun to appear in the Beijing mass media. According to their data, more than 13 million Muslims live in the PRC today (6 million Dongans, 6 million Uighurs, 800,000 Kazakhs, 170,000 Dongxiangs, 100,000 Kirghiz and tens of thousands of Tajiks, Tatars, Uzbeks, Salars and Baoan--that is, dozens of Chinese nationalities which profess or did profess the Islamic religion).

According to reports in the Chinese press, an all-China conference was held in Beijing in spring 1980 for representatives of the Islamic community. The proceedings fit in with Beijing's strategic line regarding the Arab world. A report was presented by al-Haji Burhan, who admitted that there had been outrages upon Muslim holy places and executions of Muslim religious dignitaries in the recent past.

Beijing officials even recalled Mao Zedong's famous remark about the prophet Muhammad: "He conquered the world, holding the Koran in his left hand and a sabre in his right hand." Islam now represents a convenient way of using the instability in the Arab world for a struggle against the prestige of the USSR and the ideas of socialism.

The Beijing leaders are giving extensive patronage and financial support to the Islamic Society, founded in 1953, with its center in Beijing and Burhan as its nominal leader. Many members of the Muslim society in Beijing serve Chinese statesmen as secret advisers. The society plays a perceptible role in the establishment of various contacts with the Islamic world. Ambassadors from the Muslim countries are its frequent guests. At the initiative of the society, agreements were reached with 19 countries just in 1980 on the exchange of "Islamic delegations." It sends delegations to the countries of the Islamic world to establish and strengthen political contacts for the purpose of promoting the "general line" of struggle against the socialist community. The society's contacts with Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are particularly indicative. The Beijing hegemonists support the

most reactionary religious terrorist organizations in the Islamic world, such as the Jamaat-i-Islam (Muslim Brotherhood) and others.

Emissaries from Beijing in the Arab world engage in instigation and slander against the USSR and the countries of the socialist community and in the formation of pro-Beijing subversive extremist groups. The Beijing leadership finances the activities of pro-Chinese Muslim groups in Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, India and other countries.

Beijing is maintaining and strengthening its ties with the governments of such Arab countries as Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Sudan and Somalia and, of course, with Egyptian President Sadat. Beijing's policy in this region coincides completely with the policy of the Western countries, especially the policy of the Washington administration. Beijing's approach to events in the Near and Middle East proves that the Chinese leaders are working hand in glove with the imperialists. They are promoting the common interests of the capitalist countries in this oil-rich region and they regret the disintegration of the U.S. bloc with the former shah's regime, which was performing the function of suppressing the national liberation movement in the Islamic countries.

The Beijing leaders have taken a hypocritical stand on the Iranian revolution. They are trying to push the leadership of this country into an anti-Soviet direction. Playing up to American extremists, Chinese propaganda has alleged that the Soviet Union is to blame for the aggravation of the situation here. In conjunction with the United States, Beijing has made many attempts to blame the Soviet Union for the escalation of tension in the Middle East. Now, when the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY comments on the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq, it never fails to bring up the old thesis about the "hand of Moscow." To avoid weakening its ties with Iran and the Muslim world, Beijing makes curtseys from time to time in Tehran's direction, enlisting the aid of the top-level Muslim clergy in China, especially the leadership of the Islamic Society. At the beginning of 1980 the Chinese press reported festivities honoring Iranian religious figures in mosques in Beijing, Guangzhou, Xian and other Chinese cities.[3]

When he presented the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th party congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev announced: "Islamic slogans are being energetically voiced in some Eastern countries. We communists respect the religious beliefs of people professing Islam and other religions. The main question here concerns the goals being pursued by the forces proclaiming these slogans."[4] It is no secret that the Chinese leaders support primarily the Islamic slogans that fit in with their global strategy of struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and, in general, against the world revolutionary movement.

Beijing's response to the events in Afghanistan is quite indicative. In essence, this is now the site of open military intervention in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Maoists have begun to arm various renegades and leaders of bandit gangs who are employing Islamic slogans in their fight against the Afghan "non-believers." Five anti-Afghan bases have been set up for these gangs on Chinese territory, in Xinjiang, and the Chinese mass media are hostilely slandering the Afghans in unison with imperialist propaganda.

The tone of the anti-Afghan campaign is set by official statements by Maoist leaders. They are not only using their own, made-in-Beijing anti-Soviet theses and subjects, but are also eagerly borrowing delirious ravings about the "Soviet threat," the increasing "aggressiveness of Moscow" and so forth from more reactionary figures in the United States and other imperialist countries. Lebanon's AL-SAFIR newspaper correctly reported on 22 January 1980: "China's open intervention in Afghan affairs is complicating the situation throughout the region and confirming the aggressive nature of the Beijing leadership, which is trying to turn Afghanistan into another Kampuchea.... Beijing has completely allied itself with the United States and is now acting in concert with reactionary and aggressive forces against socialism and democracy."[5] When PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua spoke in Pakistan at the beginning of 1980, he promised the "Afghan liberators" support in their "struggle" against democratic Afghanistan, not only on behalf of official Beijing but also on behalf of the nationalities in the PRC professing Islam.

The undeclared war against the DRA, in which Beijing is playing one of the main roles, is justifiably regarded by progressives as part of China's expansionist policy in Asia. Immediately after the establishment of the DRA, the Beijing leaders began to actively intervene in the internal affairs of this neighboring state. In order to regain the positions they had lost in this part of Asia, they did not balk at cooperating with a protege of American imperialism, the former shah of Iran. For example, during CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng's official visit to Tehran in 1978, when he was premier of the PRC State Council, he proposed to the Iranian shah that they institute joint action to "prevent the consolidation of the new Afghan regime." High-level officials in Beijing and Washington are constantly discussing the coordination of anti-Afghan actions.

On 15 December 1980, Han Nianlong, Chinese deputy minister of foreign affairs, held a press conference in Beijing for foreign journalists. When he was asked whether Beijing was supplying weapons to the bandit gangs being sent into Afghanistan, he answered in the affirmative, cynically stating that the Chinese leadership considered this kind of "assistance" to be its "duty." In this way, Beijing's spokesman officially confirmed that China is involved in subversive activity against the DRA.

Beijing is still relying mainly on Pakistan in this region. It is actively using this country to assist counterrevolutionary forces in Afghanistan and to exert pressure on India. The Pakistani military establishment's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons are also supported by Beijing.

India is justifiably disturbed by the mounting activity of Beijing, Washington and Islamabad in connection with the Afghan events. Furthermore, Beijing is now trying to weaken Indian influence on the subcontinent, in Asia and in the movement for non-alignment by spending huge sums on the maintenance and training of bandit gangs in Tibet, made up of representatives of the non-Han nationalities of southern China, who are ethnically close to some nationalities in India and are conducting provocative operations along the border and within India.

Comrade Rajeshvar Rao, general secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, made an announcement at the 26th CPSU Congress: "Along with the

American rulers, the Chinese leaders are arming the Zia ul-Haq regime to the teeth. They are giving all-round support to rebellious separatist forces in northeast India and are thereby endangering the unity of our country."[6]

Beijing's policy is harmful and dangerous to the Asian countries and the people of the Asian continent, people who represent more than half of the world's population, who have inherited complex economic and social problems and who have a particular need for peaceful cooperation and friendship. This is why the Soviet Union invariably and consistently favors the establishment of lasting peace and security in Asia through the joint efforts of the Asian states. "Our entire peaceful foreign policy, bequeathed to us by the great Lenin, is aimed at delivering mankind from the scourge of war. This is reflected in our actions and in our constructive initiatives," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in a speech on 30 September 1980.[7]

The laboring masses in the Asian countries, including progressive Muslim circles, realized long ago what Beijing actually intends to do in Asia and why it is playing up to Islam. In an interview in Spain's PAIS, Abdul Aziz Sadeq, chairman of the Council of Mullahs of Afghanistan, said: "The Muslims must oppose any and all attempts...by imperialism and Beijing hegemonists to involve them in this new 'cold war' on the pretext of defending Islam."[8]

Reality itself has refuted the Maoist concepts. Maoist foreign policy ideas run counter to the mainstream of contemporary political development in the world. It is no secret that the Maoists have taken the side of the imperialist countries in the struggle between progressive and reactionary forces, and this means that their international strategy is certain to fail, despite all the complexity of the present world situation.

The common people of the world, including Muslims and the Islamic world, need detente, a peaceful atmosphere, mutual understanding and trust, regardless of their country's sociopolitical system. This human ideal was reaffirmed by speakers at the international conference of Muslim clergy held in Tashkent with the keynote "the 15th century of Hegira must become a century of peace and friendship between peoples."

Along with members of other mass movements and public organizations, authorized spokesmen of Muslim circles who attended the World Peace Parliament (Sofia, 1980) were unanimous in their desire to fight against the danger of war and the arms race and for the preservation and reinforcement of detente.

FOOTNOTES

1. XINJIANG HONGQI, 1960, No 3.

2. XINJIANG RIBAO, 21 March 1960.

3. ZHONGGUO, 1980, No 1, p 6.

4. PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.

5. Quoted in: "Pravda ob Afganistane" [The Truth About Afghanistan], Moscow, 1980, p 76.

6. PRAVDA, 26 February 1981.

7. Ibid., 1 October 1980.

8. "Pravda ob Afganistane," p 171.

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SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF PEOPLE'S MONGOLIA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 128-130

[Article by B. Shirendyb, president of the MPR Academy of Sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

THE THEATER AT THE SERVICE OF THE 'FOUR MODERNIZATIONS'

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 131-139

[Article by I. Fessen-Henjes (Berlin)]

[Not translated by JPRS]

NARRATIVE SONGS IN CHINESE LITERATURE (1949-1979)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 140-147

[Article by N. A. Speshnev, candidate of philological sciences (Leningrad)]

[Not translated by JPRS]

'NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY'--INSTRUMENT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY ABROAD

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 148-152

[Article by G. S. Lonshchakov, candidate of historical sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

EXCERPTS FROM CHINESE CLASSICAL PROSE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 153-167

[Prose fragments translated by Academician V. M. Alekseyev, prefaced by M. V. Ban'kovskaya and compiled by B. L. Riftin, doctor of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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BOOK REVIEWS

FUNDAMENTAL STUDY OF SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 168-171

[Review by V. S. Myasnikov, doctor of historical sciences, of the book "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya. 1945-1980" by O. V. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, 3d Edition, supplemented, Moscow, Mysl', 1980, 638 pages]

[Text] Soviet-Chinese relations during the current stage represent a complex group of positions in international affairs, taking in Soviet-Chinese bilateral diplomatic and economic relations, political problems on the regional and global levels and the interaction of the two states in the sphere of global problems. In contrast to the USSR's consistent efforts to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations, the Chinese leaders' policy of creating a broad anti-Soviet front in the international arena is aimed at involving the USSR in political confrontations in all spheres of international life. The Chinese leaders are turning the PRC into imperialism's open accomplice, are trying to injure the world socialist system and the national liberation movement, are opposing international detente and are instigating a worldwide military catastrophe.

A thorough analysis of these phenomena can be found in the third, considerably supplemented edition of "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya" [Soviet-Chinese Relations] by O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov. This work became the most authoratitative study of contemporary Soviet-Chinese relations in world Sinology long ago. By 1973 it had already been translated into German and Czech,[1] and in 1975 it was published in the United States and Great Britain.[2] With a view to the general world public's great interest in the topics discussed in the book, the Progress Publishing House also published a supplemented English translation of the book.[3]

The second edition of the work (published in 1977) covered 7 more years of history than the first Russian edition, published in 1971, and the latest edition covers the period up to August-September 1980. The indisputable success of this book over many years has been due to a number of factors, with the main one being the authors' partymindedness and scholarliness, in the highest Leninist sense of these terms.

The authors undeviatingly comply with the Marxist-Leninist requirement that a concrete historical approach be taken to the analysis of social phenomena and the determination of the alignment of class forces within the country and within the international arena. This methodology excludes the possibility of the subjective

assessment of events, party activities, groups and individuals. The book reflects the indissoluble connection between the theoretical and practical activities of the CPSU and other fraternal parties with regard to the Chinese question and is based on the decisions of our party's congresses and CPSU Central Committee plenums, the decisions of international conferences of communist and workers parties and statements by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and several other CPSU and Soviet State leaders.

The book proves that our party's principled assessments of the Beijing leadership's activity in the last 25 years have been corroborated by the course of history. For example, in the beginning of the 1960's, when Maoism was still camouflaging its activities with ultra-leftist phrases, a CPSU Central Committee Plenum met in February 1964 and, after hearing and discussing M. A. Suslov's report "On the CPSU's Struggle for the Unity of the International Communist Movement," noted that the ultra-leftist ambitions of the Beijing leaders could actually cause them to take a turn to the right, into the imperialist camp. A decree published by the plenum stressed that the Chinese leadership's efforts to deteriorate Soviet-Chinese intergovernmental relations and to break up the international communist movement were diverting "the efforts and attention of communist and workers parties from urgent problems in socialist construction, complicating the struggle against imperialism and injuring the entire anti-imperialist front."[4]

The authors of the work constantly stress the fact that the foreign policy metamorphosis of the Maoist line and the diplomatic balancing act of the Beijing leaders constitute an irresponsible game with the fate of the Chinese people and the entire world population. As L. I. Brezhnev underscored in his speech in Alma-Ata on 29 August 1980, "Beijing is continuing to converge with the most aggressive circles in the United States and other imperialist states and is making a more vigorous effort to push these states into a clash with the Soviet Union, while imperialist circles are striving to involve China more deeply in anti-Soviet actions."[5]

O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov describe how the Soviet Union has consistently and invariably worked toward the normalization of relations with China while waging a principled and irreconcilable struggle against Maoism. When Mao Zedong and his closest associates left the political arena, the PRC had more opportunity to respond to the Soviet Union's friendly overtures. The new Beijing leadership neglected these opportunities, however, and was unable to even implement the principles of peaceful coexistence by the two countries and continued to implement the Maoist strategy in the international arena, taking anti-Soviet action in conjunction with imperialism.

The authors reveal the connection between Beijing's foreign policy and the economic and political situation in China. The constant internal political struggle in the CCP, the assignment of national economic priority to the creation of a military industrial complex with the aid of the developed capitalist states and the maximum cultivation of anti-Sovietism in PRC politics and ideology are all having a negative effect on Soviet-Chinese intergovernmental relations.

The authors cite a great deal of factual information to prove that the principled efforts of the CPSU and Soviet State to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations are in the interest of the people of our countries. This completely refutes the far-fetched conjectures of bourgeois Sinologists who try to blame the present state of Soviet-Chinese relations on the "traditional friction" between the Russian and Chinese people, on intergovernmental problems dating back to the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689 and unsettled interparty and intergovernmental differences.[6] With a few minor changes, this theory has also become the basis of Maoist historical science. The study by O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov refutes these historical falsifications and presents a scientific analysis of many unique documents that are generally not cited in the works of foreign authors.

When the authors discuss the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese people, they demonstrate clearly to the reader that this is not simply a matter of political or scientific rhetoric, but a matter pertaining primarily to the future of the Chinese people. The refusal to resume truly close relations with the USSR and the choice of rapprochement with the leading imperialist powers as an alternative represent an attempt to ignore the nature of the present era as the era of transition from capitalism to socialism, an attempt to solve national problems with the aid of imperialism. It is wrong to ignore history in general and China's recent history in particular. For a long time Sun Yat-sen associated the hope of Chinese reconstruction with the prospect of imperialist assistance, but the imperialists destroyed these illusions. The great historical significance of Sun Yat-sen's activity consists in the fact that he viewed liberated Soviet Russia as a truly sincere friend, capable of helping China give up its dependence on imperialism and take the road of national and social rebirth.[7] The Beijing leaders' present course, aimed at alliance with imperialism, "certainly will not return China to the healthy path of development. The imperialists will not be socialism's friends," as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev remarked in his speech at the 26th CPSU Congress.[8]

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States on the basis of cooperation in the international arena for anti-Soviet purposes, the signing of a friendship treaty with Japan, the conclusion of economic agreements with the main capitalist states and the judicial authorization of foreign capital to function within the PRC have all strengthened the ties attaching the Beijing leaders to the imperialist camp.

Imperialism's motive for rapprochement with the PRC, however, is far from unselfish. "The willingness of the United States, Japan and several NATO countries to establish broader military and political contacts with China," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in his report at the 26th CPSU Congress, "conceals the simple intention to use China's hatred for the Soviet Union and the socialist community in their own imperialist interest."[9] The great-Han chauvinism, hegemonism and rabid anti-Sovietism that have become the distinctive features of PRC foreign policy have impressed imperialism, which particularly appreciates Beijing's concrete antisocialist actions in the international arena. The armed aggression launched on 17 February 1979 against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the announced cancellation on 3 April 1979 of the Soviet-Chinese treaty on friendship, alliance and mutual assistance of 14 February 1950 and the intervention in the affairs of sovereign Afghanistan in conjunction with imperialism--this series of steps testifies to the growth of pro-imperialist tendencies in the present Beijing leadership's foreign policy line.

At the same time, Beijing's actions convinced the world public that the Chinese leaders are striving to use imperialism as an ally in their struggle against the socialist world, disrupt the current global balance of power and push the world into a war for the sake of their own hegemonistic goals. The main obstacle encountered by Beijing has always been the policy of international detente, the policy of peace conducted by the USSR.

As for Beijing's allegations that the treaty with the USSR is "outdated," the authors of the work correctly write: "In fact, however, it is not that the treaty is outdated, but that Chinese policy has degenerated. The Beijing leaders have moved from friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, to which eternal loyalty was pledged by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders, and from expressions of gratitude to the Soviet people, the CPSU and the Soviet State for the tremendous help they gave China during all stages of the Chinese revolution, to a position of anti-Sovietism, great-power hegemonism and expansionism and to alliance with imperialism and anticommunism" (p 607).

The counteraction of the policy of detente in every way possible has always been an element of Maoist diplomatic strategy. This was corroborated by the Soviet-Chinese talks in Moscow at the end of 1979 on the normalization of relations. The Chinese side came to these talks after rejecting numerous Soviet initiatives aimed at the normalization of relations and set forth in 1969, 1970, 1973 and 1978. The authors conclusively prove (pp 608-612) that the Chinese side consented to the talks for the purpose of domestic and foreign policy maneuvers, intending to intensify hostility toward the USSR, and not to regulate relations between the two countries. When L. I. Brezhnev appeared on Hungarian television on 1 July 1979, he stressed: "The renunciation of the treaty and the expressed wish to improve relations do not go together somehow.

"Nonetheless, we are prepared to take a serious and positive approach to the organization of Soviet-Chinese talks. We have issued several proposals to the Chinese side regarding the normalization of our relations and the direction of these relations into friendly channels. We are still willing, but certainly not if it harms the interests of third countries. In other words, if the Chinese side displays genuine good will, we will not hold up the matter."[10]

The Soviet side proposed that the talks focus on the discussion of a draft declaration to regulate the principles of interrelations between the USSR and PRC on the basis of peaceful coexistence, including equality, mutual respect, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-intervention in one another's internal affairs and non-aggression. The Soviet Union also proposed that both sides agree not to make any claims whatsoever to special rights or hegemony in world affairs. The Soviet proposals are completely in line with the principles of the United Nations and present-day international law. They do not contain any preliminary conditions or demands, they are not directed against third states, and their complete implementation should help to safeguard peace and international security in Asia and the rest of the world.

Even during the stage of preparations for the talks, however, the Chinese side was already asserting that "the talks could drag on for a long time without any progress";[11] the intensification of anti-Soviet propaganda in China continued.

During the first round of the talks on the normalization of intergovernmental relations (from 23 September to 10 December 1979), the two sides agreed in principle on the organization of the second round of talks in Beijing at a time to be determined through diplomatic channels. In spite of this, however, the Chinese side began to avoid continuing the talks. The authors of the monograph note that Chinese diplomacy quite often ignores its obligations, which "does not serve the interests of the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations and will not benefit China" (p 612).

The work by O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov is multileveled, but the main, focal topic is the struggle for China's socialist future and the resolution of the many, extremely complex problems facing the Chinese people on the basis of scientific socialism. The known changes that have taken place in PRC domestic politics have not affected its foreign policy as yet. "It is still aimed at the aggravation of international affairs and fits in with imperialist policy," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in the accountability report to the 26th CPSU Congress.[12] Furthermore, in their continuation of Mao Zedong's anti-Soviet policy line, the present Chinese leaders are trying to link it with programs for the military, economic and social development of China, assigning priority to the development of contacts with the capitalist system. The Chinese leaders have displayed a total lack of interest in normalizing relations between the two countries. "Common sense suggests," Deng Xiaoping frankly said when he was interviewed by CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR editor Foell, "that if China is brave enough to oppose the Soviet Union even when it is so poor and has such outdated weapons, why should we strive for a reconciliation with the Soviet Union after we become a rich country."[13]

When the Chinese leaders make Soviet-Chinese relations something like a commodity for barter with the imperialist countries, they must realize that the obstacles they set up to inhibit the normalization of PRC-USSR relations will have to be removed by the Chinese side. China's relations with the socialist world will not always depend on those who gamble on a partnership with imperialism. The danger of this policy was quite precisely defined in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 23 June 1980 "On the International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy." "The rapprochement of aggressive Western circles, especially in the United States, with the Chinese leadership is taking place on an anti-Soviet basis that can endanger the cause of peace," this decree states. "Imperialism's partnership with Beijing hegemonism is a new and dangerous phenomenon in world politics, dangerous for all mankind, including the American and Chinese people."[14]

Developments have taken such a turn that PRC foreign policy today has essentially become a synonym for the policy of anti-Sovietism in its extreme forms. However, when we trace the history of Soviet-Chinese relations over the last 35 years, as it is reconstructed in the work being reviewed, we must agree with the authors' main conclusion: "Friendship and cooperation between the USSR and China are in the fundamental interest of the people of both countries, as well as the interests of peace, democracy and socialism throughout the world. During all stages of China's contemporary history, the help and support of the Soviet Union invariably played an important role in the Chinese working public's national liberation and revolutionary struggle.... The deterioration of China's relationship with the Soviet Union has had an extremely negative effect on the political climate in the country, has diminished revolutionary enthusiasm, has promoted the growth of national tendencies and has given internal reactionary forces an opportunity to conspire with imperialism: (p 631).

The 26th CPSU Congress defines specific ways of relaxing international tension and propose a group of specific measures to all interested states--measures which will help to create a healthier atmosphere in the most explosive regions. The Soviet Union expressed its willingness to engage in dialogue with each individual country and proposed, in the interests of stronger world peace, the negotiation and institution of measures to increase thrust in the Far East. Proceeding from the deep conviction that the genuine interests of the Chinese people would be served by a policy of peace and normal relations with other people, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in the accountability report to the 26th CPSU Congress that "the Soviet Union has not sought and is not seeking confrontation with the People's Republic of China. We are adhering to the policy line defined by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and we would like to build relations with the PRC on a friendly basis. Our proposals aimed at the normalization of relations with China are still in force, just as our feelings of respect and friendship for the Chinese people have not changed."[15]

The present impasse in Soviet-Chinese relations is not in any sense the fault of the USSR. The consistent and principled abandonment of the Maoist heritage in the sphere of Sino-Soviet relations is one of the most urgent tasks facing the Chinese people. The accomplishment of this task is indivisible from fundamental changes in domestic policy and ideology and from the positive role that China, as a truly great country, could play in the international arena.

FOOTNOTES

1. O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Sowjetisch Chinesische Bezeihungen 1945-1970," Berlin, 1973; O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Sovietsko-cinske vztahy 1945-1970," Bratislava, 1973.

2. O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Soviet-Chinese Relations 1945-1970," Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1975; idem, London, Indiana University Press, 1975.

3. O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1973," Moscow, PROGRESS, 1975.

4. PRAVDA, 3 April 1964.

5. Ibid., 30 August 1980.

6. This is the "confrontation structure" described, for example, by prominent Japanese Sinologist Nakajima Mineo. See: Nakajima Mineo, "The Sino-Soviet Confrontation in Historical Perspective"; Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Krie (editors), "The Origins of the Cold War in Asia," University of Tokyo Press, 1977, pp 203-204.

7. S. L. Tikhvinskiy, "Istoriya Kitaya i sovremennost'" [Chinese History and the Present Day], Moscow, 1976, pp 207-238.

8. PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 2 June 1979.

11. Ibid., 27 September 1979.

12. Ibid., 24 February 1981.

13. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 3 December 1980.

14. KOMMUNIST, 1980, No 10, p 9.

15. PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.

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STUDY OF DIPLOMATIC STRATEGEMS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 172-176

[Review by Professor M. S. Kapitsa of book "Imperiya Tsin i Russkoye gosudarstvo v XVII veke" [The Ch'ing Empire and the Russian State in the 17th Century] by V. S. Myasnikov, Moscow, 1980, 312 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

OBJECTIVE TESTIMONY OF A JAPANESE HISTORIAN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 176-177

[Review by K. Ye. Cherevko, candidate of philological sciences, of book "Nichiro kan-keishi, 1697-1875" by Shigetada Manabe, Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1978, 350 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

BOOK ON CHINESE STYLISTICS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 177-179

[Review by M. V. Sofronov, doctor of philological sciences, of book "Stilistika sovremennogo kitayskogo yazyka" [The Stylistics of the Modern Chinese Language] by V. I. Gorelov, Moscow, Prosveshcheniye, 1979, 192 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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AMERICAN-CHINESE CONFLICTS IN THE FAR EAST

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 180-182

[Review by Ye. P. Bazhanov, candidate of historical sciences, of book "Tayvan' i Yuzhnaya Koreya v kitaysko-amerikanskikh otnosheniyakh, 1969-1979" [Taiwan and South Korea in Chinese-American Relations, 1969-1979] by D. T. Kapustin, Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 197 pages]

[Text] The U.S.-PRC rapprochement is built on an increasingly overt anti-Soviet basis that is hostile to the cause of peace. It is one of the most urgent duties of Soviet historians to determine the causes and essence of imperialism's partnership with Beijing hegemonism, which is endangering all mankind.

This will be a complex task, requiring the thorough analysis of various "points of contact" and "parallel interests" of Beijing and Washington and the disclosure of the conflicts and differences that are impeding joint American-Chinese maneuvers in world politics or could impede them in the future.

The Far East is one of the regions of traditional conflicts of U.S. and Chinese interests. Both powers, motivated by expansionist aggressive aims, are striving to gain a dominant posiition in the Far East and are consequently rivals in this region.

Hoping to safeguard its presence in this part of the world, the United States of America is trying to maintain and modernize its diversified system of military treaties, established in the first postwar years and still directed against forces for socialism, democracy and national liberation in Asia. From the very beginning, a key role in American imperialism's military strategy in the Far East was assigned to the two reactionary regimes artificially created and nurtured by Washington in Taiwan and South Korea. In particular, Taipei and Seoul were the main instruments of the U.S. policy of Chinese "containment" for two decades.

It is understandable that Beijing's rapprochement with Washington raised questions about the future of Taiwan and South Korea. On the one hand, the White House, guided by global interests, displayed its willingness to muffle the anti-Chinese aspects of its policy in the Far East but, on the other, the Americans do not want to give up their military-policy bridgeheads in the region.

At this time, Beijing also attaches primary significance to the development and reinforcement of its partnership with the United States and is displaying a certain

degree of flexibility in regard to the preservation of American military and political influence in the Far East. This does not mean, however, that American-Chinese disagreements over Taiwan and South Korea have been completely forgotten. They have simply been pushed into the background.

The question of whether they will flare up again, and if so, then how, under what circumstances and with what consequences for the entire complex of Beijing-Washington interrelations, is a matter of serious concern.

There are a number of Soviet scholarly works dealing with this subject matter, but the book being reviewed contains the first systematized, detailed analysis of the evolution of the role played by Taiwan and South Korea in PRC and U.S. policy in the 1970's. This work by D. T. Kapustin, which deals with an urgent, politically pressing problem, is thoroughly documented and expresses profoundly logical views, and there is no doubt that it will be of great interest to all readers concerned about international affairs in the Far East.

D. T. Kapustin begins his work with a study of the process by which the United States worked out its "new approach" to China in 1969-1971. Washington, the author states, decided it would be best to reduce its "participation in the containment of China" in order to gain advantages for the United States from the growing rift between the PRC and the socialist countries.

The policy of rapprochement with Beijing did not mean that the United States would pay less attention to other areas of foreign policy activity in the Far East. In particular, within the framework of the "Nixon Doctrine," the United States continued its efforts to build up the military potential of Washington's Far East allies, the PRC's neighbors--Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. As the author correctly points out, however, the desire for rapprochement with China naturally gave rise to serious difficulties in U.S. relations with partners in the Far East and naturally led to more pronounced centrifugal tendencies within the camp of America's allies in Asia (p 30).

Even Washington's first "minor" steps in Beijing's direction in 1969 and 1970 (for example, the cancellation of some restrictions on travel by American citizens in China, trade with the PRC, etc.) were viewed by the Kuomintang as "U.S. degradation" and a "bad U.S. move." South Korea had an equally negative reaction to U.S. behavior toward Beijing. Seoul was particularly disturbed by the news of Washington's plans to withdraw some of its troops from South Korea.

The implementation of the "Nixon Doctrine" had an extremely noticeable effect on the policy line of the United States' "minor" Far East partners. On the one hand, they became more active in the reinforcement of "regional collective security" and the creation of a military alliance "by Asians for Asians" in the Far East and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, South Korea and Taiwan had to reassess their foreign policy lines with a view to the changing situation. For example, there were signs of flexibility in Seoul's foreign policy, the author notes, in 1969-1970: the renunciation of claims to represent the "entire Korean population," the authorization of the issuance of entry visas to representatives of socialist countries attending international forums in South Korea, etc.). "The signs of change also affected the attitude of South Korean ruling circles in regard to the question of national unification" (p 57).

The book contains a profound and detailed description of the position taken by the United States in regard to Taiwan during Nixon's talks with the Beijing leaders in 1972 and its effect on the policy of Taipei and South Korea.

Even before the American President went to Beijing, the PRC's rights in the United Nations were restored and Chiang Kai-shek's representative was driven out of this international organization. Kapustin stresses that this was the first serious defeat suffered by the Taiwan regime in its entire history. As the results of the American-Chinese talks of 1972 indicated, however, the United States then intended to maintain contact with the Chiang Kai-shek regime and continue to use Taiwan for its own political purposes. Representatives of the Nixon Administration assured the Taipei leaders that Washington would adhere loyally to the American-Taiwanese "mutual defense" treaty and that the U.S. Government would continue to encourage American businessmen to invest capital in the "model Taiwanese economy" (p 76). Taiwan also retained influential supporters and friends among U.S. congressmen, top-level military personnel and businessmen. In this connection, although Taipei condemned the American President's behavior, it decided to continue the modification of its foreign and domestic policy in order to preserve the regime and its main pillar of support--the American-Taiwanese military alliance.

The author correctly notes that the South Korean rulers' decision to consent to talks with the DPRK was one of the consequences of the summit-level contacts between Washington and Beijing. "South Korea's willingness to engage in talks with the DPRK signified a radical shift in the position of the Seoul regime, which had previously rejected this idea outright and had even persecuted its supporters" (p 85). In his analysis of Seoul's approach to these talks, however, the author concludes that Pak Chong-hui and his group were not striving in the least for the actual unification of the motherland, but were only trying to "reduce the pressure exerted by the United States and (indirectly) by China on the South Korean regime and avert the dissatisfaction of the South Korean masses with the division of the country" (p 90).

The next section of the book tells of the further adaptation of Taipei and Seoul to the political changes in the Far East in 1972-1975. The author tells how Taipei was motivated to conduct an increasingly pragmatic line in international relations by the growing political isolation of the regime in the world arena.

The author conclusively proves that Washington not only maintained diplomatic and military contacts with Taipei during these years, but also made a considerable effort to strengthen the island's economic potential and its commercial ties with American business and the business communities in Japan and other capitalist countries. Private foreign capital investments in Taiwan grew considerably in 1972-1975 and Taipei's volume of trade with the United States, Japan and the Western European states also grew.

The cornerstone of Seoul's policy in 1972-1975 also consisted of the reinforcement of military, political and economic relations with the United States, which were necessary for the survival of the Pak Chong-hui regime. Washington, the author notes, agreed with this policy and made every effort, including diplomatic efforts (in the United Nations and on the multilateral basis) to strengthen South Korea as an independent state and a bridgehead for American imperialism in Asia. At the

same time, Seoul and Washington tried to use the PRC's hypocritical stand on the Korean problem in their own interests.

Seoul stubbornly put forth various initiatives, with U.S. encouragement, aimed at the development of contacts with China and, although Beijing rejected these initiatives, the Chinese leadership displayed a favorable attitude toward many aspects of the Pak Chong-hui regime's foreign policy and, in particular, the preservation of the South Korean-U.S. military alliance. Kapustin cites evidence to prove that the White House knew that Beijing supported the U.S. military presence in the southern half of the Korean peninsula and that the PRC's position was reflected in U.S. policy in the Far East (pp 121-122).

The last chapter of the book tells of the place assigned to Taiwan and South Korea in the recent strategy of Washington and Beijing, from the time of the U.S. defeat in Indochina in 1975 to the middle of 1980. The author stresses that Washington discarded the agreement of 1954 and all previous guarantees to the Taiwan regime in order to establish an anti-Soviet alliance in the Far East with Beijing as one of its members. At the same time, the United States has stubbornly held on to South Korea, regarding it as a strategic outpost and proceeding from the belief that American military presence on the Korean peninsula will not impede U.S. rapprochement with the PRC and, on the contrary, is approved by the Chinese leadership at this time.

As the author correctly points out, however, the struggle between Washington and Beijing is not over. "Beijing," Kapustin writes, "is still trying to postpone the final decision on urgent issues (Korea, the Senkaku Islands and, in part, Taiwan) and maintain the status quo so that China can present its 'bill' later, when, as Beijing hopes, it becomes a strong militaristic power" (p 183).

A precise assessment of the present situation and the prospects for the development of international relations in a region as politically complex as the Far East is an extremely difficult but exceptionally important task. Kapustin's book is one of the works that sheds light on the course of events in this part of the world and on the complex of interrelations between the two powers endangering peace in Asia--the United States and the PRC.

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ALMANACS OF THE PRC--INTERESTING AND NECESSARY PUBLICATIONS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 182-184

[Review by V. A. Vladimirov of books "Kitayskaya Narodnaya Respublika v 1977 godu: politika, ekonomika, ideologiya" [The People's Republic of China in 1977: Politics, Economics, Ideology], Moscow, 1979, 326 pages; "Kitayskaya Narodnaya Republika v 1978 godu: politika, ekonomika, ideologiya," Moscow, 1980, 368 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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CHAUVINISM IN BEIJING'S POLICY ON NATIONALITIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 184-188

[Review by B. K. Otradnov of books "Maoism and the Question of Nationality" (proceedings of an international science symposium held in Ulaanbaatar on 30 May-2 June 1979), Ulaanbaatar, Oriental Studies Institute of the MPR Academy of Sciences, 1980, 388 pages; "Guansi-Chzhuanskiy i Ninsya-Khueyskiy avtonomnyye rayony KNR: Voprosy politiki rayonnoy natsional'noy avtonomii" [The Guangxi-Zhuang and Ningxia-Huei Autonomous Regions of the PRC: Aspects of the Policy of Regional National Autonomy] by A. A. Moskalev (gen ed M. I. Sladkovskiy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, ed-in-chief T. R. Rakhimov), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 152 pages; "Avtonomnyy rayon Vnutrennyaya Mongoliya Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki" [The Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia in the People's Republic of China] (ed by Academician B. Shirendyb and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. I. Sladkovskiy), Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 160 pages]

[Text] One of the most important tasks now facing Orientologists in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is the further study and vigorous exposure of the PRC leadership's chauvinistic policy toward non-Hans and the disclosure of the ruinous effect of this policy in China's national regions.

Orientologists in the socialist countries have already made a significant contribution in this field. Thoroughly researched studies, based on painstaking Marxist-Leninist analysis and reinforced with fundamental factual information, have been published. They include the recently published collection of papers presented at the international science symposium held in May-June 1979 in the capital of the MPR. The collection includes reports and speeches by members of the academic community of the fraternal socialist countries on the question of nationality in China, as well as new monographs which examine the Chinese leadership's policy on nationality in three large autonomous regions in the PRC--Guangxi-Zhuang, Ningxia-Huei and Inner Mongolia.

The collection entitled "Maoism and the Question of Nationality" deals with the most important topics discussed at the symposium. In an introductory speech at this symposium, Academician B. Shirendyb, president of the MPR Academy of Sciences, exposed Maoism's reactionary policy regarding the question of nationality and stressed the importance of analyzing this policy from the Marxist-Leninist standpoint. The reports by Academician S. Bira, vice president of the MPR Academy of

Sciences and director of the Oriental Studies Institute, on "Maoism and the Question of Nationality in China," corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. I. Sladkovskiy, director of the Far East Institute, on "The Great-Han Doctrine of the Unified Chinese Nationality," Doctor M. Matous, deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, on "Great-Han Chauvinism--the Enemy of World Progress," Ngo Than Diunh, Philosophy Department head at the Higher Party School of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee, on "The Expansionist Great-Power, Hegemonistic Nationalism of Beijing Reactionary Circles in Relations with Vietnam," and others are of great interest.

Beijing ruling circles are still conducting a chauvinistic policy of enforced assimilation in relations with the non-Hans in the PRC. Their "rationale" is the "theory" that there is a unified Chinese nationality in China, and the Hans represent its nucleus. By distorting history and extolling the Chinese nationality as something that supposedly unites not only the peoples inhabiting present-day China but also the territory of neighboring countries, Chinese ideologists are fueling war hysteria and great-Han fanaticism. They are deliberately ignoring the sociohistorical conditions of the existence of nationalities and the class stratification of society and are employing ethnogenesis as the main, deciding criterion of nationality. Even here, they are bending the truth by including people of different races in the same ethnic group (pp 38-39).

The non-Hans in the PRC have no right to self-determination. The reports and speeches included in this collection stress that "the ruling clique in China has turned the officially declared system of regional autonomy into a fiction.... The economic policy in China's national regions is perpetuating the economic retardation of these regions and inhibiting their development" (p 4). Recent events testify that, for example, in the sphere of cadre policy, particularly in matters pertaining to the placement of cadres, Beijing is still trying to maximize the role of Hans in national autonomous regions and expects the non-Hans to "welcome the assistance" of Han migrants and help them "settle down in border regions" ("Guansi-Chzhuanskiy i Ninsya-Khueyskiy avtonomnyye rayonny KNR," p 17). Various aspects of the reactionary essence of great-Han chauvinism are discussed in detail in the collection. They are cogently revealed in the reports by M. I. Sladkovskiy on "The Great-Han Doctrine of the Unified Chinese Nationality," L. M. Gudoshnikov on "The Great-Han Chauvinism of the Chinese Leadership in Matters Pertaining to the Construction of National Government and the Policy of National Autonomy," V. I. Potapov on "The Economic Policy of the PRC Leadership in National Regions" (USSR), A. Khalkimarskiy on "Some Problems in the Policy of Assimilation and the Sinization of Ethnic Minorities in China" (Poland), R. V. Neronov on "The Social Class Policy of the Chinese Leadership and Some of Its Peculiarities in the National Regions, 1971-1976" (USSR), C. Dalai and M. Zenee on "The Maoist Policy of the Assimilation of the Native Population of Inner Mongolia," E. Puntsag and M. Hurmethan on "A Study of the Present Status of non-Hans in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region" (MPR) and A. Damdingsuren on "The Ruinous Effects of the 'Cultural Revolution' in Inner Mongolia" (MPR).

In reference to the policy on nationality in China, Academician B. Shirendyb noted that the Beijing leadership's chauvinistic policy is diametrically opposed to Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the question of nationality and its proper implementation in the USSR and the countries of the socialist community ("Maoism and the

Question of Nationality," p 8). After the PRC was established, no nationality in China had the right to establish independent, or even autonomous, republics. During the years of the PRC's existence, the territory of the autonomous regions has been altered several times and has been settled by members of the Han nationality.

Shirendyb describes the characteristic features of the Chinese leadership's chauvinistic policy as the following: In the first place, the concept of the equality of nationalities is being erased from the consciousness of native inhabitants of the PRC's national regions, and the concept of the exceptional nature of the Han nationality is being widely preached. In the second place, ethnic minorities are being Sinized by means of demographic assimilation. In the third place, the slightest signs of unrest among the people of Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and other national regions are mercilessly stifled by force of arms. In the fourth place, border regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia have been turned into military strategic bases against the neighboring countries of the USSR, India and the MPR, and this makes conditions even harder for ethnic minorities. In the fifth place, the Beijing leaders are waging an unbridled slanderous campaign against the USSR and other socialist countries, where Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the question of nationality has been properly implemented for the first time in mankind's history, by camouflaging their chauvinistic policy in the national regions with phrases about the long-ago kinship of Chinese emperors, Mongol khans, Tibetan princes and feudal lords in the national regions. Noting the successes of the Soviet Union's policy on nationality, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, stressed in the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th congress that, "since the first years of Soviet rule, our economic and social policy has been engineered in such a way as to raise the level of development in the previous national districts of Russia to the level of the central zone as quickly as possible. And this objective has been attained successfully."

Methods of resolving the issue of nationality have always aroused the interest of Chinese revolutionaries. As we know, Sun Yat-sen favored the self-determination of the nationalities inhabiting China. Ever since the Chinese Communist Party was founded, communists have taken an interest in the issue of nationality. It is no coincidence that the main objective set at the First CCP Congress in 1921 was the objective of struggle for the social and national liberation of the nationalities inhabiting China, and the decisions of the Second CCP Congress raised the question of the future ethnic structure of the country. It is indicative that one of the points in the program of action of the Sixth CCP Congress (1928) recognized the right to national self-determination. The documents of liberated zones contained statements envisaging a federated structure and the self-determination of nationalities after the triumph of the revolution in China (p 68). Several papers in this collection examine aspects of the enforced Sinization of the material and spiritual culture of ethnic minorities, particularly during mass campaigns (pp 76-77, 191-203, 334-335).

The Marxist-Leninist analysis of the essence of the Chinese ruling clique's chauvinistic policy, set forth in the collected papers, makes this work a valuable source and a point of departure for the further exposure of the Chinese leaders' great-Han chauvinistic policy in the national regions of the PRC and on the international level.

In recent years, Sinologists from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have taken steps to expand the study of the policy on nationality in the PRC, specific aspects of this policy in various national regions and the methods used by the Chinese authorities in dealing with various non-Han nationalities in the PRC.

In connection with this, A. A. Moskalev's monograph "Guansi-Chzhuanskiy i Ninsya-Khueyskiy avtnomnyye rayony KNR" is of considerable interest. The book consists of two sections, each dealing with one of these autonomous regions. The author describes in detail all of the stages these autonomous regions have undergone from the time of their establishment until recently, including national construction during the first years after the founding of the PRC, the period of increased chauvinistic tendencies in Maoist policy, the "Great Leap Forward," the "Regulation" and the "Cultural Revolution," with all of the ensuing consequences.

From the information presented in this monograph about these two specific regions, the reader gains an understanding of the peculiarities of the Chinese leadership's political practices in national regions, can judge the present status of these regions and, finally, can trace the progressive deformation of the Chinese policy of regional autonomy. The author stresses that he also had another reason for choosing these autonomous regions as the subject of his study. The two regions were both founded in 1958 and were affected by the so-called Inner Mongolian experiment in the application of the policy of regional autonomy. We know that in the mid-1950's the terrritory of the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia (ARIM) was considerably enlarged, allegedly to "help" the Mongols and "strengthen the solidarity" of nationalities, by means of the incorporation of neighboring areas densely populated by Hans, and that the percentage accounted for by Mongolians in the autonomous region declined sharply. During the "Cultural Revolution" the ratio of Mongolians to Chinese in the ARIM was 1:38, which was much lower than in any other autonomous region of the PRC. The Guangxi-Zhuang and Ningxia-Huei autonomous regions (GZAR and NHAR) also acquired a certain degree of homogeneity--Hans make up the majority of their population.

The author has undertaken the massive task of gathering and analyzing available factual material, taken almost exclusively from Chinese monographs and journalistic articles, as well as reports in the local and central Chinese press. In particular, he used materials published in the 1950's and 1960's in the Zhuang language in the GZAR--for example, the PAU SAISHUEN newspaper and others.

Socioeconomic and political reforms in the GZAR and NHAR in the first years after the establishment of the PRC helped in the gradual eradication of the negative heritage of ethnic oppression, discrimination, hatred and alienation, which were particularly characteristic of the relations between Hans and non-Hans.

These positive processes and the establishment of regional autonomy were accompanied from the very beginning by a fierce struggle between proletarian-international and petty bourgeois-nationalist forces in the PRC. Prior to the Eighth CCP Congress (1956) positive features prevailed in national construction, and this was directly due to the efforts of Chinese internationalist communists who espoused scientific socialism (p 132).

The political line imposed on China by Mao Zedong and his followers, however, disrupted the positive development of the system of regional autonomy. Despite

the fact that these two autonomous regions were established in 1958, at the height of the "Great Leap Forward" in the PRC, it was precisely at that time that national construction began its obvious process of regression and regional autonomy acquired an increasingly nominal character. The facts testify that the institution of regional autonomy in the PRC did not improve after the "Great Leap Forward" began, but, on the contrary, deteriorated with each year.

The results of the more than 20-year existence of the GZAR and NHAR confirm the fact that national construction in the PRC was developed successfully only in those years when China joined the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community on the road of socialist construction and made use of their rich experience. Obviously, the positive development of national construction in the PRC is possible only if the Marxist-Leninist principles of interethnic relations are implemented, and this naturally depends on the general policy line of the Chinese leadership (p 135).

In the monograph entitled "Avtonomnyy rayon Vnutrennyaya Mongoliya," compiled by a group of academics from the Oriental Studies Institute of the MPR Academy of Sciences with the aid of researchers from the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Mongolian authors approach the issue of nationality from a precise Marxist-Leninist standpoint.

This autonomous region, which was created as a result of the Mongolian people's national liberation struggle in 1947, even before the triumph of the people's revolution in China and the establishment of the PRC, has certain distinctive features.

The authors of this book have devoted many pages to the history of the national liberation movement of Inner Mongolia's people and social reforms in the autonomous region. They reveal the ruinous influence of the Chinese leadership's great-power policy on the non-Han nationalities of the PRC.

The system of regional autonomy, envisaged in PRC legislative acts, considerably reduced the territory inhabited by the native Mongolian population. The CCP leadership took every opportunity to restrict the rights of the Mongolian population's institutions of self-government and to lower the status of the Mongolians to the provincial level (p 3).

The Mongolian people fought a long battle for their independence.

The 1911 revolution in China promoted a powerful upsurge in the national liberation struggle of the Mongolian people. Under the guidance of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and with the support of Soviet Russia, the people of Outer Mongolia were able to carry out a people's revolution and establish the MPR. For several reasons, the masses in Inner Mongolia lost the fight for freedom. Inner Mongolia became a target of the great-Han policy of the Yuan Shikai government, the Chinese militarists and reactionary Kuomintang forces, and in the beginning of the 1930's it became the victim of Japanese aggression (p 140).

Even under these difficult conditions, however, the Mongolian people, with weapons in hand, did not cease their selfless struggle for freedom.

The book vividly demonstrates the significance of the defeat of the Japanese invaders and the liberation of Inner Mongolia by Soviet and Mongolian troops (1945) in the establishment of favorable conditions for the successful conclusion of the Inner Mongolians' national liberation struggle, for social progress and the construction of a new life (p 39).

The results of the national liberation struggle were reflected in the decisions of several Inner Mongolian people's congresses in 1945 and 1946, in the creation of autonomous Inner Mongolia in May 1947 and in the democratic reforms of the late 1940's (p 141).

Great-power tendencies in the policy of the CCP leadership had a negative effect on the course of political, social, economic and cultural reforms in the region. After the victory of the people's revolution in China and the establishment of the PRC, Mao Zedong deprived the non-Hans, including the people of Inner Mongolia, of the right to self-determination, offering them only regional autonomy. Nevertheless, radical reforms were carried out in the political, social and cultural spheres during the first years of the PRC's existence. Inner Mongolia, just as other regions of the PRC, took the route of socialist construction (p 141).

At the end of the 1950's, however, Mao Zedong was able to impose his own "special" line on the CCP and the people of the PRC: The CCP leadership's policy on nationality acquired an openly chauvinistic character. This was particularly apparent during the "Cultural Revolution," when constitutional organs of self-government were abolished and Han-headed "revolutionary committees" were established. The national culture, customs and traditions of the native population were banned. Militarization became much more pronounced.

In recent years the Chinese leadership has resorted to various tactical ruses to conceal the great-Han essence of its policy on nationality and correct the more odious and discredited aspects of the Maoist policy line.

In summer 1979 the CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council decided to restore the previous administrative boundaries, which existed until June 1969, of the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia. In accordance with this decision, the ARIM regained some of the towns and villages that had been taken away from it during the Cultural Revolution and turned over to neighboring provinces which were inhabited primarily by Hans (p 142).

The alteration of the map of the ARIM was not dictated by any kind of concern about the circumstances of the Mongolian ethnic minority in China. By returning these fragmented sections, which have been ground in the great-Han mill, to Inner Mongolia, the Chinese leaders are actually trying to turn this national region into one of the Chinese provinces. It was no coincidence that speakers at the first extended meeting of the PRC State Council, held in Tianjin in May-June 1979, stressed the need to "combine the large Han population and its technical superiority with the vast territories of the ethnic minorities and their natural resources" (p 142).

The facts testify that the actual state of affairs in the PRC's autonomous regions and the nature of Beijing's present policy in these regions are, in

essence, unchanged and represent a continuation of the notorious "nationality policy of Mao Zedong," signifying that non-Han nationalities are subjected to discrimination of various types.

The books discussed in this review confirm the fact that this policy dooms the non-Han nationalities to an underprivileged status and a low standard of living.

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STRATEGY OF VICTORY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 188-190

[Review by Yu. M. Ryakin of book "The Great Victory of Spring 1975. Memoirs" by Van Tien Dung, translated from the Vietnamese, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1980, 247 pages, illustrations and diagrams]

[Not translated by JPRS]

USEFUL COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 190-192

[Review by P. I. Ol'gin of book "Otnosheniya Sovetskogo Soyuza s narodnoy Koreyey. 1945-1980. Dokumenty i materialy" [The Soviet Union's Relations with People's Korea, 1945-1980. Documents and Papers], Moscow, Nauka, 1981, 424 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

AT THE 27TH EUROPEAN SINOLOGISTS CONFERENCE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 193-195

[Report by V. F. Sorokin, doctor of philological sciences, on 27th European Sinologists' Conference, held in Zurich from 31 August through 5 September 1980]

[Not translated by JPRS]

COMMEMORATING V. A. KRIVTSOV'S 60TH BIRTHDAY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 pp 196-197

[Not translated by JPRS]

COMMEMORATING A. M. DUBINSKIY'S 75TH BIRTHDAY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 81 p 198

[Not translated by JPRS]

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